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Our mandate was to consider the economic feasibility and possible impact of a free
trade agreement between the European Union and Armenia. The study has been
conducted by a group of researchers from Poland, Ukraine, UK, US and Armenia. All
have worked on this project in an independent capacity. The European Commission
has also commissioned a similar study for Georgia. Even though the methodology of
the two reports is the same, the two studies are independent and the economic
feasibility and impact of a free trade agreement with each country is assessed on its
own merits.
Defining the FTA scenarios
Throughout the report we look at different degrees of integration between Armenia
and the EU. We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement (FTA)
assuming the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the bilateral trade
between Armenia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes full liberalization
of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and elimination of all quantitative
restrictions on agricultural and food products on Armenian exports to the EU and vice
versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario assumes full elimination of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on all products in the bilateral trade between Armenia and the
EU. Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a significant
elimination of barriers to trade and investment throughout various sectors of the
economy. This would also result in a more extensive commitment to the reform of
domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in Armenia. Finally, the
comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with more wide-
ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead to a re-
branding of Armenia as a favourable investment location. This is our scenario Deep
FTA+ where we assume that Armenia would achieve a notable reduction in the
perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Armenia
as a favorable and safe place to invest. 
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Executive Summary
Economic context
Armenia is a small, land-locked country with a level of GDP per head comparable
to that of Bulgaria. It is currently enjoying very rapid GDP growth and this rapid
growth is expected to continue with only a slight deceleration over the next two-three
years. One of the dominant features of the Armenian economy is the deficit on balance
of trade, equivalent to 18.6% of GDP in 2006. In the past the trade deficit (and the
services deficit) has been largely covered by remittances from Armenians working
abroad and diaspora Armenians. However there appears now to be a change of pattern,
with the current account deficit widening and foreign direct investment coming in as
an increasingly important factor of balance in the overall balance of payments. This is
an import-oriented country. The treatment of foreign investors in selected sectors and
general business environment raises serious doubts about the potential benefits of a
Simple FTA. 
Regional FTAs
Armenia has free trade agreements with the CIS countries and is currently
negotiating an FTA with Iran and Lebanon. Armenia’s FTAs with Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seem to be functioning normally. The frontier with
Azerbaijan is closed. Azerbaijan refuses goods of Armenian origin, but Armenia is open
to Azeri goods at MFN rates of tariff, which may be imported via Georgia. The land
frontier is closed on the Turkish side since 1993. However goods can pass between the
two countries either by air, or by road transiting through either Georgia or Iran. 
Impact of the EU-Armenia FTA – Sussex Framework
Since the overall level of pre-FTA tariff protection in Armenia is low, the future
reduction of tariff barriers under the EU-Armenia FTA is expected to have a limited
scope for either trade creation or trade diversion in the Armenian economy. Physical,
regulatory and political (first of all, the closure of borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey)
barriers to trade considerably increase the costs of trade in Armenia and have a huge
detrimental impact on the overall volumes of trade (both exports and imports), as well
as impose trade distortions on the Armenia’s trade structure. Any significant welfare
gains therefore could come from political and economic stability of the region and from
deeper integration with the EU. 
Survey of non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
The majority of Armenian firms consider the burden of EU technical regulations
and product standards as not important, with the exception of testing and certification.
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This fact is underpinned with the structure of Armenian exports dominated by
minerals, precious stones, and raw materials which meet the product standards and
safety requirements almost by default. Moreover, many export products are
manufactured under some sort of the outward processing scheme, when Armenian
firms provide their production services and all the matters of logistics and marketing
are carried out by their European partner. Therefore the Armenian counterparts are
not even familiar with full costs involved in exporting to the EU. The companies that
fall short of satisfying European market requirement and are unable to change their
technology accordingly are excluded from the list of exporters – and this is the absolute
majority of Armenian companies.
Institutional and regulatory harmonization
Armenia has achieved a certain degree of regulatory harmonization with the EU in
many trade-related areas, in particular as regards approximation of the legislation.
Nevertheless, incongruities still remain high, especially in the areas of IPR, SPS and
state procurement. The most striking differences with EU regulations in all spheres
then lie in enforcement and practices. Armenian regulatory system is, one hand, rather
bureaucratic and, on the other hand, ineffectual. Shady and corrupt practices further
undermine the system of enforcement. In the areas of standards and SPS, the impulse
towards harmonization depends not only on the Government efforts but on the private
sector as well. A Deep FTA should certainly go beyond eliminating the vestiges of legal
differences targeting enforcement and practices.
Implications of an FTA for FDI flows
FDI inflows into Armenia averaged around USD200 million annually in recent
years. The role of foreign capital has gradually decreased along with the development
of the economy, although still remained substantial. In 2005, FDI accounted for 16%
of Armenian investment. At the moment, foreign direct investors into Armenia seem to
be primarily market-driven and go to highly protected service and food-producing
sectors. Mineral resources (precious stones, metal ores) also attract smaller part of the
FDI. Investors are not yet willing to use the relatively cheap Armenian labour and
outsource part of production there. This, however, might be changed by implementing
a Deep FTA+. A further precondition for this would be to lower the costs of trading
across borders, in particular by achieving an opening of border crossing points with
Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
The estimates of potential foreign investment suggest that if economic, institutional
and political reforms are entrenched and enhanced, the country could enjoy a sizeable
increase in FDI inflows. For example, if Armenia is to achieve the current level of
18
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
transition of Bulgaria, its annual FDI inflows increase from USD 220 million (in 2005)
to USD 319 million. A Deep FTA+ with the EU could become one of the
vehicles/triggers for these reforms; however the country’s own effort in the transition
reforms remains paramount.
Services sectors
Tourism: This is an area of great natural advantage for Armenia. Tourism industry
is likely to attract clients from beyond the Armenian diaspora. Road transport
infrastructure is a bottleneck for Armenian tourist development. There are no major
programmes of new road building, and it is not clear that modernizing the existing
road network would be enough to accommodate the country’s tourist potential. It
would not be easy or even appropriate, even within the framework of a Deep FTA+, to
seek to impose on Armenia ambitious and expensive programmes to develop the
national and local road network. This is no doubt one of the areas in which the
government would like to develop public/private partnerships. 
Information and Communication Technology
ICT is of particular importance in Armenia, as in other emerging economies,
because it provides the technological basis for the economy-wide increases in
organizational efficiency which lay the foundation for the catch-up process. It is a
crucial input for every sector of the economy. ArmenTel’s fixed telephony state
monopoly is scheduled to be abolished by the end of 2008. In the case of the countries
of South-Eastern Europe, the European Commission has facilitated regulatory
convergence in the telecoms area through a combination of regular reports and
working group meetings. The same approach could be used in the Armenian case, and
full convergence could, in principle, be achieved soon after the signing of a Deep FTA.  
Construction and Engineering services
This relates primarily to the import of construction services, where cross-border
supply is generally unbound under the Armenian WTO agreement, with regard to both
market access and national treatment. Armenia also exports some construction
services. Given the scale of building activity in Armenia right now, free market access
for foreign construction project management organizations is clearly crucially
important. It would probably need a full-scale Deep FTA+ to ensure this. But there is
only one major importer of building materials in Armenia. There must be some
suspicion that there is in this sector a de facto monopoly situation. Trade in
construction and engineering services in Armenia is substantially liberalised in formal
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terms, and conclusion of a Simple FTA would have a degree of impact here only in
completing the process of formal liberalisation. It would take a Deep FTA+, flanked by
far-reaching measures to strengthen the implementation of competition law, to have a
significant impact. 
Financial Services and Banking
The Armenian financial sector is among the smallest relative to GDP in the World
Bank’s Europe and Central Asia region. Under the WTO accession agreements, the
banking sector is largely liberalized in Armenia. But the sector remains 50%
domestically-owned and predominantly Armenian-owned (when account is taken of
banks owned by Diaspora Armenians). Comparison with the experience of other
transition countries, where banking liberalization has generally been followed by
substantial foreign penetration, suggests that key flanking measures are not in place
here. Detailed analysis confirms that indeed measures to strengthen corporate
governance, strengthen the supervisory role of the Central Bank of Armenia and
strengthen accountancy and audit practice would be crucial in further development of
financial services and banking. Thus a Deep FTA+ could greatly benefit banking and
financial services sectors with comprehensive flanking measures as essential
conditions for the increased foreign involvement and development of the sectors.
Energy-related services
The Armenian government has a vision of Armenia as an exporter of energy and
energy services in the form of transmission, including possibly transit transmission. In
relation to the procurement of energy, transition from a single buyer system to a
competitive energy market was scheduled to take place in 2006-7. No precise
information on the progress of this transition has come to hand, but the Armenian
energy market does seem to be fairly highly liberalized at the present time and we can
conclude that the regulatory foundation for Armenia’s energy vision has been laid. A
Deep FTA+ would help Armenia to realize the vision to the extent that it facilitated
inward investment in the energy industry from EU countries. Whether the Russian
interests who have such a large stake in the Armenian energy industry would accept
such a prospect is doubtful. And it must be stressed that realisation of the vision is also
dependent on a full normalisation of political relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. At
present the prospects for such a normalisation still seem distant. In the largely
liberalised energy-related services sector, the impact of a Simple FTA would be slight.
A Deep FTA+ could have a much greater impact, but only if combined with far-
reaching flanking measures including political agreements at the regional level.
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Sectors of importance
Agro-food sector
With regard to a Simple FTA/Simple FTA BIS, it can be expected that it would not
have further large effects on the agro-food sector, since Armenia has rather low tariff
rates on agricultural products. For a Deep FTA+ to have a significant impact the
competition policy and general business environment would need to improve
significantly. In addition the lack of compliance with SPS measures and the protection
of IPRs remain serious obstacles to further expansion of trade and FDI in the agro-food
sector. A Deep FTA+ could be able to tackle effectively these problems.
Mining
Since a large share of the exports of the mining industry already goes to the EU-27
countries, and because EU import tariffs for these products are mostly very low or zero
we do not expect any impact of a Simple FTA. The impact of a Deep FTA would not be
significant either, since standardization and technical barriers are not important for
the sector. Transportation of mining products is costly and difficult, among other
things, because of the closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Processing of precious stones
With regard to the potential implications of an FTA, it has to be emphasised first of
all, that Armenia enforces a liberal foreign trade regime for jewellery and diamond-
cutting industries. The same can be stated for the EU, which is not levying tariffs for
imports of diamonds from any country. Armenian jewellery exporters can enter the EU
market on tariff-free bases under EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme.
Therefore, the sector under consideration already is subject to Simple FTA conditions.
A Deep FTA+ might have a significant impact on FDI into the industry, as long as it
linked with an increased confidence of investors in locating their capital in Armenia.
CGE Model and Simulations
We study a range of scenarios ranging from the liberalization in the EU-Armenia
bilateral trade that took place in 2006 (baseline scenario) to a Deep FTA+. Our analysis
using a CGE model indicates that the welfare gains for Armenia from tariff
liberalisation on its and the EU side respectively that took place in 2006 (in particular
Armenia’s unilateral lowering of import tariffs and EU’s granting Armenia tariff
preferences under the general arrangement of its new GSP) are likely to be small (less
than 0.4% of GDP). Also the additional impact of a possible future EU-Armenia Simple
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FTA or Simple FTA BIS is likely to be negligible. A Deep FTA would involve a more
complete elimination of barriers to trade and investment implying reductions in, or
elimination of regulatory and behind-the-border impediments to trade, which may
relate to customs procedures, product standards and certifications procedures and
market access for foreign providers of services. The potential additional welfare gains
are estimated to amount to about 3.38% of GDP. If comprehensive reforms brought
about by deeper integration along with additional flanking measures related to
competition policy and corruption led to a re-branding of Armenia as a favourable
investment location, a reduction of the risk premium on investment could work as an
additional mechanism for boosting both investment and GDP growth - Deep FTA+
scenario. If this was to occur, from our model simulations, we envisage the possibility
of additional economic gains from a Deep FTA+ reaching as much as 7.95% of GDP. 
Policy recommendations
Given that Armenia is already a member of the WTO and its tariffs are quite low, a
Simple FTA is feasible, but is not likely to have any noticeable impact. The real gains
could materialize over the medium to long term with a completion of a Deep FTA+.
Given the slow progress with the actual implementation of the ENP Action Plan,
serious questions remain as to the institutional capacity of Armenia to undertake steps
towards harmonization with EU aquis beyond those indicated in the ENP Action Plan.
However, this situation can be eased with technical assistance. For Armenia to benefit
from a Deep FTA+, the agreement would need to be backed by a strong political
commitment to tackle the prevalent import monopolies, to truly liberalise the markets,
implement the EU regulations in practise, strengthen the rule of law and open its
markets to foreign companies in all sectors. Certainly, the economic arguments suggest
that the welfare gains to be reaped are likely to be very high
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The aim of this study is to evaluate the economic feasibility and implications of free
trade agreement between the EU and Armenia as well as of greater regional integration
between Georgia, Armenia and the Black Sea countries. The study uses a mix of
qualitative and quantitative analysis along with surveys, sectoral studies and local
expert knowledge. This approach will allow the policy maker not to rely on any single
methodology while providing an interrelated analysis of various aspects of free trade
agreements (FTAs). 
The study begins with an account of the status quo reporting on key features of the
Armenian economy and most recent trade and economic developments, including a
brief overview of EU-Armenia trade and economic relations (chapter 2). Both chapter
3 and chapter 4 include the analysis of trade relations with the EU and the other
Armenian trade partners in greater detail. In chapter 3 we study the options for future
FTAs between Armenia and its neighbours. This is followed by the diagnostic analysis
based on various trade and economic indicators (Sussex Framework) used to provide
an insight into the trade and welfare implications of greater integration with the EU
and within the region. 
Throughout the report we look at different degrees of integration between Armenia
and the EU. We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement (FTA)
assuming the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the bilateral trade
between Armenia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes full liberalization
of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and elimination of all quantitative
restrictions on agricultural and food products on Armenian exports to the EU and vice
versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario assumes full elimination of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on all products in the bilateral trade between Armenia and the
EU. Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a significant
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1. Introduction
elimination of barriers to trade and investment throughout various sectors of the
economy. This would also result in a more extensive commitment to the reform of
domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in Armenia. Finally, the
comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with more wide-
ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead to a re-
branding of Armenia as a favourable investment location. This is our scenario Deep
FTA+ where we assume that Armenia would achieve a notable reduction in the
perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Armenia
as a favorable and safe place to invest. 
As is becoming increasingly recognized there are potentially substantial gains to be
realized in regional trading arrangements to the extent that these include elements of
deep integration, as opposed to allowing only for shallow integration. The extent to
which successful deep integration can be achieved will depend on the nature of existing
non-tariff barriers which may be in place, and on the scope for institutional and
regulatory harmonization between the partner countries. Chapter 5 provides a detailed
discussion of the institutional and regulatory harmonization issues between the EU and
Armenia. Changes in laws however do not immediately translate into lowering of
NTBs. The next chapter provides some more empirical evidence of the status of the
NTBs based on the survey conducted for the purpose of this study in the late 2007. 
One of the key factors in further economic expansion of Armenia is the development
of competitive economy with strong service sectors. This cannot be achieved without
foreign direct investment. It is also expected that harmonization of legislation,
improved access to the EU market and reforms leading to improved business
environment following a conclusion of an FTA will act as strong incentives for further
flows of FDI. Here again, as in the case of NTBs, we apply both qualitative and
quantitative analysis. In chapter 7 we discuss the regulatory barriers and practice with
respect to establishment and cross-border issues affecting trade and investment in a
number of key service sectors. Then we turn our focus to FDI and the likely benefits
resulting from further integration with the EU and the neighbouring countries. We
employ a gravity model to evaluate the likely impact of an FTA. 
Finally, the CGE analysis brings together the elements discussed in previous
sections. We study the economic impact of elimination of tariffs, non-tariff barriers in
trade between the EU and Armenia and an improved access to the Armenian market by
foreign providers of services. We also study the impact of a potential lowering of the
risk to invest in Armenia believing that signing a Deep FTA+ with the EU could serve
as a positive signal to investors that Armenia’s economic reforms are irreversible and
that further improvements in business environment are to follow.
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Last chapter is devoted to diagnostic analysis of the implications of FTA for further
expansion of trade and investment in sectors key to the Armenian economy. We focus
on agro-food sector, mining and processing of precious stones. Finally, the last section
provides some policy recommendations regarding an EU-Armenia FTA. 
The translation of the final report into Armenian is foreseen and will be completed
within a month after the acceptance of the final text by the Commission.
Along with this report, the Commission ordered a similar report for Georgia.
Although the structure of the two reports is very similar and methodology applied in
various chapters in the case of both countries is the same, this is where the similarities
end. Both reports are independent and the impact of an FTA for each country is being
judged on its own merits.
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Armenia is a small, land-locked country with a level of GDP per head that is low by
European standards, and comparable to that of Bulgaria. It is currently enjoying very
rapid GDP growth, after the collapse in GDP experienced in the early years of
transition, and this rapid growth is expected to continue, though with some
deceleration over the next two-three years. Inflation is under control, though the
inflation outturn for 2007 was significantly above the forecast figure, mainly on
account of a surge in the prices of imported foodstuffs towards the end of the year. The
budget deficit has averaged a little under 2% of GDP in recent years, and is expected
to be above 2% of GDP in 2008. Forecasts of deficits in subsequent years vary, but even
on the worst scenario no serious problems in covering deficits are expected.  
The pattern of economic growth in Armenia
Table 2.2 below shows the broad pattern of economic development in Armenia over
the past decade or so. Growth rates of GNP have accelerated steadily as Armenia has
emerged from the deep depression of the early transition years, and have been
sustained at levels above 13% per annum over the past three years. But GDP growth
has not been driven by industrial recovery. Indeed industrial rates of growth have
remained uniformly low, from a low base. They are expected to increase slightly over
the period 2009-10, but not enough to prevent GDP growth from easing to around 6%.  
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2. The most recent trade and
economic developments in Armenia
Table 2.1. Key macro indicators
 2005 2006 2007 
GDP (US$bn)  4.9 6.4 9.2 
Real GDP growth (%)  13.9 13.3 13.7 
Inflation (ave.; %)  0.6 2.9 4.4 
Population (m)  3.0 3.0 3.0 
GDP per head (US$)  1,634 2,134 3,067 
Consolidated fiscal deficit (% of GDP)  -1.9 -1.5 -2.3* 
The reason for the projecting fall in the growth rate of GDP is plain to see from the
third row of Table 2.2. Armenia’s double-digit GDP growth has been largely sustained,
in sectoral terms, by an extraordinary boom in construction, with annual growth rates
sometimes exceeding 30%. This boom is forecast to ease off in 2009-10, and this
coincides exactly with the projected fall in GDP growth rates.
Table 2.3 shows how the main elements within GDP have moved as the Armenian
economy has grown in recent years. Very large balance of trade deficits have been a
feature throughout, while investment grew steadily in percentage terms up to 2006. But
the most striking element in the table is consumption. In the first two years of the
century consumption was substantially higher than GDP, with capital inflow being
used to a substantial extent to bolster consumption, rather than to finance real
investment. By 2006 the situation had normalised, with consumption accounting for a
still high 83% of GDP and investment for a very high 34%, with some 40% of the latter
being covered by foreign inflow. The Ministry for the Economy and Finance of
Armenia, in its 2008-2010 Medium-Term Public Expenditure Framework, forecasts that
these proportions will remain similar through the period up to 2010, with investment
coming down a little as the trade deficit falls. Clearly much of the investment that has
taken place over the past few years has been in construction. Equally clearly, much of
that investment, indeed of investment as a whole in Armenia, has been financed by
foreign capital. The challenge for Armenia at present is to maintain those flows of
investment while diversifying the economy away from the heavy dependence on
construction. Any kind of opening of the economy associated with an FTA could
facilitate that process of diversification.
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Source: Ministry for the Economy and Finance of Armenia
*Forecast
Table 2.2 Annual growth rates of GDP and main production sectors, actual and forecast
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 2010* 
GDP 5.9 9.6 13.2 14.0 10.5 13.9 13.3 13.7 10.0 6.0 6.0 
Industrial  
 output 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
2.2 7.4 -1.1 2.7 2.0 3.0  
3.0 
Construction  - - - - 15.3 35.1 37.2 20.7 19.5 8.6 7.1 
Source: Ministry for the Economy and Finance of Armenia
+Planned
*Forecast
Table 2.3. Main macroeconomic elements as a %age of GDP
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007+ 2008* 2009* 2010* 
Consumption  108.9 104.8 99.1 93.5 92.6 86.0 83.1 85.2 84.2 84.0 84.4 
Investment  18.6 19.8 21.7 24.3 24.9 30.5 33.6 28.1 28.2 28.2 28.1 
Net exports  -27.2 -20.7 -17.2 -17.9 -14.7 -13.2 -14.4 -13.3 -12.4 -12.2 -12.5 
Prospects for domestic macroeconomic balance
As Table 2.4 shows, there is no serious dispute about the likely pattern of
macroeconomic evolution over the medium term in Armenia. The International
Monetary Fund is slightly less sanguine than the Ministry for the Economy and Finance
on the prospects for the budget deficit, and correspondingly slightly less optimistic
about the future of the inflation rate. The EIU goes along with the higher estimate for
budget deficit, but derives a lower inflation trend from that. What is clear is that on any
set of credible forecasts Armenia’s prospects for continued macroeconomic stability are
good. Against the background of a low level of GDP per head and a high rate of growth
of GDP, this must be rated a considerable achievement. 
Structure of employment
As Table 2.5 shows, employment in Armenia is still heavily concentrated in agriculture,
for the most part on low-productivity, traditional farms. Highly dynamic sectors like
construction account for a relatively small proportion of total employment, this reflecting
relatively high productivity. Unemployment has fallen steadily – from 10.1% in 2003 to
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Source: Ministry for the Economy and Finance of Armenia, 2008-2010 Medium-Term Public Expenditure
Framework; IMF, Republic of Armenia: Fifth Review under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, December 2007, EIU, Armenia Country Reports.
Table 2.4. Alternative forecasts of key macroeconomic variables
 2008 2009 2010 
 MEFA IMF EIU MEFA IMF EIU MEFA IMF EIU 
Inflation (ave.;%)  3.0 4.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 2.3 3.0 4.0 NA 
Consolidated fiscal  
deficit (% of GDP)  
-2.2 -2.6 -2.5 -1.2 -2.4 -3.1 -0.6 -2.3 NA 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Armenia 2007
Table 2.5. Structure of employment in 2006 (total = 100)
Agriculture  46.2 
Mining and quarrying  0.7 
Manufacturing  10.1 
Electricity, gas and water  2.1 
Construction  2.7 
Distribution  9.7 
Hotels and restaurants  0.7 
Transport and communications  4.4 
Financial services  0.6 
Real estate  2.1 
Public administration  3.2 
Education  9.2 
Health 4.5 
Local and personal services  3.7 
9.6% in the following year and 8.1% and 7.2% in 2005 and 2006 respectively. But between
open unemployment and concealed unemployment in agriculture, there is still enormous
scope for productivity enhancement through redeployment of labour. Any shifts of
employment between sectors might impose transitional adjustment costs due lack of skills
or inadequate social protection of some individuals. However, in the long run expansion
of the economy associated with any FTA could clearly facilitate the processes of
redeployment of labour and increasing aggregate productivity.
Armenia’s external balance
One of the dominant features of the Armenian economy is the deficit on balance of
trade, equivalent to 18.6% of GDP in 2006. In the past the trade deficit (and the services
deficit) has been largely covered by remittances from Armenians working abroad and
diaspora Armenians. As Table 2.6 shows, there appears now to be a change of pattern,
with the current account deficit widening and foreign direct investment coming in as an
increasingly important factor of balance in the overall balance of payments. FDI inflow
for the first half of 2007 alone totalled US$148 m, 33% more than in the same period of
2006. For the time being, it is quite clear that the trade deficit is being driven by
remittance and investment inflows, rather than the other way round. But FDI inflow is
currently 60% in the telecoms sector, with the two main mobile phone operators, both
Russian-owned, building up wireless networks. This kind of investment is inherently
lumpy, and it cannot be assumed that FDI inflows into the telecoms sector will be
maintained indefinitely at these levels. By the same token, FDI in sectors like tourism
and energy could multiply many times in the next few years. In a word, FDI is volatile
in a way that remittances are not. The downside risk is that FDI collapses, or simply has
a poor year, sometime over the medium-term future, leaving a large structural trade
deficit predicated on FDI inflows to be covered by short-term foreign borrowing, with
the attendant risk of a collapse in the value of the dram. For the time being, however,
this risk appears remote, and Armenia shows up as a classic example of an emerging
economy with a big trade deficit and an appreciating currency (see Table 2.7).
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Source: EIU
Table 2.6. The balance of payments, current account (US$ m)
 Jan-June 2006 Jan-June 2007 
Exports 455.1 487.2 
Imports -833.3 -1174.5 
Trade balance -378.2 -687.2 
Services balance -52.0 -79.4 
Income balance 88.5 133.3 
Current transfers (remittances) 
balance 
286.3 377.6 
Current account balance -55.4 -255.8 
The pattern of foreign trade
Table 2.8 shows how the pattern of economic development in Armenia is reflected
in visible trade. Among exports, base and precious metals and precious stones together
account for more than half the total, with prepared foodstuffs, mainly in the form of
Armenian brandy, playing an important subsidiary role. On the import side, mineral
products – mainly in the form of oil – is the biggest single category, with machinery and
vehicles, major items of both investment and consumption, also strongly featured.
Precious stones and metals are prominent on the import side as well, this reflecting the
fact that Armenia is a centre of diamond processing rather than diamond mining.
Overall, the pattern of Armenian exporting is strikingly undiversified.
Armenia’s trade and economic relations with the EU
Armenia has been a WTO member since 2003. The EU-Armenia bilateral trade
relations are provided for by the EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
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Source: National statistics, AEPLAC
*First six months
Table 2.8. Foreign trade by main type of commodity (US$ m)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Total exports 300.5 342.8 505.2 685.6 722.9 973.9 1,004.0 733.5 
Base metals 44.2 43.4 44.8 90.4 137.6 322.0 280.8 253.4 
Precious stones 
 and metals 
121.5 122.9 258.3 350.7 299.3 336.3 320.4 133.2 
Mineral  
products 
37.2 38.4 42.1 50.3 99.9 93.5 136.4 109.0 
Prepared 
foodstuffs 
27.3 48.0 54.4 72.2 69.2 96.9 95.3 104.5 
Total imports 884.7 874.3 987.2 1,279.5 1,350.7 1,801.7 2,194.4 1,925.7 
Mineral 
products 
178.0 184.8 171.4 179.5 209.4 297.4 365.8 333.1 
Machinery 
and equipment 
117.4 88.4 103.4 133.8 135.5 232.5 305.1 252.5 
Transport 
 equipment 
- - 40.2 78.5 92.5 151.8 197.3 235.8 
Precious stones 
 and metals 
113.3 106.8 213.5 333.1 291.5 347.6 312.5 183.5 
Source: EIU
Table 2.7. Dram:US$ exchange rates (end-period)
 Jan  
2005 
Jan  
2006 
Jan  
2007 
Feb  
2007 
Mar  
2007 
April 
2007 
May 
2007 
June 
 2007 
July  
2007 
Aug  
2007 
Exchange rate  478.5 449.2 359.4 353.6 362.1 357.0 347.9 341.0 337.2 336.5 
Year-on-year  
 % change 
18.3 6.5 25.0 27.5 24.5 25.0 22.9 22.8 23.2 17.9 
(PCA) in force since July 1999. The PCA confirms most-favoured nation (MFN)
treatment with respect to tariffs and quantitative restrictions are prohibited in the
bilateral trade. The PCA envisages progressive regulatory approximation of Armenia’s
legislation and practises to the most important EU trade related acquis, which should
lead to a better access of Armenian products to the EU markets. The above regulatory
aspect is further emphasized and developed in the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) Action Plan for Armenia adopted in November 2006 (together with similar
Action Plans for the two other South Caucasus countries Georgia and Azerbaijan).
Armenia benefits from the general arrangement of the EU Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) under the current EU GSP Regulation in force from January 2006
to December 2008, and has repeatedly expressed a wish to qualify for the special
incentive arrangement for good governance and sustainable development, the so-called
GSP+, under the new regulation in force as from 2009. Armenia requested to be
granted by the EU market economy status (MES) in the context of anti-dumping
investigations in 2005, and the evaluation of its request is ongoing.
As Table 2.9 shows, the bulk of Armenian exports goes to the EU (almost 70%),
while about one-half of Armenian imports originate from the EU. In relation to FDI the
situation is rather different. Over the period 1988-2006 the EU accounted for some 35%
of total FDI inflow into Armenia. The biggest investing countries within the EU over
that period were Germany, with 10.9% of the total, and France with 7.9%. The leading
investor in Armenia 1988-2006 was Russia, with 32.6% of the total. However the trend
is for Russia’s share in total FDI to fall, and for that of particular EU countries to rise.
Thus in 2006 taken by itself France accounted for around one-third of total FDI inflow.
The next two chapters analyse Armenia trade and investment patterns with the EU and
its neighbours in greater detail.
Key features of the political economy of Armenia
These peculiar structural characteristics of the Armenian economy help us to
understand how politics and economics interact in the country. This is an import-
oriented rather than an export-oriented country. And just as in export-oriented
countries like Japan and Korea it is the export interests that are most powerful, in
Armenia it is the import interests that dominate. These interests are organised into
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Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions
Table 2.9. Armenia’s trade with the EU in 2006 (US$ m)
 Export Import Balance 
EU27 470.9 688.6 -217.7 
Total 686.6 1394.3 -707.7 
powerful cartels. It is this that explains why, for instance, the domestic prices of key
imported commodities like wheat and fuel do not go down as the dram appreciates.
And because the cartels generally have good political connections, it is difficult to
challenge them through orthodox competition policy.
A related theme here is that of the Russian presence in the Armenian economy. In
key sectors like energy and telecoms Russian companies now own dominant shares of
total capital stock. There is clearly a two-way pattern of causation here. Because the
Russia economy is also cartelised, Russian companies find the Armenian business
environment congenial. But the Russian element is in itself one of the major
contributing factors to the cartelised pattern within Armenia. So the more Russian
investment there is in Armenia, the more cartelised is the system, and the more
cartelised is the system, the more attractive it is to Russian investment. The official line
of the Armenian government, as expounded to us by the policy-makers we met, is that
FDI is FDI, and it really doesn’t matter whether it is US, EU, Russian, or whatever.
This line of reasoning is dubious, for a range of reasons. Only US, EU or Japanese
investment brings the latest technologies. Only US, EU or Japanese investment brings
state-of-the-art management systems. More specifically in the present context,
however, it may be argued that only US, EU or Japanese investment will help to
liberalise the Armenian economy. Thus a free trade agreement which facilitates FDI,
but in practice facilitates mainly Russian FDI, may arguably tend to defeat its own
purposes. The implication is clear – a Simple FTA might actually do Armenia more
harm than good. It is the flanking measures that would move the country away from
the cartelised pattern that really matter, and that means a Deep FTA+. It is against this
background that the priority within the EU/Armenia Action Plan on strengthening the
rule of law and respect for human rights, combating fraud and corruption and
reinforcing the executive powers of the competition agency should be understood. 
What this means for SMEs
How do SMEs fit in to all of this? The answer we received from the SMEs we talked
to during our field trip is that they are very vulnerable to corruption; they have to pay
bribes to get certificates, they have to bribe the tax authorities etc. That there are
serious problems of corruption in the tax service is disputed by no one. President
Kocharian himself recently attacked both the State Tax Service and the State Customs
Committee, alleging widespread corruption and favouritism, and a special government
commission has been set up to investigate these issues. Again, SME managers tell us
that anti-fraud campaigns in practice turn into offensives by the tax authorities against
the SMEs. Clearly, these managers are telling us only one side of the story. For the
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present study, however, the key issue is less the apportionment of blame and more the
potential impact of new international agreements on this kind of problem. By getting
rid of tariffs, a Simple FTA would reduce the scope for corruption (cf. experience of
Georgia with unilateral free trade). But only a Deep FTA+ could hope to address the
underlying political economy factors which make it possible.
What it means for foreign companies
The OTE story, as discussed in detail in the services chapter of this report,
demonstrates the difficulties that foreign companies can have in trying to operate
within this cartelised structure. The implications for the present study are clear. A
Simple FTA would do nothing to change the patterns of interaction between foreign
capital and the domestic political economy. A Deep FTA+ might. It is important to
emphasise, however, that some multinationals active in Armenia are confident that
they are big enough and powerful enough in their own right to operate in Armenia
according to their own, corporate rules. There may be a sectoral dimension here. There
appear to be no strong domestic cartel interests in the financial services sector, in
contrast to the telecoms sector.         
The dangers of a construction-led boom
As we saw above, the volume of construction in Armenia has regularly grown
annually by over 20% in recent years, and construction currently accounts for one-third
to one-half of GDP growth. Much of this construction is financed by remittances, and
much of it presumably takes the form of second homes for diaspora Armenians.
Residential construction booms are a normal feature of the pattern of development of
emerging economies, and similar booms can be seen in most of the other CIS countries.
But residential housing booms by definition do not go on for ever, and when they stop,
there is little by way of technology transfer or other linkage to compensate for falling
demand for construction services. The experience of Spain in recent years has
demonstrated that the tailing-off of a construction boom can have a serious effect on
economies much bigger and more advanced than the Armenian. The annual rate of
growth of construction output in Armenia is already projected by the Ministry for the
Economy and Finance to fall to a still robust 7-8% in 2009-10. That could represent a
welcome stabilisation. But a continued downward trend in the rate of growth of
construction would mean a serious weakening of Armenia’s growth dynamic. None of
this has any direct implications for FTAs. But it does mean that Armenia could face a
significant recession at some point in the medium-to-long-term future. That could in
33
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ARMENIA
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
turn strengthen the protectionist elements within the political economy of Armenia,
and put great strain on the implementation of any FTA that might in the meantime have
been signed.   
Conclusions
There is substantial scope in the Armenian economy for redeployment of
underutilised labour and diversification of the export structure. But it would be difficult
to exploit this scope without a series of flanking measures designed to strengthen the
rule of law, reduce corruption and reinforce the implementation of competition law, as
laid out in the ENP EU/Armenia Action Plan. For this reason, a Simple FTA could be
expected to have only a very limited effect. It would take a Deep FTA+ to unlock the
potential for EU-Armenia trade to act as a locomotive for productivity enhancement
and the development of new sectors in Armenia.
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The EU, as a matter of general policy, encourages its free trade partners to think
also in terms of their own regional economic integration, favouring in principle ‘south-
south’ arrangements. This is advocated on both economic and political grounds. The
European Commission has in fact been encouraging the three South Caucasus states to
work out together with a view to better regional cooperation. This does at least see the
three foreign ministers meeting together with the EU periodically at times, but given
the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict more ambitious hopes cannot materialise.
Armenia-Georgia free trade. Armenia’s FTA with Georgia dates from 1995 with the
initial set of CIS agreements. It appears to function normally from the policy
standpoint. However the trade flows between Armenia and Georgia, in spite of their
functioning FTA and improvements to the road infrastructure connections are
extremely limited. The traveller crossing the main road frontier between the two
countries observes a virtually total absence of commercial traffic by truck. The shares
of their bilateral trade average for imports and exports represent only 4% of Georgia’s
total trade, and 3% of Armenia’s total trade on 2006. These shares have moreover even
been decreasing over the last ten years (see Table 31and Table 32 below). 
Armenia-Azerbaijan. This land border is closed and there is no direct trade.
Azerbaijan refuses goods of Armenian origin, but Armenia is open to Azerbaijani goods
at MFN rates of tariff, which may be imported via Georgia. 
The land border has been now for some 14 years a militarised cease-fire line, after
a war which was accompanied by violent ethnic cleansing on both sides. The cease-fire
line still sees recurrent hostile exchanges of fire and occasional fatal casualties. Thus,
only a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would change the outlook
concerning trade relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Peace talks between the
two parties are ongoing since several years assisted by mediation efforts of the so-called
Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, Russia and US) under OSCE auspices. 
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3. Armenia and regional integration
scenarios
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan would definitely benefit from a re-opening of the
natural trade routes along the Aras river valley along the southern border of Azerbaijan
(including its exclave province of Nakichevan) and Armenia, which have been
interrupted since 1993. The future construction of a railway bypass line from Kars in
Turkey to the Alkalkalaki region of Georgia, with links to the rail lines to Tbilisi and on
to Baku could further aggravate Armenia’s difficult situation in the region and the
balance of disadvantage of the Armenian-Azeri frontier closure could become much
more pronounced for Armenia than for Azerbaijan.
South Caucasus free trade. If the conflict with Azerbaijan could be resolved it would
be natural to consider the case for a trilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan-Georgia agreement,
or a ‘South Caucasus Free Trade Area’. One might think of the Benelux regional model,
as an example of three small economies which integrated faster than its wider region.
However this would also require that Azerbaijan becomes a WTO member. Like Russia
as an oil/gas exporter, the priority interests of the Azerbaijan leadership revolve around
the distribution of economic rents, rather than WTO accession. Moreover the very
limited scale of Georgian trade with both Armenia and Azerbaijan suggest that a South
Caucasus FTA would be of limited economic potential.     
FTAs with CIS states. Armenia’s FTAs with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan seem to be functioning normally.
Eurasec (Eurasian Economic Community) – there is an ongoing initiative between
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the framework of Eurasec aiming at going further
than the existing FTAs to a customs union. Armenia, which holds an observer status in
Eurasec, is not part of this initiative, since it wishes to retain freedom to have its own
trade policy, including the possibility to make a FTA with the EU. Moreover Armenia
is already in the WTO since 2002, whereas the three above mentioned countries are not. 
Armenia-Iran. Armenia currently negotiates a FTA with Iran, with whom it has a
short land border connection. In addition to the road connection there is also now a
direct gas pipeline connection.
Armenia-Turkey. The land frontier has been closed by Turkish side since 1993
because of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in which Turkey supports the Azeri side.
However goods can pass between the two countries either by air, or by road transiting
through either Georgia or Iran. This trade is done at MFN tariff rates.
The European Parliament has recently commissioned a report on “The Case for
Opening the Turkish-Armenian Border”1. This study offers a detailed account of the costs
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2 Study for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, “The case for Opening the
Turkish-Armenian Border”, by Nathalie Tocci, Burcu Gultekin-Punsmann, Licinia Simao and
Nicolas Tavitian, July 2007, Trans European Policy Studies Association.  
of the status quo to both Armenia and Turkey and of the benefits of opening this
frontier. The normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations, and the opening of the
presently blockaded frontier, would be of the highest importance for the Armenian
economy, both for trade in goods and tourism.
Armenian sectors that could gain from opening the borders with Turkey include,
according to the study done for the European Parliament, electricity, metal products,
textiles and heavy goods industries as well as tourism. Estimates by AEPLAC quoted in
this study suggest an opening of the Turkish frontier could generate a gain for
Armenian GDP of 2.7% over five years. 
For Turkey the gains would also be useful. Although the macroeconomic magnitudes
would be proportionately much smaller, the gains for the Kars region of eastern Turkey
would be significant, especially since this is Turkey’s most obstinately backward region
economically. Kars is significant regional centre only 75 kilometres from the frontier,
which in the early 1990s began to develop a lively commercial traffic with Armenia.
Turkish business interests keenly support the opening of their frontier with Armenia.
Black Sea free trade area. This idea has long been on the agenda of the BSEC, but
never really advanced, first of all because both Greece and Turkey were part of the EU’s
customs union, thus requiring free trade between the EU and all the Black Sea states.
However the Commission has recently launched its ‘Black Sea Synergy’ concept and
free trade for this region becomes now a more serious candidate for consideration.
Indeed with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey half of the Black Sea coast is already in the
EU customs union. Of course a Black Sea FTA would still require first of all agreements
on EU-Russia, EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldova and EU-Azerbaijan free trade, as well as with
Armenia and Georgia. The Russian and Ukrainian cases have both been subject to
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Table 3.1. Trade flows between Armenia and major partners, 2006 
 Armenia imports  Armenia exports  
 million $  % million $  % 
EU-27 688.9 31.4% 470.9 46.9% 
Russia 299.9 13.7% 116.5 11.6% 
Ukraine 164.7 7.5% 22.4 2.2% 
Iran 113.0 5.1% 29.1 2.9% 
Turkmenistan  169.0 7.7% 1.7 0.2% 
United States  98.1 4.5% 64.3 6.4% 
China 115.8 5.3% 2.7 1.2% 
Turkey 93.8 4.3% 0.2 0.0% 
Georgia 34.7 1.6% 47.5 4.7% 
Un. Arab Emirates  18.9 0.9% 5.4 0.5% 
Canada 10.6 0.5% 11.1 1.1% 
Moldova 2.7 0.1% 0.8 0.1% 
Rest of world  384.30 17.5% 231.40 23.0% 
Total 2 194.4 100.0% 1 004.0 100.0% 
detailed feasibility studies made for the European Commission (Ukraine in 2006, Russia
in 2007), and so these have become at least more than purely academic hypotheses.
Negotiations of a deep and comprehensive FTA between the EU and Ukraine have been
launched on 18 February 2008 following the conclusions of Ukraine’s WTO accession
process on 5 February 2008. But for Russia there is no presumption that an FTA with
the EU will be negotiated following Russian WTO accession. Until and unless Russia was
seriously interested in free trade this scenario cannot materialise.
EU-ENP East free trade area. In the case that Russia was the only country of the Black
Sea region which did not want to pursue free trade with the EU, there would remain the
option of the EU+Turkey customs union making a multilateral free trade area with
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, i.e. with all the ENP-East
countries that have Action Plans. This could also be extended with the ‘deep free trade’
agenda, since the EU intends to generalise this concept with all its ENP partner states.
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Source: WITS
Table 3.2. Trade flows between Armenia and major partners, 1997 
 Armenia imports Armenia exports 
 million $ % million $ % 
EU-27 195.5 26.4% 195.5 26.4% 
Russia 188.1 25.4% 188.1 25.4% 
Ukraine 10.3 1.4% 10.3 1.4% 
Iran 69.4 9.4% 69.4 9.4% 
Turkmenistan 27.0 3.7% 27.0 3.7% 
United States 114.7 15.5% 114.7 15.5% 
China 2.7 0.4% 2.7 0.4% 
Turkey 11.0 1.5% 11.0 1.5% 
Georgia 32.4 4.4% 32.4 4.4% 
Un. Arab Emirates 38.0 5.1% 38.0 5.1% 
Canada 6.5 0.9% 6.5 0.9% 
Moldova 0.04 0.0% 0.04 0.0% 
Rest of world 44.9 6.1% 44.9 6.1% 
Total 740.5 100.0% 740.5 100.0% 
Source: Kort and Dragneva, except for *, with information of Armenian mission to the EU. 
Table 3.3. Armenia’s Free Trade Agreements with CIS countries
Partner country Date of agreement 
Georgia 1995 
Azerbaijan no 
Kyrgyzstan 1994 
Kazakhstan 1994 
Moldova yes 
Russia 1992 
Tajikistan yes 
Turkmenistan Yes?* 
Ukraine 1994 
Uzbekistan No?* 
4.1. Introduction
In order to evaluate the trade and welfare implications of a potential EU-Armenia
FTA we apply a set of diagnostic indicators developed by the University of Sussex
(referred to as the “Sussex Framework”). The Sussex Framework helps to identify
possible gains and losses from a bilateral preferential trade agreement between
countries, as outlined conceptually in Box 1. 
The majority of the Sussex Framework indicators concentrate on the welfare
consequences from shallow integration. Indicators for deep integration are much
harder to identify, though looking at patterns of intra-industry trade is useful in this
regard. The evaluation of the relative importance of trade creation and trade diversion
effects from shallow integration is carried out in accordance with theoretically
grounded rules of thumb:
1. The higher are the initial tariffs, the greater is the likelihood of both trade
creation and trade diversion.
2. The greater the number of PTA partners the more likely it is that there will be
overlaps with cost differences, and therefore the greater the likelihood of
trade creation.   
3. The wider the difference in comparative advantage between countries and the
higher the initial share of trade between them, the more likely the trade
agreement will be welfare improving. 
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4. Assessing the potential welfare
effects of an EU-Armenia FTA using
the Sussex Framework 
4. The more similar is the product mix in the partner countries, the more likely
it is that there will be trade creation because there is more scope for
specialization. 
5. The higher the percentage of trade with potential partners, the greater the
possibility that the PTA will be welfare increasing. 
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Box 1. Welfare gains from shallow and deep integration: the main concepts
Shallow integration is defined as the removal of border barriers to trade, such as
tariffs and quotas; which normally comprises the first policies to be implemented under
any preferential trade agreement (PTA). Shallow integration is typically accompanied by
both trade creation and trade diversion which have opposing welfare effects. Trade
creation is welfare increasing since countries shift from consumption of less efficiently
produced (higher cost) domestic goods in favour to more efficiently produced (lower
cost) goods of the partner country. This results in cost savings and more efficient
resource allocation within the participating countries. Trade creation could occur either
on the production side when trade displays domestic production of goods, which are
similar with those produced by partner country; and on the consumption side when
demand and consumption of imports increases due to lower partner country prices.       
Trade diversion is welfare decreasing since it is characterised by the sourcing of
imports switching away from more efficient non-partner countries to less efficient
partner countries. Partner countries enjoy preferences within the trade agreement and
thus are able to undercut their more efficient and lower cost non-partner competitors.
The net welfare impact of a preferential trade agreement depends on the relative size of
these two trade effects. At the same time, welfare increasing trade reorientation from
less efficient to more efficient sources of imports may take place should partner
countries participate in other trade preferential agreements with third countries. 
Deep integration implies reductions in, or elimination of regulatory and behind-the-
border impediments to trade, which may relate to customs procedures, product
standards and certifications procedures, competition policy, government procurement,
market access for foreign providers of services, FDI regulations, etc. As such, partner
countries develop closer and more stable trade relations allowing for more
specialization in niche goods, participation in a fine division of labour, creation of stable
value chains. Deep integration has welfare increasing impacts for partner countries due
to greater exploitation of economies of scale in production, technology transfer and
diffusion both through trade and FDI, positive externalities from institutional and policy
approximation leading to wide productivity increases. The welfare gains from deep
integration, though being not immediate, and if appropriately implemented, are
generally likely to exceed substantially the possible losses from shallow integration.
4.2. Armenia’s foreign trade dynamics 
According to the officially reported trade statistics (WITS), Armenia’s merchandise
trade turnover expanded by more than 3 times over 1997-2006, from USD 949.7 million
in 1997 (57.8% of GDP) up to USD 3.1 billion (about 48.0% of GDP) in 2006. Imports of
goods have accounted for the major part of total merchandise trade in Armenia; still the
importance of exports in total trade has been substantially rising during the period (from
22.0% in 1997 to 32.0% in 2006). In terms of GDP, merchandise imports constituted
about 32.6% of GDP in 2006 vs. 45.2% in 1997, while exports strengthened their role up
to 15.3% of GDP in 2006 from 12.8% in 1997. Armenia’s merchandise trade deficit has
been high and has widen by about 2 times over 1997-2006, from USD 531.3 million in
1997 to USD 1.1 billion in 2006. However, since Armenia has been experiencing high
economic growth during these years, the trade deficit has shrunk in terms of GDP, from
32.4% of GDP in 1997 to 17.3% of GDP in 2006.
The Armenian economy is characterised by a structural trade deficit of large
proportions, financed in large measure by remittances from the diasporas in the US
and Russia. From a very low base in the late 1990s exports of goods have been growing
faster than imports (see Figure 4.1), which has narrowed the ratio of exports to imports
to about 50%, whereas earlier the ration was only 25%. The main contribution of such
a substantial export expansion has been made by a diamond processing sector. A good
export performance has backed, in turn, Armenia’s strong economic growth in recent
years. However, during the last two years the imports performance has improved
compared to exports one. In 2006, the growth of exports substantially decelerated and
lagged far behind of imports growth (3.1% y/y vs. 21.8% y/y). The slowdown in exports
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Source: Key indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, 2007; IBM report, 2004.
Figure 4.1. Armenia’s merchandise trade dynamics
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growth in 2006 occurred mainly because of a fall in base-metal exports, a drop in the
diamond-processing trade (due to supply disruptions and stiffer competition from other
countries),  and stagnation of foodstuff exports. Import growth consisted mainly of
capital goods and mineral products, which reflected the expansion of investment and
construction activities in Armenia, as well as higher world prices on major imports. As
a result, there has been a substantial widening of merchandise trade deficit in 2006 (by
-43.8% y/y compared to 2005).  
4.3. Armenia’s trade policies and market access
Tariffs
According to the first rule of thumb, the higher are the initial trade border barriers,
the greater is the likelihood of both trade creation and trade diversion after those
barriers are removed under the preferential regime. The higher initial tariffs imply
higher initial distortions to trade, whose removal will trigger i) higher price reduction
on goods resulting in a greater demand for them (trade creation on the consumption
side), ii) greater possibility for the new partner to supply the good more efficiently than
the domestic economy (trade creation on the production side). At the same time, if the
initial tariffs are high there is also greater possibility for the new partner who has a
preferential access to the market to supply the goods cheaper than the non-PTA
partners. As such, there is greater likelihood that trade diversion will occur as a result
of the PTA (Gasiorek et al., 2006).
Armenia has been a member of the WTO since 2003 and its relevant legislation has
been brought in conformity with international standards. Armenia has developed a
liberal trade regime in goods and services in regard to tariff and formal non-tariff
barriers (such as quantitative restrictions) over the transition period. 
Armenia applies MFN tariffs to imports from its trade partners, except duty-free
treatment under the current FTAs with CIS countries. In line with the WTO tariff
commitments Armenia has bound its simple average MFN tariff at an average of 8.5%
level, including 14.7% for agricultural products and 7.5% for non-agricultural products
(see Table 4.1 and Appendix 2 Table 1 for more details). At the same time, Armenia has
been long applying tariffs being much lower than the WTO bound rates (according to
the WTO estimates, the simple average MFN tariff equals 3% as of 2006). The tariff
regime is comprised of only two tariffs, 0% (applied to over 70% of tariff lines) and
10%2. 
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2 See the detail data on MFN applied tariffs in Armenia (as of July 2006) at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/armenia_e.htm.
The highest tariff rate (10%) is applied mainly to agricultural imports such as meat
and meat products, fish products, dairy products, vegetables and fruits, sugar and
sugar products, and prepared foodstuffs3. Imports of alcoholic beverages and tobacco
products are subject to specific tariffs. Zero tariffs are imposed on the majority of non-
agricultural imports, excluding those, which are sensitive and produced in Armenia
(see Box 2). In 2006, about 25% of total imports were subject to non-zero tariffs. 
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3 0% tariff rate is applied only to certain agricultural products such as live animals; live fish; dried
egg yolks; cereals; seed potatoes; malt and starches, inulin, wheat gluten; oils seeds (excluding
sunflower seeds), straw and fodder, vegetable planting materials; cane and beet molasses; castor
oil; cocoa beans; food preparations for infant use; tapioca; crispbread; toasted products; yeasts;
residues and waste from the food industries, prepared animal fodder; tobacco raw materials, etc.
Source: WTO. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/armenia_e.htm.
Table 4.1. The WTO tariff profile for Armenia, 2006
 Total Agricultural  Non-Agricultural  
Simple average final bound*  8.5 14.7 7.5 
Simple average MFN applied**  3.0 7.9 2.3 
marble and travertine, granite,
sandstone, dolomite;
cement; 
certain household articles and toilet
articles of plastics; 
re-treaded pneumatic tyres; 
certain articles of rubber; 
articles of leather;
certain articles of fur skin;
manufactures of straw or other plaiting
materials; 
certain articles of paper; 
carpets and other textile floor
coverings; linoleum;
textile articles (HS 61, 62, 63); 
footwear (exc. parts of footwear); 
headgear; 
umbrellas; 
prepared feathers and down; 
articles of stone, plaster, cement;
ceramic products; 
certain glass and glassware;
natural and cultured pearls, articles of
jewellery; 
iron or steel wool, table, kitchen or
other household articles;
household refrigerators; air
conditioning machines; 
washing machines; 
Certain electrical equipment (batteries,
electro-mechanical household
appliances, line telephone sets;
videophones, record players, radio-
broadcast receivers, video monitors;
lamps, etc.); 
certain vehicles (motor cars, motor-
bicycles, parts and accessories of the
motor vehicles; trailers and semi-
trailers); 
cameras; 
photocopying apparatus; 
clocks and watches; watch straps and
watch bracelets;
seats; 
electric lamps; 
video games;  
furniture, nec; 
sports requisites; 
works of art.
Box 2.  A 10% tariff is imposed on the following non-agricultural
commodities:
Table 4.2 presents calculations of simple average and import-weighted average
tariffs applied in Armenia to imports from major trade partners in 2006 (based on
UNCTAD TRAINS -Trade Analysis and Information System database). Effectively
applied tariffs for imports from EU27, Turkey and Iran are the MFN tariffs, since no
tariff preferences exist for these countries. Nevertheless, their import-weighed average
tariffs are low and range from 2.1% for the EU27 to 2.6%4 for Turkey (3.3 % and 3.5%
respectively if the simple average tariff of traded tariff lines is considered). The lowest
import-weighed average MFN tariff is applied to imports from the EU reflecting the
prevalence of industrial goods in its import structure to Armenia. Under the
preferential duty-free trade regime with Armenia, CIS partners receive preference
margins measured as a difference between effectively applied tariffs and MFN tariffs,
which would have been imposed if no preference had existed. Effectively applied tariffs
to preferential trade with CIS countries are zero, and the weighted preference margins
in 2006 were in the range between 2.4% for Ukraine to 4.8% for Georgia. 
According to the first rule of thumb, the low overall tariff protection in Armenia
indicates a low level of current tariff-driven trade distortions. Since the overall level of
pre-FTA tariff protection in Armenia is low, the future elimination of tariff barriers
under the EU-Armenia FTA is expected to have a limited scope for either trade creation
or trade diversion in the Armenian economy, especially in regard to non-agricultural
trade. Particularly, provided no change in the composition of the EU exports to
Armenia the future EU-Armenia FTA may provide a 2.1% average tariff preference
margin for the EU imports (7.4% for agricultural products and 1.7% for non-
agricultural goods in case of a full coverage of the FTA). 
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4 Calculations do not include specific tariffs on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. 
Source: UNCTAD - TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System)
Note: *Excluding specific tariffs on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products.
** TL – tariff lines.
Table 4.2. Applied tariffs and tariff preference margins* in Armenia, by country, 2006
Partner Imports,  
million US$ 
Effectively  
applied  
simple 
 average 
of traded  
TL** 
Effectively  
applied  
weighted 
average  
of traded TL 
MFN simple 
average 
of traded  
TL 
MFN  
weighted 
 average 
of traded 
TL 
Preference 
 margin 
 weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(6)-(4) 
Georgia 34.7 0.0 0.0 4.2 4.8 4.8 
Ukraine 164.7 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.4 2.4 
Russia 299.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 
Turkey 93.7 3.5 2.6 3.5 2.6 - 
Iran 113.0 3.1 2.5 3.1 2.5 - 
EU27 688.6 3.3 2.1 3.3 2.1 - 
World 2094.3 2.6 1.8 3.1 2.4 0.6 
Besides, the low MFN tariff protection implies that the preference margins received
by CIS trade partners under the existing FTAs are not significant as well. As a result,
there are limited possibilities for welfare-increasing trade reorientation occurring
among other FTA partners and the new partner. That is, there is some likelihood,
though not significant, of switching sources of imports from CIS countries to the EU,
provided the EU receives preferential access to the Armenian markets under the future
EU-Armenia FTA. Overall, due to the relatively low pre-FTA tariff protection in
Armenia, the welfare effects induced from the removal of tariff barriers under the
future EU-Armenia FTA will not be significant and other factors (such as non-tariff
barriers including transport costs, regulatory barriers, corruption, etc.) will play a
more important role in determination of those effects. 
At the same time, there will be some scope for shallow integration effects with
regard to those agricultural and industrial products that are subject to a 10% tariff
protection, assuming these sectors will be included into the FTA and relevant tariffs
will be abolished. Since 10% duties are applied to the EU major imports to Armenia,
like vehicles and domestic appliances, etc. (see chapter on the EU import composition
below), both trade creation and trade diversion are likely to occur in regard to those
products under the future EU-Armenia. Noteworthy, the magnitude of these effects will
also depend on the degree of underlying elasticities of supply, and the extent to which
this tariff (10%) affects differences in competitiveness across countries (Gasiorek et al.,
2006). The overall net welfare effect in regard to these products needs to be considered
in the light of other rules of thumb.  
Concerning market access for exporters, Armenia enjoys MFN treatment from
the other WTO members (except Turkey), as well as free trade regimes with CIS
countries. Besides, Armenian products benefit from the new EU Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP general agreement) in force since January 2006. Neither the EU
nor other WTO partners currently maintain any trade protection measures against
imports from Armenia. At the same time, technical barriers to trade for the
Armenian exports to the developed country markets are rather restrictive. European
certifying institutions used by Armenian exporters are located in Europe, which
adds considerable expense and creates extra uncertainty (IBM report, 2004).
Compliance with quality standards in the EU is considered to be the one of the main
constraints by Armenian food processors. A low competitiveness of Armenian
products also restricts the penetration of Armenian goods into the European and
world markets. 
Since the EU tariffs are already low for Armenian goods, trade creation and trade
diversion effects from the future EU-Armenia FTA are not expected to be significant for
the EU as well.
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Other barriers to trade in Armenia
Armenia’s official non-tariff barriers are minimal; import and export restrictions
are only applied for health, security, and environmental reasons. Armenia does not use
safeguards or antidumping measures for temporary protection against imports. There
are no export taxes or subsidies. In line with its WTO commitments, Armenia offers
very liberal market access in the services sector5, and a very open investment regime
for foreign investors (except ownership of land in the territory of Armenia, which is
prohibited). In addition as chapter 2 notes there are certain restrictive businesses
practices that may affect trade and limit the scope for the effect of the reduction of
formal barriers passed on to consumers and producers.
Despite such a limited use of formal NTBs, trade regime in Armenia, like in other CIS
countries, is characterized by a wide prevalence of trade-restrictive informal NTBs
resulting from poor law enforcement, corruption, institutional weaknesses, and
underdeveloped infrastructure. As a result, although most imports and exports are free of
any prohibitions, quotas or licensing, businesses face costly and cumbersome procedures
and discretionary practices that impose undesirable costs on trade and foreign
investment. In this regard, the most important Armenia’s NTBs are associated with the
persisting weaknesses in customs and tax administration, Armenian customs
bureaucracy and high informal customs payments. Though the existing Customs Code
adopted in 2001 is formally in full compliance with the WTO rules, customs valuation of
imports has been largely based on discretionary practices (through the use of market
value method) thus promoting unfair competition and creating an unpredictable and
intimidating environment for international traders, since the same or similar goods have
been reported to be valued at substantially differing costs (IBM report, 2004). At the same
time, customs officials complain that importers systematically underestimate the
transaction value of goods to avoid import tariffs, VAT, and excise taxes. The VAT refunds
have been the most problematic tax administration issue facing exporters and investors.
To reduce the existing barriers to trade, it is essential to further strengthen the
regulatory and legal environment in Armenia, including strict implementation of
customs and tax legislation, sustained efforts to curtail corruption, and strengthening
of the judicial system and rule of law. The future FTA with the EU may serve a lock-in
mechanism for Armenia to implement the needed economic reforms.  
The high transportation costs constitute another serious barrier to both Armenian
exports and imports. Transport costs on goods traded to and from Armenia were
estimated at 20-25% of their nominal value, which are among the highest in the world
(Jrbashyan et al., 2007). The high transportation costs are explained by a set of factors
including the landlocked geographical position and relatively long distance from main
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5 Some restrictions have been stipulated only for the insurance sector.
export and import markets; absence of direct ways to reach the main export and import
markets due to the unsettled regional conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,
which led to the border closure and trade limitations with its neighbouring countries
(Azerbaijan, Turkey)6; usage of combined transportation modes7; limited amount of
cargo turnover between South Caucasus countries and the rest of the world8;
substantial amount of unnecessary documents requested by different national
authorities and paid by cargo owners; high level of official and unofficial payments,
needed for transportation, especially in Georgia, which is the main liaison between
Armenia and external world; poor regional transport infrastructure (IBM report,
2004). Furthermore, during the last years transport through Georgia is frequently
disrupted by that country’s disputes with Russia leading to the closure of land routes
between Georgia and Russia and thus blocking Armenia’s most important land
communication with the rest of the world (Tocci et al., 2007).
High transportation costs, on the one hand, increase the cost of imports including
critical imports and imports of raw materials and intermediate goods used for domestic
production, on the other hand, create “natural” protection for domestic industries and
favourable conditions for import substitution. In regard to exports, high transportation
costs have forced Armenia to develop high-value added or low transportation cost
industries to use the competitive advantage of an educated and low-cost labour force
(IBM report, 2004). This has resulted in significant structural changes in the Armenian
economy, since Armenia has been forced to reorient its trade from heavier industrial
sectors9 and to develop niche markets of lightweight products with low transportation
costs, such as processed diamonds, precious stones, jewellery, and computer software
(which can be easily airlifted). At the same time, the narrow export structure has made
Armenian exports more vulnerable to demand and price changes in the main markets.
Overall, physical, regulatory and political (first of all, the closure of borders with
neighbouring countries) barriers to trade considerably increase the costs of trade in
Armenia and have a huge detrimental impact on the overall volumes of trade (both
exports and imports), as well as impose trade distortions on the Armenia’s trade
structure.
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6 Currently, Armenia has rail and road connections only with Georgia to the Poti and Batumi ports
on the Black Sea. The road connection in the south to the Iranian ports is much longer and costly,
as the route passes through difficult mountainous terrain.
7 For example, when trading with the EU countries, the transportation is conducted by rail to
Georgian ports, the by sea to Mediterranean ports, and then by road or rail to the final destination,
or road transportation via Iran or to Russia which substantially increases the transportation costs.
8 This does not allow to maritime companies, operating in Georgian ports to employ larger vessels,
which negatively affects the maritime transportation cost, making it much higher than in the
countries with bigger volumes of cargo.
9 Until the early 1990s, Armenia was heavily industrialized, and the major part of exports
comprised capital and intermediate goods, particularly machinery, rubber, chemicals, and
electronics. These sectors have been gradually contracting since that time (ADB, 2006).
The current Government’s strategy relates to improving regional cooperation in
transport and trade facilitation initiatives, which is crucial for improving Armenia’s access
to the external markets. The rehabilitation of road and rail infrastructure would reduce
transport costs and enable Armenia to expand trade in traditional heavier items. Transport
sector developments and trade facilitation will allow for a significant increase in the level
of competitiveness of traditional Armenian exports, such as the textiles and shoes industry,
food processing, furniture, etc., will support agriculture as well as the industrial, mining,
and construction sectors which demonstrate high export potential (ADB, 2006). 
4.4. Existing FTAs
Armenia’s top export and import partners have traditionally been presented by the
CIS countries; however their cumulative importance has reduced over last years.
Particularly, trade with CIS countries accounted for 28.9% of Armenia’s trade turnover
in 2006 vs. 35.6% in 1997. Armenia has signed bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
with almost all CIS partners, with the exceptions of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan: with
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.10 All the agreements are almost identical and
have the following major features: i) can be described as minimal and quite basic; they
do not cover trade in services, investment or government procurement; ii) provide for
duty-free trade in goods (both industrial and agricultural), though with potential
exemptions11. Exemptions from free trade are introduced in the protocols to the FTAs
and can be changed annually12; iii) contain provisions on contingent protection
measures, including quotas, export taxes, safeguards and anti-dumping measures,
which countries can apply unilaterally. 
Armenia has also signed the plurilateral Agreement on the Creation of an Economic
Union (1993) and the Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Area within the CIS (1994),
but has not ratified any of them. The agreement on Economic Union is a framework
document envisaging that parties move towards the establishment of a customs union
and common market among CIS countries, however, each party might exercise its own
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10 Among them, the following bilateral free trade agreements had been ratified and became legally
binding: with the Russian Federation (1993), Kyrgyz Republic (1995), Turkmenistan (1995),
Georgia (1996), Ukraine (1996), Kazakhstan (1999) and Belarus (2000) (see the Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Armenia, 2002, www.wto.org).
11 Exemptions can be applied in the form of import (common tariffs) or export (export taxes)
restrictions. 
12 Exemptions from free trade regimes with Armenia were applied mostly by Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Belarus. Armenia has not applied any exemptions in imports and exports of goods to CIS
countries.
discretion on the pace and timing of integration into economic structures of the CIS.
The CIS FTA Agreement aims at creating a free trade area, coordinating economic
policy, promoting inter- and intra-sectoral cooperation and harmonizing legislation
and regulations. It has been ratified by only Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and remains ineffective so far. As a
result, preferential trading relations among CIS countries have been established and
determined on the bilateral level.
CIS countries have also signed a set of other plurilateral agreements concerning the
application of product standards, rules of origin, customs procedures, transit rules and
other issues. In particular, they include:     
• Agreement on Mutual Policies in the Area of Standards, Metrology and
Certifications (1992), amended in 2000, which provides for the creation of the
Interstate Council on Standards, the system of harmonised standards and mutual
recognition of certificates of conformity13. Products standards are mainly former
Soviet Union standards; however countries are carrying out harmonization of their
national standards with the international ones. The mutual recognition applies
only to standards approved at the interstate level, rather than national standards,
which are often not notified to trade partners (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco,
2004), thus undermining the integrity and efficiency of the whole system. 
• Rules of origin within bilateral CIS FTAs are governed by the Rules adopted on
30 November 2000 by all CIS countries, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
The Rules stipulate that exports subject to the free trade treatment must be
conducted by tax residents in the free trade area14. Identical rules of origin
applied by all the CIS countries having bilateral FTAs de facto imply the free trade
area among those countries. 
• The CIS FTAs and plurilateral agreements provide for the national treatment in
transit, however, these provisions have been largely dysfunctional. Transit
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13 Still, in practice certificates issued by the partner country can be questioned (Freinkman,
Polyakov and Revenco, 2004). 
14 According to the general rule of origin (tariff heading criterion), a product is considered to be
of CIS origin if it is fully produced in the CIS country or, when imports are used in its production,
if the designation of the product is different from the designation of the inputs according the 4-
digit CIS trade nomenclature. However, there is a list of goods, which are exempted from the
general rule of origin and are subject to two other rules – ad valorem rule (specified shares
(normally 50 percent) of imported materials or value added in the price of final production should
be met) and technological requirements (specified technological operations should be performed
in the free trade area). The products traditionally considered sensitive, such as footwear, textiles,
and clothing, are subject to the tariff heading criterion rather than more restraining technological
requirements (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004).
countries usually maintain transit permits and quotas system for road transport
and tend to create extra hurdles such as mandatory high-cost customs convoying,
insurance, and other high fees in customs clearance, which are often in violation
of such agreements (IBM report, 2004).
Overall, the CIS free trade bloc is characterised by i) weak administration, lack of
strict procedures for the application of non-tariff measures and temporary protection
measures under FTAs, dispute settlement mechanism, and underdeveloped plurilateral
and bilateral institutions that do not have enough power to influence policies of the
national trade bodies; ii) lack of transparency and efficiency due to parallel existence of
bilateral and plurilateral agreements that overlap and sometimes contradict each other;
iii) as well as a lack of permanency due to frequent changes in the list of exemptions15
and of applied contingent measures (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004).
Exporting to other CIS countries is more advantageous compared to other
destinations because of close historical ties and geographical proximity, the proximity
of product standards and the mutual recognition of the mandatory trade and
standardization documentation. On the other hand, the efficiency of CIS FTAs has been
undermined due to such factors as: 
• being competitors in many sectors CIS countries have little interests to grant
preferential access to imports from other CIS countries, especially in sensitive
sectors, leading to trade wars and arbitrary unilateral application of trade
protection measures (pronounced in trade with large CIS countries); 
• political and ethnic tensions between CIS countries, such as between Georgia and
Russian Federation, have also negatively influenced trade relations of the CIS
countries. 
• the CIS trade agreements have been inefficient in reducing excessively high
border and transport costs within the CIS (including customs delays, problems
with mutual recognition of customs documentation and application of rules of
origin) negatively impacting on bilateral trade and preventing countries from fully
benefiting from scale and competition effects on CIS huge markets. 
The CIS FTA countries actively develop the economic relations with non-CIS
partners (71.1% of Armenia’s total trade in 2006). CIS countries usually consider
economic integration with non-CIS countries potentially more welfare increasing due
to the effects of deep integration (e.g., technology transfer, institutional and policy
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15 Countries have agreed schedules for mutual abolishing of exemptions.
harmonization, productivity convergence, etc.) and “lock-in” mechanisms for political
and economic reforms. Taking into account the lack of strong economic incentives and
political will of CIS countries to integrate, the prospects of the full implementation of
the plurilateral CIS FTA seem rather weak. At the same time, to become fully functional
and more efficient bilateral CIS FTAs require strengthening their administration,
brining their legal and institutional framework in line with the WTO rules concerning
substantial coverage of the agreement, transit rules, application of SPS and TBT
measures, application of safeguards and antidumping measures, as well as dispute
settlement mechanisms.
Armenia is also a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
Organization. Ten other BSEC members include Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. This agreement does
not stipulate preferential trade among parties although it envisaged the possibility of
free trade zones in the future. It covers a number of fields, including economic
cooperation and trade, investment, scientific and technical cooperation, the
establishment of a BSEC Bank, and cooperation on transport and communications.
Still, the BSEC have not advanced much in achieving the declared goals due to lack of
political support, unresolved border and territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts among
the member countries (Maliszewska, 2005). Besides, the creation of the BSEC FTA
requires all members to have FTAs with the EU (since some counties, Greece, Turkey,
Bulgaria and Romania, are already members of the EU customs union), which is not a
short-run perspective for some of them (e.g. Russia). 
Presently, Armenia is involved in FTA negotiations with Iran and Lebanon. The
major difficulties in the FTA negotiations with Iran relate to non-compliance of Iran’s
legislation and trade regime with the WTO rules and requirements (Iran’s trade regime
is much more restrictive compared to Armenia’s). Negotiations with Lebanon largely
concern customs tariffs issues. 
4.5. Trade Openness
The openness indicator is measured as the share of exports and imports in GDP. A
higher openness index tends to indicate a more outwardly-oriented economy. Although
Armenia has developed very liberal trade regime and its trade turnover has been
steadily increasing, Armenia’s openness indicator has fallen during the past years since
the growth of nominal GDP exceeded that of the trade (see Table 4.3). Particularly, the
share of total trade of goods and services in nominal Armenia’s GDP has declined (by
-24.2%) over 2001-2006 from 73.9% of GDP in 2000 to 56.0% of GDP in 2006. The
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decline in openness was more pronounced in regard to imports of goods and services
than for exports (reflecting the faster growth of exports compared to imports during the
period). 
4.6. The geographical composition of trade 
The fifth rule of thumb focuses on the extent to which countries trade with each
other prior to the FTA. Where there is initially little trade with a potential trade partner,
this signifies that the third countries are more efficient suppliers and thus that the
future FTA is more likely to result in trade diversion. Also, there may be limited scope
for trade expansion from forming a FTA between countries that do little trade with each
other. On the contrary, if in the initial situation the countries trade significantly then it
is more likely that they importing from the more efficient suppliers and the chances for
trade diversion are lower.
The World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database is used in all calculations in
this chapter. However, it is important to note that CIS trade statistics are known to be
often deficient and the exercise with comparing mirror trade flows confirms this16 (see
Table 4.4). The persistent problems of the CIS countries in the recording of
international transactions are explained by weak border control, a lack of control over
parts of territories (in the case of Moldova and Georgia), poor customs procedures and
evaluation techniques (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004). CIS countries anti-
corruption and customs reform initiatives influence the dynamics of their trade figures,
thus the consistency of trade data over time is also a matter of concern. 
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16 Imports are recorded in CIF prices while exports are recorded in FOB prices, thus imports
should exceed exports by transportation and insurance costs.
Source: Key indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, 2007
Table 4.3. Armenia’s openness (GDP decomposition, current prices) 
 2000 2003 2006 % change  
2000-2006 
Exports of goods  
and services as % of GDP 
23.4 32.2 21.6 -7.7 
Imports of goods  
and services as % of GDP 
50.5 50.0 34.4 -31.9 
Total Trade as % of GDP 73.9 82.2 56.0 -24.2 
As can be seen from Table 4.4, major discrepancies appear in mirror data on
Armenia’s trade with Georgia (on Armenia’s import side), the EU (import side), Turkey
(import side). One of the possible explanations of such discrepancies is the
misspecification of the country of origin after the transit trough the territory of a transit
country (first of all, Georgia) regardless of the share of its content that actually comes
from this country. Data discrepancies with Georgia are most evident for HS 87 and HS
10 commodity groups. In 2006, Georgia reported the USD 8.2 million exports of HS 87
group (“Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and
accessories thereof”) to Armenia (or 11.1% of total Georgia’s exports to Armenia), while
no such imports from Georgia were reported by Armenia (see Appendix2 Table 2) for
commodity composition of trade with Armenia’s main trade partners). This can be
possibly explained by the fact that Georgia imports the used cars from the Western
Europe and then re-exports them to its neighbouring countries, Armenia and
Azerbaijan (ADB, 2007). A similar situation arises when looking at the data on exports
of cereals (HS 10) from Georgia to Armenia (Georgia reported USD 11.8 million
exports of cereals to Armenia in 2006 while no such imports from Georgia were
reported by Armenia)17. 
Discrepancies in mirror trade between Armenia and Turkey arise due to border and
trade limitations between countries. Turkey reports no trade with Armenia, while
according to the Armenian data trade with Turkey (mainly imports) accounted for 3.1%
of Armenia’s total trade. In 1993, Turkey made a political decision to close off its
borders with Armenia. Still, de facto the countries trade with each other, though export
destinations are usually registered as lying in Georgia or Russia (Tocci et al., 2007). 
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.4. Armenia’s mirror statistics for main partners, 2006 (USD million)
 Armenia trade 
 statistics  
Mirror trade statistics  
of trade partners  
 Export Import Balance Export Import Balance 
Georgia 47.5 34.7 12.8 73.6 40.2 33.4 
Ukraine 22.4 164.7 -142.3 136.3 21.1 115.2 
Russian  
Federation  
116.5 299.5 -183.0 249.3 95.3 154.0 
Iran 29.1 113.0 -83.9 165.9 30.9 135.0 
Turkey 0.2 93.8 -93.5 - - -  
EU27 470.9 688.6 -217.7 588.6 437.6 151.0 
Total 686.6 1394.3 -707.7 1213.7 625.1 588.6 
17 Georgia was a net importer of cereals in 2006 (USD 109.6 million imports vs. USD 11.8 million
exports.
A discrepancy in the EU-Armenia trade data is largely caused by the mineral fuels,
HS 27 group. Armenia reported USD 97.4 million imports of mineral fuels from the EU
in 2006 vs. USD 1.5 million reported in the EU data.  
We use Armenia’s trade data for further analysis in order to provide a consistent
set of measures for the remainder of this report (still bearing the above considerations
and caveats in mind). 
Table 4.5 presents the Armenia’s ten largest trade partners in 2006. The list is
topped by the EU capturing 37.7% of Armenia’s total trade in 2006. Armenia’s trade
turnover with the EU has grown by 4.5 times since 1997; as a result the share of the
EU in Armenia’s total trade has risen by over 10 percentage points over the last decade
(from 27.1% in 1997). On the contrary, the role of trade with Russia has declined
substantially during the past years (from 25% in 1997 to 13.5% in 2006); still Russia
has preserved its second largest partner position. Trade with Israel and Ukraine, the
third and fourth trade partners in 2006, was subject to pronounced increases over
1997-2006, contrary to the considerable negative trade dynamics with Iran and the US.
Also, China and Turkey have strengthened their weight in Armenian trade over the last
decade. The five largest partners attributed for 69.1% of Armenia’s trade turnover in
2006 vs. 89.5% in 1997 thus Armenia has reduced the geographical concentration of its
trade to some extent.
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Source: WITS. *Total exports plus imports
Table 4.5. 10 Armenia’s largest trade partners in 2006
Trade partner  Trade  
turnover 
Balance Balance  
as a share 
of bilateral 
trade  
Share 
in total 
trade, 
2006 
Share 
in total 
trade, 
1996 
 million USD million USD % % % 
EU27 1159.6 -217.7 18.8% 37.7% 27.1% 
Russian Federation 416.0 -183.0 15.8% 13.5% 25.0% 
Israel 194.3 18.8 1.6% 6.3% 0.01% 
Ukraine 187.1 -142.4 12.3% 6.1% 1.4% 
Turkmenistan 170.7 -167.4 14.4% 5.5% 4.3% 
United States 162.4 -33.8 2.9% 5.3% 12.8% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 142.1 -83.9 7.2% 4.6% 11.8% 
China 110.0 -109.1 9.4% 3.6% 0.3% 
Turkey 94.0 -93.5 8.1% 3.1% 1.9% 
Switzerland 91.7 52.4 4.5% 3.0% 2.7% 
RoW 351.2 -150.1 -42.7% 11.4% 12.8% 
World 3079.0 -1109.6 36.0% 100 100 
4.6.1. Export Structures by Major Trading Partners
The EU is Armenia’s most important market. Almost half of all Armenia’s export
in 2006 (47.8%) was captured by the EU (see Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2). Five
Armenia’s largest export partners made up about 85% of total Armenia’s exports in
2006 signifying about a very high level of geographical concentration of Armenian
exports (which is explained by Armenia’s landlocked geographical position and
trade and border limitations with Turkey and Azerbaijan). Armenian exports to the
EU have been reporting a consistent growth over the last decade (overall, exports
have grown by 7.6 times from 1997). As a result, the share of Armenia’s exports to
the EU in total exports has expanded by over 18 percentage points (from 29.4% to
47.8% in 1997).
The geographical structure of Armenia’s exports has undergone significant changes
over the last decade. Armenia has been developing its trade with the EU and other non-
CIS countries while reorienting it from its traditional CIS partners. The weight of the
CIS bloc has decreased from 36.6% in 1997 to 25% in 2001, and to 20.1% in 2006. The
share of exports to Russia has also significantly dropped compared to 1997 – by about
2 times. Russia is the key destination market for Armenia’s traditional exports, first of
all, beverages and spirits (HS 22 group captured 52.2% of total Armenia’s exports to
Russia in 2006, see Appendix2 Table 2 for more details) and other foodstuffs, as well as
precious metals including processed diamonds and gold, articles of jewellery (9%),
rubber (6.7%) and electrical machinery (4.5%). At the same time, the weights of
Georgia and Ukraine have been almost stable over time. Armenia exports largely
cement (34.4%), foodstuffs, electricity (about 15%) and plastics to Georgia, whilst
beverages and spirits (33.2% of total exports to Ukraine), ferro-molybdenum (about
30%) and foodstuffs - to Ukraine.  
The shares of exports to Israel and Switzerland were subject to the most drastic
changes (over 1997-2001). The reorientation of Armenia’s trade to Israel was
intensified by strong inflows of FDI since 2001 largely directed to diamond-processing
sector (worked diamonds accounted for about 98% of total exports to Israel in 2006).
The major exports to Switzerland included ores, slag and ash, HS 26 (38%), precious
metals (gold in semi manufactured form), HS 71 (36%), and cases and dials for
watches, HS 91 (23%). At the same time, exports to Iran have been declining over the
last decade (by about 30% since 1997). As a result, the share of exports to Iran in total
exports has fallen by almost 7 times over the period - from 20.3% in 1997 to only 3%
in 2006. The major items of Armenia’s exports to Iran included electricity (35%),
Portland cement (22%) and aluminium (16.2%), vegetable oils (6.2%).
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.6. Geographical distribution of Armenia’s exports
1997 2001 2006 Country name 
million  
USD 
% million 
 USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
EU27 61.6 29.4% 92.0 27.4% 470.9 47.8% 
Russian Federation 49.5 23.7% 57.70 17.2% 116.5 11.8% 
Israel 0.03 0.01% 33.39 9.9% 106.6 10.8% 
Switzerland 2.3 1.1% 23.01 6.9% 72.1 7.3% 
United States 7.0 3.4% 51.49 15.3% 64.3 6.5% 
Georgia 8.2 3.9% 11.89 3.5% 47.5 4.8% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 42.4 20.3% 31.45 9.4% 29.1 3.0% 
Ukraine 3.1 1.5% 10.90 3.2% 22.4 2.3% 
Belize 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 12.1 1.2% 
Canada 0.1 0.03% 0.90 0.3% 11.1 1.1% 
CIS (other)  15.8 7.5% 3.7 1.1% 11.7 1.2% 
RoW 19.3 9.2% 19.4 5.8% 20.5 2.1% 
Total 209.2 100% 335.8 100% 984.7 100% 
Source: WITS.
Figure 4.2. Geographical distribution of Armenia’s exports, selected years 
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4.6.2. Export Structures by Commodities 
The Sussex Framework suggests considering the sectoral pattern of trade that will
help to identify (1) the sectoral distribution of likely trade creation and trade diversion
and (2) those sectors which are of particular importance to the economies concerned.
This is important from the perspective of economic significance, but also important
from a political economy perspective. 
Table 4.7 presents the 10 largest commodity groups of exports in 2006 aggregated
at HS-2 level, as well as changes in their exports over time. The ten largest export
groups are comprised of precious and non-precious stones, base metals, mineral
products, beverages and spirits, cements, and textiles, and rubber. “Precious and semi-
precious stones and metals” HS group, mainly diamonds, which are processed in
Armenia, gold in semi-manufactured forms and articles of jewellery, represent the
major part of Armenia’s exports (32.5% of all exports in 2006 vs. 26.4 % in 1997 and
36.6% in 2001). The slowdown of the growth of exports of precious stones in recent
years has occurred due to disruptions in the external supply of raw diamonds for
processing and stiffer competition from other countries. The key destinations for these
exports from Armenia are the EU (mainly Belgium) – 48% of total exports from
Armenia in 2006, Israel – 33%, the US – 16%, and Switzerland – 8%. Armenia imports
raw diamonds from other countries, mainly Belgium and Israel, then processes them
and re-exports back to these countries.  
Increased FDI into the metallurgy sector has intensified the sectors’ development
and accelerated their exports in recent years. The rise in world prices of base metals
has also increased the nominal value of exports of base metals from Armenia. Exports
of iron and steel products was the second largest commodity category in 2006, have
increased by about 7 times compared to 1997 and by 17.5 times as compared to 2001.
In 2006, the key markets for iron and steel (mainly ferro-molybdenum) were the EU,
Ukraine and Switzerland and Iran. The share of ores, slag and ash group, mainly
copper ores and concentrates, has grown by almost 3 times since 1997 (from 3.3% in
1997 to 9.5% in 2006) and have been directed mostly to the EU (55% of all group
exports in 2006), Switzerland and Belize. The fourth most important export category
in 2006 was “Beverages and spirits” (mainly spirits obtained by distilling grape wine)
with 8% share of total exports, which slightly decreased overt the last time (from 11.6%
in 2001). The key markets for this group have traditionally been CIS countries, first of
all Russia (77% of all exports to in 2006). Articles of apparel and accessories exports,
HS 62 commodity group (mainly brassieres) have maintained its share over the time.
In 2006, 97% of these exports have been destined to the EU (Italy). 
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Overall, in 2006 as compared with 1997 the Armenian exports revealed higher level
of commodity concentration. The five largest export categories accounted for about
75% in 2006 vs. 62% in 1997. Furthermore, the importance of exports of machinery
and electrical equipment (HS 84, 85) has declined substantially (together they
accounted for 13% of total exports in 1997 vs. only 2% in 2006) reflecting the declining
role of these sectors in the economy.  
Bilateral trade with the EU is even more concentrated compared to Armenia’s
total trade, though Armenia has diversified to some extent its exports to the EU
over the last decade. The five largest commodity groups represented by precious or
semi-precious stones, base metals and mineral products comprised 88% of all
exports to the EU in 2006 (see Table 4.8). The exports of precious or semi-precious
stones to the EU have grown by over two times during the last decade, however
their share has been experiencing a huge decline since 1997 (from 77% of all
exports to the EU in 1997 to about 66% in 2001 and 23% in 2006), explained by
disruptions in the external supply of raw diamonds for processing and stiffer
competition from other countries. At the same time, the importance of exports of
base metals to the EU has considerably strengthened. Also, Armenia has expanded
exports of articles of apparel and rubber to the EU capturing 4.3% and 2.6% of total
exports to the EU in 2006. 
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.7. 10 largest commodity groups of Armenia’s total exports, by HS 2 digit 
HS  
code 
Product description 1997 2001 2006 
  million  
USD 
% million 
USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
71 Precious or semi-precious 
stones and precious metals 
55.1 26.4% 122.82 36.58% 319.8 32.47% 
72 Iron and steel  24.2 11.5% 9.57 2.85% 167.5 17.01% 
26 Ores, slag and ash 6.8 3.3% 20.49 6.10% 93.5 9.49% 
22 Beverages, spirits and 
vinegar 
19.1 9.1% 39.08 11.64% 79.1 8.04% 
74 Copper and articles thereof 14.6 7.0% 12.88 3.83% 77.2 7.84% 
81 Other base metals; cermets 0.6 0.3% 1.90 0.56% 25.7 2.61% 
40 Rubber and articles thereof 8.1 3.9% 12.40 3.69% 24.5 2.48% 
25 Salt; sulphur; earths and 
stone; plastering materials; 
lime and cement 
3.3 1.6% 0.22 0.07% 23.4 2.37% 
62 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, not 
knitted or crocheted 
7.0 3.3% 15.54 4.63% 20.9 2.12% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 
and products of their 
distillation 
1.6 0.8% 17.16 5.11% 19.5 1.98% 
 Total 140.4 67.20% 252.06 75.06% 851.1 86.41% 
According to the Sussex Framework, the pre-FTA substantial and consistently
growing share of Armenian exports to the EU market signifies that Armenian
producers have been successfully exploring their comparative advantages on the EU
market in regard to Armenian major export items (see below). As such, after getting
a preferential access to this market under the future FTA there will be more
opportunities for Armenian exporters to expand their exports (trade creation effect).
Still, taking into the account the low level of EU tariff barriers applied to most
Armenian products (GSP general agreement), the tariff reductions and shallow
integration, overall, are not likely to induce considerable expansion of Armenian
exports to the EU. In particular, the EU already imposes zero tariffs on such major
Armenia’s exports as precious stones and metals, ores and concentrates, copper and
articles thereof, ferroalloys, rubber and articles thereof, spirits obtained by distilling
grape wine (see TRAINS database for effectively applied tariffs in 2006). At the same
time, non-zero taxes are applied to most agricultural and food products (max ad-
valorem tariff – 40.3% for cigarettes); textiles and clothing (max - 9.6%); other base
metals, cermets, and articles thereof (max – 5%); aluminium and articles thereof
(max – 2.5%) – therefore, shallow integration-induced trade creation is likely to
occur in regard to these Armenian exports. Overall, the average effectively applied
tariff in 2006 weighed by Armenia’s imports to the EU in 2005 equalled 0.2%,
including 5% - for agricultural products, and 0.16% - for non-agricultural goods18
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Table 4.8. 10 largest commodity groups of Armenia’s exports to the EU, by HS 2-digit
HS 
code 
Product description 1997 2001 2006 
  million  
USD 
% million  
USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
72 Iron and steel  8.22 13.3% 7.58 8.2% 156.3 33.2% 
71 Precious or semi-precious 
stones and precious metals 
47.54 77.2% 60.94 66.2% 109.4 23.2% 
74 Copper and articles thereof 1.32 2.1% 1.17 1.3% 74.6 15.8% 
26 Ores, slag and ash 0.00 0.0% 3.51 3.8% 50.9 10.8% 
81 Other base metals; cermets; 
articles thereof 
0.52 0.8% 1.79 1.9% 25.7 5.4% 
62 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, not 
knitted or crocheted 
0.00 0.0% 4.37 4.8% 20.3 4.3% 
40 Rubber and articles thereof 0.03 0.0% 0.73 0.8% 12.5 2.6% 
61 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, knitted 
or crocheted 
0.00 0.0% 1.11 1.2% 3.9 0.8% 
3 Fish and crustaceans, 
molluscs 
0.01 0.0% 0.003 0.004% 3.2 0.7% 
76 Aluminium and articles 
thereof 
0.17 0.3% 0.88 1.0% 2.4 0.5% 
 Total 57.81 93.70% 82.09 89.22% 459.2 97.30% 
(including 6.1% - for textiles and clothing (HS 50-63); 2.5% - for aluminium and
articles thereof (HS 76); and 0.9% - for other base metals, cermets, and articles
thereof (HS 81)). 
As was mentioned, high trade and transportation costs, NTBs and regulatory
impediments, low competitiveness of Armenian products are the major market access
restrictions for Armenia in regard to the EU, so their reduction during deep integration
between countries creates much more potential for Armenian producers to increase
their penetration in the EU market. The expected development of new industrial
structures in Armenia under the future EU-Armenia FTA will also enhance the
Armenia’s export potential.  
4.6.3. Import Structures by Major Trading Partners
The EU is the most important trade partner of Armenia on the imports side
accounting for about one third of Armenia’s imports (32.9% in 2006) (see Table 4.9).
The EU imports to Armenia has expanded by 3.5 times since 1997, while the EU share
in total imports has risen from 26.4% in 1997 to 32.9% in 2006 (though it has remained
almost stable compared to 2001). Armenia is a net importer of the European products
with the registered USD 217.7 million negative trade balance in 2006 (or about 18.8%
of bilateral trade).
The CIS countries also remain important origin of Armenia’s imports with a stable
share of about 33% in 2006 (35.3% in 1997). However, there has been a reorientation
of sourcing of supply from Russia to other CIS countries. In particular, the share of
Russia has been dropping from 25.4% from 1997 to 19.8% in 2001 and to 14.3% in
2006. Russia largely exports to Armenia cereals (16.3% of Russian exports to the
Armenia in 2006), vehicles (15.3%), machinery and mechanical appliances (8.6%),
precious stones (8%).    
The role of Ukraine as source of Armenian imports has increases significantly over
the period. It was the third largest importer in 2006 capturing about 8% of Armenia’s
total imports vs. 1.4% in 1997. Ukraine exports mainly iron and steel products (23.6%
in 2006), mineral fuels (19.6%), tobacco products (11.2%), and vegetable oils (4.7%).
The weight of other CIS countries has also risen, mostly due to the growth of imports
of natural gas from Turkmenistan.
The registered imports from neighbouring countries Georgia and Turkey in
Armenia’s import structure capture relatively small shares (1.7% and 4.5%
respectively). Turkey’s share has shown a gradual increase over the last decade (from
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18 Excluding specific tariffs on alcohols (HS 220421, 220600) and tobacco (HS 240110, 240120). 
1.5% in 1997). According to Armenian data, it imports from Georgia sugars (34%),
fertilizers (27.4%), wood and articles of wood (15%), and beverages and spirits (almost
5%). Turkey’s major imports to Armenia consist of plastics (15.3%), iron and steel and
articles thereof (16.4%), wood and articles of wood (7.3%), machinery (5.8%). At the
same time, the weight of Iran has been consistently contracting (from 9.4% in 1997 to
5.4% in 2006). Iran’s exports to Armenia are mineral fuels, steel or iron products,
plastics, and chemicals.
There has also been a shift in Armenia’s import structure from traditional sources
of supply to new partners such as China and India with 5.2% and 1.1% shares
respectively in 2006. China exports to Armenia mostly machinery and electrical
equipments, footwear and ceramic products, while India – meat, vehicles and
machinery, and precious stones. The US was the third largest supplier to Armenia in
1997 with a 15.5% share and then has shifted to the sixth position in 2006 (4.7%). The
US exports are largely precious stones (25%), pharmaceuticals (21.7%), instruments
and apparatus (12.5%), and machinery (8.6%).
Taking into account the relatively high share of imports from the EU in Armenia’s
total imports, we can conclude that the future EU-Armenia FTA has some potential for
trade creation. At the same time, about 67% of Armenia’s imports are supplied by non-
EU countries, which suggest the likelihood for shifting of sources of imports from these
countries to the EU. Here, two opposite impacts may take place: i) if supply switching
occurs from CIS countries with whom Armenia already has an FTA accounting by
about 33% of total imports to Armenia, than there is likely to be welfare increasing
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Table 4.9. Geographical distribution of Armenia’s imports
Country name 1997 2001 2006 
 milion 
USD 
% million  
USD 
% million 
USD 
% 
EU27 195.5 26.4% 271.4 32.4% 688.6 32.9% 
Russian  
Federation 
188.1 25.4% 166.1 19.8% 299.5 14.3% 
Ukraine 10.3 1.4% 22.0 2.6% 164.7 7.9% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 69.4 9.4% 72.8 8.7% 113.0 5.4% 
China 2.4 0.3% 2.1 0.3% 109.5 5.2% 
United States 114.7 15.5% 83.4 10.0% 98.1 4.7% 
Turkey 11.0 1.5% 29.0 3.5% 93.8 4.5% 
Israel 0.1 0.01% 27.6 3.3% 87.8 4.2% 
Georgia 32.4 4.4% 12.9 1.5% 34.7 1.7% 
India 0.7 0.1% 5.1 0.6% 22.7 1.1% 
CIS (other) 30.4 4.1% 3.9 0.5% 193.1 9.2% 
RoW 85.5 11.5% 140.9 16.8% 188.7 9.0% 
Total 740.5 100% 837.2 100.0% 2094.3 100% 
trade reorientation; ii) where there is shift away from non-FTA partner countries, then
this would entail welfare decreasing trade diversion. The magnitude of these effects will
also depend on how far the differences in competitiveness across CIS and non-CIS
countries are actually affected by tariff changes. Consequently, the net welfare effect
from this FTA for Armenia will be ambiguous. Nevertheless, the shallow integration-
induced welfare effects are not expected to be significant due to the low level of pre-
FTA tariffs in Armenia for all its partners. 
4.6.4. Import Structure by Commodities 
Armenia is heavily dependent on imported energy resources and has limited access
to international fuel markets due to its geographical location. Natural gas and oil
products (HS 27) are the largest commodity group of Armenia’s imports, though its
registered weight has been declining over the last decade (from 27.8% in 1997 to 16.7%
in 2006) (see Table 4.10). Turkmenistan is the main supplier of these products to
Armenia (48%), followed by the EU (28%) and Iran (21%).
Armenia also intensively imports precious stones and metals to service the
significant processing industry. Imports of precious stones and metals have risen by 6.5
times over the period thus driving their share up to by more than two times (from 6.4%
in 1997 to 15% in 2006). The key suppliers are the EU (almost 50%), Israel (27.5%) the
US (7.9%) and Russia (7.7%). 
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Figure 4.3. Geographical distribution of Armenia’s imports, selected years 
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Growing imports of machinery and equipment serve to replace the fading domestic
industry and underpin infrastructure investment (ADB, 2006). Machinery and
mechanical appliances is the third largest import group with a gradually increasing
share over the period (8% in 2006). These imports are largely sourced from the EU
(47.5%), Russia (15.4%), China (12.5%) and the US (5%). Electrical equipments (6.5%
of all imports in 2006) are imported from the EU (65%), China (7%), and Russia (7%),
the US (3.5%) and Ukraine (3.2%). The weight of vehicles has expanded by 4 times over
the period; they are reported to be originated from Russia (43%), the EU (23%), Japan
(9.8%), Belarus (8.8%)19, and India (3.4%)20. Metallurgical products, cereals,
pharmaceuticals and plastics captured almost the same shares in the Armenia’s
imports in 2006 (about 3%). The role of cereals and pharmaceuticals in total imports
has been falling during the last decade, while the shares of iron and steel and plastics
have been on the rise. The key importers of pharmaceuticals to Armenia are the EU
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Table 4.10. 10 largest commodity groups of Armenia’s total imports, by HS 2-digit
HS 
code 
Product description 1997 2001 2006 
  milion 
USD 
% milion 
USD 
% million 
USD 
% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral 
oils and products 
of their distillation 
206.1 27.8% 186.31 22.25% 350.6 16.74% 
71 Precious or semi- 
precious stones 
and metals 
47.5 6.4% 106.76 12.75% 312.5 14.92% 
84 Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
and mechanical  
appliances 
36.9 5.0% 47.82 5.71% 168.0 8.02% 
85 Electrical machinery 
and equipment 
33.5 4.5% 38.93 4.65% 135.7 6.48% 
87 Vehicles other than 
railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
9.8 1.3% 13.09 1.56% 107.1 5.11% 
72 Iron and steel 3.0 0.4% 9.29 1.11% 63.0 3.01% 
10 Cereals 50.4 6.8% 47.92 5.72% 60.7 2.90% 
30 Pharmaceutical products 43.7 5.9% 28.94 3.46% 60.1 2.87% 
39 Plastics and articles 
thereof 
8.2 1.1% 16.15 1.93% 55.4 2.65% 
73 Articles of iron or steel 9.8 1.3% 5.53 0.66% 54.9 2.62% 
 Total 448.9 60.5% 500.74 59.8% 1368 65.3% 
19 Mainly motor vehicles for the transport of goods.
20 Mainly road tractors for semi-trailers.
(43.2%), the US (35.3%) and Switzerland (4.9%); of plastics and articles thereof –
Turkey (26%), the EU (22.6%), Iran (14.1%) and China (9%). Overall, the level of import
concentration is significant, but not so high as compared to Armenia’s exports.  
Armenia’s imports from the EU are dominated by precious stones and metals
(22.5% in 2006), electrical equipments (12.7%), machinery and mechanical appliances
(11.6%), pharmaceuticals (3.8%) and vehicles (3.6%) (See Table 4.11). As previously
mentioned, Armenia reported mineral fuels taking about 14% of its imports from the
EU (originated mainly from Romania and Bulgaria) or USD 97.4 million; whilst the
same figure provided by the EU data is only USD 1.5 million. The strongest growth over
1997-2006 have been revealed by mineral fuels, machinery and mechanical appliances,
vehicles, articles of iron or steel, and essential oils and cosmetics. 
Imports of agricultural products from the EU have revealed a huge decline since
1997: from 37.2% of total imports from the EU in 1997 to 8.7% in 2006. The two major
commodity groups of agricultural imports from the EU in 2006 included tobacco
products, HS 24 (1.8% of total imports from the EU) and preparations of vegetables,
HS 20 (0.8%), while in 1997 – products of the milling industry, HS 11 (10.1%) and
cereals, HS 10 (8.5%). Since the majority of agricultural products are subject to 10%
tariff protection in Armenia, there exist some scope for trade creation and trade
diversion effects in regard if these products are included into the FTA. 
According to the Sussex framework, trade creation and trade diversion are likely to
appear mainly in regard to those goods, in which the pre-FTA trade between partners
has been concentrated as reflected in Table 4.11. Furthermore, the EU will compete
with those partners, who export a similar set of goods to Armenia; hence the future FTA
may cause Armenia’s trade to divert from those partners. On the contrary, less trade
diversion is expected in regard to partners with dissimilar structures of exports to
Armenia. As previously described, the EU competes with Russia, China, the US and
Ukraine in regard to electrical equipment; with Russia, China, and the US in regard to
machinery and mechanical appliances; with the US and Switzerland in regard to
pharmaceuticals; with Russia, Japan, and India in regard to vehicles. The low overall
level of pre-FTA tariffs on the EU major imports in Armenia suggest that the shallow
integration effects from the tariff elimination are not expected to be significant in
regard to these products (first of all, those imports subject to 0% tariff rates such as
unworked precious stones; mineral fuels; pharmaceuticals; essential oils, perfumery,
cosmetic or toilet preparations; most articles of iron and steel, machinery and
mechanical appliances). At the same time, shallow integration effects are possible to
arise for the EU imports subject to 10% tariff rate (such as electrical machinery and
equipment, motor cars, motor-cycles, cameras; photocopying apparatus; certain
plastics, etc.). If the 10% tariff were scrapped this could be a useful improvement of
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competitiveness of the EU products in relation to Japan, China, the US and India, and
thus trade diversion is likely to occur. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, free trade
regime with the EU is likely to trigger some reorientation of the trade in these products
from CIS countries to the EU.
4.7. Finger-Kreinin Indices
According to the third and forth rules of thumb, the extent to which the trade
creation on the production side will occur depends on the degree of overlap in
production and trade structures across the economies of future partners, and on the
differences in relative costs of production between them. The more similar the
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Table 4.11. 10 largest commodity groups of Armenia’s imports from the EU, by HS 2-digit
HS  
code 
Product description 1997 2001 2006 
  million
 USD 
% million
 USD 
% million
 USD 
% 
71 Precious or semi- 
precious  
stones and metals 
45.8 23.4% 44.93 16.55% 154.9 22.5% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral 
oils and products  
of their distillation 
2.2 1.1% 65.40 24.09% 97.4 14.1% 
85 Electrical machinery 
and equipment 
22.5 11.5% 18.13 6.68% 87.2 12.7% 
84 Nuclear reactors,  
boilers, 
machinery and  
mechanical appliances 
15.6 8.0% 19.13 7.05% 79.8 11.6% 
30 Pharmaceutical 
products 
6.1 3.1% 5.51 2.03% 26.0 3.8% 
87 Vehicles other than  
railway or tramway  
rolling-stock 
2.5 1.3% 2.62 0.97% 24.6 3.6% 
73 Articles of iron or steel 1.4 0.7% 1.82 0.67% 20.6 3.0% 
33 Essential oils and  
resinoids; perfumery, 
cosmetic or toilet 
preparations 
1.0 0.5% 4.36 1.61% 14.6 2.1% 
90 Optical, photographic,  
cinematographic,  
measuring 
and other instruments  
4.1 2.1% 3.64 1.34% 13.8 2.0% 
39 Plastics and articles  
thereof 
3.0 1.6% 5.44 2.00% 12.5 1.8% 
 Total 104.2 53.30% 170.98 62.99% 531.4 77.20% 
production bundles of the economies and the higher the elasticities of supply, the
greater the possibility of trade creation from the PTA, since countries are able to source
the good to the more efficient partner supplier (Gasiorek et al., 2006). Otherwise, trade
diversion is likely to occur. The only possibility for trade creation of the future FTA will
be on the demand side. 
The degree of similarity between two partners with regard to their trade or
production structures is measured by the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index. The FK index is
equal to 1 (or 100 if expressed as percent) when the structure of trade across the two
countries is identical, and is equal to 0 when the structure of trade is completely
different. Ideally, it is computed on the basis of production data, but since it is not
readily available, highly disaggregated trade data is used instead. We calculated FK
indices to measure similarities of export structures between Armenia and its main trade
partners - the EU27, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Iran21, Turkey, as well as across these
partners at the HS 6-digit and 4-digit level. Also, we did the same exercise for imports
(see Table 4.12 through Table 4.15).
As can be seen from Table 4.12 and Table 4.13, the FK indices capturing export
similarities between Armenia and its main trade partners are relatively low. The
highest FK index is between Armenian and Georgian exports: it equals 19.11 at HS
6 digit level and 31.33 at HS 4 digit level. The FK index for Armenia and the EU
exports is about 2.5 times less than that for Armenia and Georgia and equals 7.58 at
HS 6 digit level and 10.72 at HS 4 digit level suggesting a low level of export
similarity between them. Therefore, according to the fourth rule of thumb there is not
much evidence for trade creation on the production side under the future Armenia
and the EU FTA. Armenia’s export structure does not overlap much with export
structures of other partners either. The common need across the CIS countries for
imports of intermediates and final goods which are not produced domestically leads
the significantly higher degree of overlap with regard to imports (see Table 4.14,
Table 4.15). 
4.8. Revealed Comparative Advantage 
It is important to analyse the relative competitiveness of producers of the partners
of future FTA. Great differences in comparative advantage between partners producing
a similar mix of goods suggest welfare improving FTA (on the production side). When
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21 Trade data for Iran is of 2005.
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Table 4.12. FK indices, 6 digit, export, 2006
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Georgia 19.11 1      
Azerbaijan 1.80 5.89 1     
Ukraine 5.00 10.03 9.26 1    
Russia 3.22 5.96 53.94 21.14 1   
Iran 1.56 4.26 62.63 4.94 38.90 1  
Turkey 7.58 7.95 3.47 16.38 5.51 4.49 1 
EU27 7.41 16.13 8.18 27.01 18.12 6.91 23.01 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.13. FK indices, 4 digit, export, 2006
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Georgia 31.33 -      
Azerbaijan 2.49 7.35 -     
Ukraine 9.18 18.42 11.70 -    
Russia 5.23 11.60 55.83 25.50 -   
Iran 2.93 6.98 64.86 7.48 42.01 -  
Turkey 10.72 12.47 4.74 21.26 7.18 7.65 - 
EU27 10.08 23.29 10.42 34.49 20.77 9.76 27.89 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.14. FK indices, 6 digit, import, 2006
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Georgia 53.31 -      
Azerbaijan 32.23 39.76 -     
Ukraine 35.52 37.92 38.41 -    
Russia 31.94 42.19 34.50 56.27 -   
Iran 18.24 20.25 26.59 34.00 35.11 -  
Turkey 20.87 22.29 24.39 50.16 38.61 42.06 - 
EU27 31.41 35.28 31.51 53.01 51.13 35.99 48.08 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.15. FK indices, 4 digit, import, 2006
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Georgia 64.11 -      
Azerbaijan 47.65 51.97 -     
Ukraine 50.59 53.57 46.40 -    
Russia 44.17 54.62 44.36 56.27 -   
Iran 37.46 39.29 36.33 42.74 43.44 -  
Turkey 42.69 39.36 33.83 51.18 46.36 51.70 - 
EU27 46.43 53.26 43.05 62.96 60.33 43.84 55.75 
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there are differences in production efficiency and costs between partners trade creation
arises since countries are able to source the goods from the most efficient and less-cost
FTA partner. In other words, countries have the potential to greater specialise in those
goods, in which they have a comparative advantage. The greater the differences in
comparative advantage the greater are the trade creation effect and welfare gains.  
Indices of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) are usually used to compute the
relative competitiveness of producers. The RCA compares a country’s share of exports
in a given good with the world share of exports of this good. A country has a comparative
advantage when its share is above the world share for that good or when RCA is greater
that 1; disadvantage is expressed by an RCA less than 1. For our analysis, we i)
calculated the RCAs for Armenia and for the EU, as well as for all Armenia’s main
partners, namely Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, at the HS 6-digit level for
2006; ii) calculated Armenia’s RCAs for 1997 to analyse the evolution of Armenia’s
comparative advantage over the last decade; iii) compared Armenia’s largest export
items by export shares vs. exports with the highest RCAs to show if Armenia exported
products in which it had a comparative advantage; iv) computed Armenia’s RCAs for
non-agricultural exports to better highlight Armenia’s stance in this area, v) did the same
exercises with respect to Armenia’s exports to the EU.
The analysis of Armenia’s export structure and its RCAs has resulted in the
following conclusions: 
• Armenia’s export is highly concentrated at the HS 6-digit level (see Appendix1
Table 1). The 15 top export sectors accounted for about 81% of total exports in
2006. 5 top export sectors having made up 62% of total exports in 2006 comprised
worked diamonds, ferromolybdenum, copper ores and concentrates, spirits
obtained by distilling grape wine, unrefined copper and copper anodes. Other
important export items include gold in semi-manufactured forms, articles of
jewellery, chloroprene, brassieres of all types of textile materials, Portland
cement, and electricity. In all of these goods Armenia has a comparative
advantage. Furthermore, 8 among 15 largest export items simultaneously belong
to the list of exports with the highest RCAs in 2006 signifying that Armenia is very
successful in specializing in and exploring its comparative advantages on the
world markets (see Appendix1 Table 2). At the same time, there is still a potential
for Armenia to enhance its specialisation in other exports revealing the highest
comparative advantage. 
• The 15 largest export sectors in 2006 made up only 41% in 1997 (Appendix1 Table
2). Armenia’s export structure has undergone considerable changes concerning
certain items in 2006 vs. 1997. The most significant rise of export shares has been
observed for ferro-molybdenum, copper ores and concentrates, gold in semi-
manufactured forms, unrefined copper and copper anodes, and brassieres. At the
same time, the role of exports of worked diamonds, spirits, chloroprene remained
almost unchanged. The greatest positive changes in RCAs have occurred for:
cases and dials for watches, ferromolybdenum, unrefined copper and copper
anodes, crustaceans, fit for human consumption, articles of molybdenum, tubes
and pipes having circular cross-sections, and negative changes – for liquid
dielectric transformers, gas-operated machinery for welding, artificial fur and
articles thereof, men’s or boys’ ensembles of cotton, and wastes and scraps of base
metals (steel, copper and aluminium) (see Appendix1 Table 3, Appendix1 Table 4).
The RCAs have remained almost unchanged for worked diamonds, copper ores,
spirits and electricity. There has been a tendency for a decline of the RCAs in
textile and machine building sectors, while an increase in metallurgical sector.
Also, Armenia has successfully developed new niche markets connected with
processing of precious stones such as cases for watches, dials for clocks and
watches, etc.    
• The high concentration of Armenia’s exports is also true for Armenia’s non-
agricultural exports (top 15 export sectors made up 84% of total non-agricultural
exports in 2006). Cases for watches of precious and other than precious metals,
dials for clocks and watches, ferro-molybdenum and articles and molybdenum,
chloroprene, and unrefined cooper top the list of exports with highest RCAs (see
Appendix1 Table 5, Appendix1 Table 6). Again, 63% of non-agricultural exports
belonged to the list of items with the highest RCAs in 2006, which a sign of
Armenia’s specialization in those goods, in which it has a comparative advantage
(see Appendix1 Table 6).   
• In regard to the EU market: we can see again a higher concentration of Armenia’s
export to the EU: seven top export items (ferromolybdenum, worked diamonds,
unrefined copper, copper ores, brassieres, molybdenum ores and concentrates,
and chloroprene) accounted for about 85.5% of all exports to the EU in 2006 (see
Appendix1 Table 7). The Armenia’s most important export items reveal even
higher RCAs on the EU market: chloroprene, ferromolybdenum, molybdenum
and copper ores, unrefined copper, articles of molybdenum, crustaceans (see
Appendix1 Table 7). It worth noting that top 15 Armenia’s exports to the EU
revealed on average a higher comparative advantage than the total exports to the
world markets (see Appendix1 Table 1 and Appendix1 Table 7). On the other
hand, the top 15 export items with highest RCAs made up 89% of Armenia’s
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exports to the EU market in 2006, and 62% on the world markets (see Appendix1
Table 2, Appendix1 Table 8) signifying that Armenia specialises its trade with the
EU in sectors in which it exhibits greater comparative advantage. There have
been important compositional shifts in the top 15 exports to the EU in 2006 vs.
those in 1997 resulting in some increase of diversification of Armenia’s exports to
the EU. In particular, exports of worked diamonds accounted for 72% of all
exports to the EU in 1997 while 22% - in 2006. At the same time, Armenia’s
exports shifted to ferromolybdenum; copper ores and concentrates; unrefined
copper, copper anodes; brassieres; molybdenum ores and concentrates;
chloroprene (Appendix1 Table 7).     
We also compared the composition and RCAs of the top fifteen export sectors of
Armenia and its major partners the EU, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
We note that there is little similarity between countries highest RCAs and composition
of top export sector (see Appendix1 Table 13 and Appendix 3 (Appendix3 Table 1
through Appendix3 Table 5)). In addition, the bilateral correlation coefficients of the
RCA’s at the 6-digit HS level across all the pairs of countries are very low (and in most
cases negative) (Appendix1 Table 14) confirming very little similarity in both the export
patterns, and in the revealed comparative advantage they indicate. The correlation
coefficients are the most significant, though still very low, between Armenia and
Georgia RCAs (0.05). There is little correlation between the Armenian and the EU RCAs
(0.02).  
As was mentioned, low similarity between the RCAs suggests that there is a scope
for trade creation on the production side, provided that countries have similar
production bundles. Since there is little overlap in the commodities mix across
Armenia and the EU (FK index for Armenia and the EU exports is rather low), trade
creation under the future FTA on the production side is expected to be small. 
4.9. Deep integration and Grubel-Lloyd index
According to the Sussex Framework the potential for gains from deeper integration
depends on the extent to which the FTA leads to convergence of regulatory and
economic policies among partners. The greater the convergence of countries’
regulatory policies, the greater is the potential for welfare gains as a result of the FTA.
This requires both a removal of barriers to trade that operate beyond borders (such as
discriminatory regulations, institutional impediments, etc.) and undertaking common
policies needed to promote trade and investment and to generate positive externalities
and productivity gains (Gasiorek et al., 2006).
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As previously mentioned, low pre-FTA tariff barriers between Armenia and the EU
will not likely induce large-scale trade effects driven by shallow integration. Therefore,
it is very important to consider opportunities from the deeper (positive) integration
between Armenia and the EU which is likely to produce considerably higher welfare
implications for Armenia than those arising from shallow integration as a result of the
development of closer and more stable trade relations between partner countries
allowing for more specialization in niche goods, participation in a fine division of
labour, creation of stable value chains, creation of new industrial structures. In this
regard, it is very critical for Armenia to remove or reduce the existing barriers to trade
(regulatory, political, institutional and infrastructure) and maintain the regulatory and
institutional framework necessary to promote trade and generate positive externalities
and productivity gains. Again, the greater the Armenia’s achievements (prior and upon
the conclusion of the FTA) in regulatory convergence with the EU, the greater are the
expected welfare gains for Armenia from the future FTA. In addition, the strengthening
of the regional cooperation in trade and transit facilitation is crucial for Armenia to
gain better access to the EU and the world markets.
Intra-industry trade (IIT) is a key indicator of existing and possible deep
integration in market terms between partner countries. IIT is the exchange of goods
which takes three forms: 1) it is the exchange of similar goods of roughly similar
qualities and prices; 2) it is the exchange of similar goods of different qualities and
prices; 3) it is the exchange of goods within a trade classification that represents a
vertically integrated supply chain (parts for finished or partly finished goods). Each of
these represents a way in which economic integration can encourage the niche
specialisation that generates productivity gains. These gains represent the main
advantages of deep integration and compensate for any losses to trade diversion from
shallow integration (Gasiorek et al., 2006). The levels of IIT are measured by the
Grubel-Lloyd index ranging from 0 for no IIT between countries to 1 (or 100 in
percentage form) if all trade is IIT.
We computed the IIT indices for Armenia and its main partners in 2006 at the HS
6 digit and 4 digit levels (for comparison), and in 1997 at the HS 6 digit level. In
addition, for comparison we calculated the IIT indices for the EU and Georgia and the
same countries at HS 6 digit level. Table 4.16 shows that the registered IIT index
between Armenia and the EU in 2006 constituted 16.3% at HS 6 digit level and 30.6%
at HS 4 digit level. Using the EU mirror trade data for calculations of the IIT index
between Armenia and the EU, the index equals 18.5% at the HS 6 digit level. This index
is rather low; however, it reveals a greater IIT trade between Armenia and the EU than
between Armenia and Armenia’s CIS partners – Ukraine (7.8%) or Russia (15.2%), as
well as between for example the EU and Georgia (8.2% or 9.3%, excluding trade in
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oils22). Moreover, if we compare the level of IIT trade between countries in 2006 and
1997, we can see that the reported IIT has substantially risen between Armenia and the
EU over the past years (from only 2.2% in 1997). 
Armenia has the highest levels of IIT with Iran and Georgia (see Table 4.16) – 38.7%
and 27.2% at the HS 6 digit level. Since these indices are sensitive to the bilateral data
used,  for countries with big discrepancies in mirror trade flows the IIT indexes may
differ substantially. As previously described, the considerable data discrepancies in
2006 have been detected between Armenia and Georgia, Turkey and the EU. Table 4
16 shows that if we calculated IIT index on the basis of Georgia’s trade data, the
appropriate index equals 16.3%. 
The low level of IIT between Armenia and the EU confirms the earlier
considerations about  the non significant overlap between Armenia and the EU trade
patterns (captured by FK index) and competitiveness (captured by RCAs). Still,
increasing IIT over time suggests that there is some potential for the additional benefits
that can occur in presence of deep integration between countries. The low IIT index is
mainly explained by the basic realities of Armenia, namely that upon collapse of the
Soviet Union most of Armenia’s industrial structure collapsed, also under the impact
of the Turkish/Azeri blockade. 
4.10. Conclusions
In this paper we studied the potential welfare effects of an EU-Armenia FTA from
simple (shallow) integration between the countries on the basis of the Sussex
72
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Source: WITS Note: * excluding HS 27 group (Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation
Table 4.16. IIT indices for Armenia in 2006 (HS 6 digit and 4 digit levels), for Armenia in 1997
(HS 6 digit level) and for EU27 and Georgia in 2006 (HS 6 digit level)
 Armenia,  
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Armenia, 
HS 6 digit, 
1997 
Armenia, 
HS 4 digit, 
2006 
EU27, 
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Georgia, 
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Armenia - - - 18.45 16.29 
Georgia 27.18 1.56 29.07 38.89 (9.3*) - 
Ukraine 7.80 8.42 17.33 14.33 3.24 
Russia 15.24 18.70 17.46 6.16 13.44 
Iran 38.69 6.28 32.27 3.34 23.07 
Turkey 13.73 7.16 21.42 18.68 12.28 
EU27 16.27 2.20 30.59 - 8.17 
22 There are huge discrepancies in mirror data on trade flows between Georgia and the EU in
regard to mineral fuels, HS 27group.  
Framework methodology. Some attention has also been paid to potential gains from
deep integration. The following conclusions have been made:
• since the overall level of pre-FTA tariff protection in Armenia is low (simple
average MFN tariff is about 3%), the future reduction of tariff barriers under the
EU-Armenia FTA is expected to have a limited scope for either trade creation or
trade diversion on the import side in the Armenian economy, especially in regard
to non-agricultural trade; 
• the low MFN tariff protection implies that the preference margins received by CIS
trade partners under the existing FTAs are not significant as well. As a result,
there are limited possibilities for welfare-increasing trade reorientation occurring
among other FTA partners (CIS countries) and the new partner (the EU);
• physical, regulatory and political (first of all, the closure of borders with
neighbouring countries) barriers to trade considerably increase the costs of trade
in Armenia and have a huge detrimental impact on the overall volumes of trade
(both exports and imports), as well as impose trade distortions on the Armenia’s
trade structure. Therefore cooperation between Armenia and the EU on their
reduction should be welfare increasing. It should be noted that Armenia and the
EU already cooperate on the reduction of non-tariff barriers in the framework of
the PCA and ENP Action Plan’s implementation. Competition policy should be a
priority in this cooperation;
• the increasing EU share in Armenia’s imports (from 26% to 33% over 10 years)
suggests that there is a potential for trade creation from a Simple FTA. At the
same time, high importance of non-EU imports (about 67% of total imports in
2006) suggests about likely trade diversion effect. Next, the low similarity between
the production and trade structures of Armenia and the EU, as well as the low
correlation between the countries RCAs signify that trade diversion is on balance
more likely than trade creation from a future Simple FTA (though, as stated above
this effect is not expected to be significant);
• since the EU tariffs are already low for Armenian goods and Armenia accounts
for a small part of the EU trade creation and trade diversion effects from the
future EU-Armenia FTA are not expected to be significant for the EU as well;  
• the EU’s major imports to Armenia (such as precious stones, machinery and
mechanical appliances, mineral fuels, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, plastics) are
largely exempted from tariffs in Armenia, therefore little direct welfare effects are
expected from the EU-Armenia FTA in regard to these products. At the same time,
Armenia imposes 10% duties on products of central interest to the EU industries,
73
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ARMENIA
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
like vehicles, electrical machinery and equipment, certain plastics, etc. The
abolition of 10% tariff could be a useful improvement of competitiveness of those
EU goods in relation to other sources of supply such as Japan, China and India.
So, from the EU perspective, the FTA is likely to bring some advantages and no
threats of losses. Elimination of these tariffs will also be beneficial for Armenian
consumers, especially given the huge trade imbalance, with transfers from the
Armenian diaspora financing this on an apparently long-term basis to a
substantial degree;
• the EU is the largest Armenia’s destination market (about 48% of total exports  in
2006) and its share has been growing over time. Due to the low levels of pre-FTA
EU tariffs (GSP general agreement) and non-tariff protection measures (such as
quantitative restrictions), the direct shallow-integration induced impact of the
FTA on Armenia’s exports to the EU is not likely to be significant;   
• Armenia’s exports to the EU are highly concentrated (largely in precious or semi-
precious stones, base metals and mineral products) and consequently they are
vulnerable to price and demand fluctuations in the EU market. Diversification of
exports to the EU may diminish those risks for Armenia; 
• Armenia has been successful in specializing in and exploring its comparative
advantages on the EU and world markets. Over the last decade, there has been a
tendency for a decline of the RCAs in textile and machine building sectors,  while
an increase in metallurgical sector. Also, Armenia has successfully developed new
niche markets connected with processing of precious stones such as cases for
watches, dials for clocks and watches, etc.;
• the low level of the intra-industry trade between Armenia and the EU suggests that
there is little evidence of current deep integration between countries. The intra-
industry trade linkages between them could be strengthened in the event of the
development of new industrial structures under the future Deep EU-Armenia FTA; 
• Development of regional cooperation with Armenia’s neighbours, first of all, in
transport and trade facilitation initiatives, is crucial for reducing Armenia’s
transport costs and improving its access to the external markets, as well as for
enhancing Armenia’s economic competitiveness, trade and business
opportunities. Relations with Georgia are of particular importance for Armenia
because Georgia offers Armenia its only land connection with Europe and access
to its Black Sea ports. Any improvements of regional cooperation as a result of
future EU FTAs with Armenia and Georgia are expected to be beneficial for
Armenia. 
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• summing up, shallow integration effects from the future EU-Armenia FTA are not
likely to be large-scale; major welfare implications for Armenia are expected to
arise from the deeper integration between the parties. Therefore it is very critical
for Armenia to reduce the existing barriers to trade and to introduce and maintain
the regulatory and institutional framework aiming at promoting trade and
generating positive externalities and productivity gains. Effective implementation
of regulatory convergence with the EU acquis in the trade and investment issues
are expected to increase the potential for grasping greater welfare gains for
Armenia under the future Deep FTA+. 
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5.1. Product standards
The package of framework laws in the area of product standards (standardization,
conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology, and market surveillance) includes the
Law on Standardization; Law on Conformity Assessment; and Law on the Assurance of
Uniformity of Measurements (all adopted on May 26, 2004). The overall policy making
and legislative functions in the area of product standard regulations is carried out by
the Department of Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment of the
Ministry of Trade and Economic Development (MTED).
The accreditation system, which assures the technical competence and
independence of third party conformity assessment, consists of the Accreditation
Board, responsible for the issuance or annulations of accreditation certificates (most
accredited labs are private) and the Accreditation Agency (within the MTED)
responsible for examining accreditation applications and reporting the findings to the
Accreditation Board. Market surveillance is performed by the State Quality Inspection
(within the MTED). The National Institute for Standards (NIS) and the National
Institute for Metrology (closed joint stock companies with full Government ownership)
and are key implementing institutions in the fields of standards and metrology,
respectively.
Armenia inherited from the Soviet Union about 18,000 mandatory GOST standards
that contain in a single standard both mandatory safety requirements and voluntary
product specifications. Three hundred and twenty Armenian national standards were
developed since 1993 but only 20 percent of those are harmonized with international
standards (ISO standards, European norms etc.).
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5. Institutional and regulatory
harmonization issues in trade with
the EU and Armenia
Upon accession to the WTO Armenia committed to follow WTO TBT Agreement
requirements and after December 31, 2004 mandatory certification was replaced with
a dual system of voluntary standards and mandatory technical regulations based on
international standards. Since 2005, GOST standards became voluntary and a
regulatory gap appeared, as fewer than 50 mandatory technical regulations were
approved by that time23. Consequently, the Armenian Government adopted another 43
technical regulations narrowing the gap.
In the EU-Armenia PCA and the ENP Action Plan for Armenia (further referred as
ENP AP) Armenia has undertaken that it will model its new product standards and
technical regulations on EU directives. The same commitment has been further
reflected in the National Program for implementation of the PCA for the period 2006-
2009 (further referred as NP PCA).
However, many incongruities with EU practices still remain. Technical
regulations are developed by the NIS. The NIS mainly uses its own staff and invites
experts from the line ministries as necessary. Technical regulations are elaborated by
line ministries as well (e.g., sanitary-hygienic norms, construction norms). However,
the process has been slow. Experts from relevant ministries are insufficiently
involved in the process.   
EU technical regulations have been developed over many years and it will take
considerable time for Armenia to assimilate EU practice and implement the necessary
domestic legislation. In particular, the public bodies (ministries, the NIS) are lacking
staff trained in the New, Old and Global Approach Directives. The key obstacles in the
process of transposition of EU Directives are a necessity of translation of thousands of
pages of documents into Armenian and poor language skills of civil servants.
An apparent flaw in the development of technical regulation stems from the fact that
a new article introduced in the acting version of the law stipulates that standards are
voluntary except when their list is attached to the technical regulation. This contradicts
both the WTO TBT Agreement and EU approaches, which require a clear separation of
mandatory safety requirement (stipulated by technical regulations), from voluntary
standards.
The Law on standards includes the participatory principle in the development of
voluntary standards. Stakeholder participation is assured by the Scientific and
Technical Board, which should include the representatives of state administrative
bodies, the National Academy of Sciences, and NGOs involved in consumer
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23 This number includes technical regulations approved by the Government of Armenia, as well
as mandatory Norms approved by line Ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Urban
Development etc.).
protection. However, only one sector-specific Scientific and Technical Board is in
operation today – on energy. Hence, the process of the development and adoption of
standards does not fully comply with the EU principle on stakeholder involvement.   
Mandatory rules developed and approved by the line Ministries (referred to as
“Norms”) are not immune from being challenged in court. The Constitution and the
Law on Legal Acts of Armenia stipulate that mandatory rules of behaviour for natural
and legal persons can be enacted either through Laws or, if so the Law designs,
through decrees of the Government. The Norms, however, are approved at the level of
Ministries but still enforced on a compulsory basis.
In its Accession Protocol to the WTO, Armenia took a commitment to conclude
agreements on mutual recognition of certificates and on unilateral acceptance of
approvals by internationally recognized conformity assessment bodies. So far,
Armenia has agreements on mutual recognition only with CIS countries and Iran.
Armenia is not a signatory to any of multilateral agreements and no unilateral
acceptance of approvals has been granted. Meanwhile, developed market economy
countries are not prepared to agree with Armenia on the mutual recognition of
certificates taking into account that Armenia has no internationally recognized
conformity assessment bodies. However, Armenia’s legislature provides for a
possibility of unilateral recognition of the “CE” marking and the MTED is initiating
steps towards such recognition.
Accreditation covers certification bodies, and testing and calibration laboratories.
It is set under state authorities and is independent from commercial motivations.
There is no institute of assessors as recommended by the relevant ISO/IEC standard.
The laboratory accreditation process suffers from opaqueness, and the examination
of applicants is insufficient. As a rule, testing laboratories are not adequately
equipped and their personnel have only limited knowledge of the modern principles
of conformity assessment. A modular approach to conformity assessment, as
envisioned in the New Global Approach, is being applied in Armenia but not all
modules are covered and full compliance with EU regulations of adopted modules is
not achieved.
The NIS, as a fully Government-owned company (whose activities are supervised by
the MTED) cannot be considered as an independent standardization body not
dominated by public interest. In addition, the NIS operates both certification bodies
and the testing laboratory, which leads to a conflict of interests.
The State Quality Inspection operating within the structure of MTED is the core
body authorized for inspection of compliance for all products, except pharmaceuticals,
with compulsory requirements at all stages of handling the products. Eleven other
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Inspections under line ministries are also authorized for inspection activities within the
scope of their responsibilities24. There is a vast overlap among the functions of these
Inspections, as well as between functions of those Inspections and the State Quality
Inspection, both during pre-market authorization procedures and market surveillance.
It is common practice in Armenia that compliance to the same compulsory rule set
forward by a technical regulation or mandatory norms are controlled and examined by
several state inspections resulting in a duplication of effort. Business community
complains about frequent harassment of businesses by the inspections.
As ENP AP indicates, there is a need in simplification of procedures of conformity
assessment of industrial products, with the aim of avoiding compulsory certification of
low risk products and repeat testing. ENP AP also envisages developing market
surveillance capacities according to best practices of the EU Member States. These
provisions of ENP AP remain to be met.
The State Quality Inspection has inadequate capacity in terms of number of staff, its
training, equipment and reference samples, and overall budget. The same applies to all
other inspectorates as well. 
Under the present weakness of the Armenian accreditation and conformity
assessment system, an FTA between the EU and Armenia per se would not remove
barriers associated with the non-recognition of Armenian conformity certificates in the
EU. This barrier is much higher than the low tariff barriers Armenia faces already
under the GSP. Therefore, a Simple FTA would most probably have small to negligible
effect in this respect. In order for an FTA to deliver strong results, there is a strong need
to first upgrade Armenia’s institutional and regulatory frameworks in the area of
product standards. As ENP AP indicates, institutions in charge of standardization,
accreditation, conformity assessment, metrology and market surveillance need to be
strengthened by integrating them to the extent possible within European and
international structures. Furthermore, an effective implementation of regulatory
provisions of the PCA and ENP AP will certainly contribute to elimination of the
deficiencies of Armenian quality assurance system. Once this has been achieved, a
Deep FTA would be able to bring economic benefits to Armenia, including through
supporting further improvements in the area of standardization.
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24 These include: Food Safety and Veterinary State Inspection; Plant Quarantine and Agrarian
State Inspection; State Agricultural Technique Inspection (under the Ministry of Agriculture),
State Hygienic and Anti-epidemiology Inspection; Pharmaceuticals Inspection (under the Ministry
of Health), Environmental State Inspection; Atomic Energy Utilization, Nuclear and Radiation
Security Inspection (under the Ministry of Environment), Industry Works Safety and Mountain
Control Inspection (MTED), Metal Testing Control Inspection (the Ministry of Finance and
Economy), Transport Inspection (the Ministry of Transportation and Communications), and
Urban Planning State Inspection (the Ministry of Urban Planning).
The majority of Armenian firms have yet to switch from GOST standards to
international standards or they will have little prospects in the EU market. Such a
transition can be greatly facilitated if Armenian firms partner with European firms. A
long-term operation of a Deep FTA will certainly encourage establishment of such
links.
5.2. Customs
The Armenian Legislation on Customs partially compiles with EU legislation.
Armenian Customs Code was largely harmonized with the European Community
Customs Code as a part of the PCA, although there are still some discrepancies left.
Secondary legislation and procedures, however, are clearly not harmonized and this is
reflected in ENP AP. According to the Armenia Customs representative Karen
Beglarian, it could take up to three years to achieve this goal. The main problems,
however, lie in practices and administration of Customs.
As a general matter, the Customs Service appears to follow an approach based on
the idea that its role consists primarily on collecting customs duties and indirect taxes
at import and of exercising physical controls at the border. Customs should move to the
concept of trade facilitation by guaranteeing the balance between ensuring the
seamless flow of trade and applying necessary controls to protect the health and safety
of the citizens. Case in point is the use of reference price lists for Customs valuations.
Such lists are explicitly prohibited by the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation, apart
from exceptional cases, but reportedly they are widely used in Armenia. Meanwhile, the
articles of the Armenian Customs Code are in full concordance with the WTO
Agreement, with transaction value declared as the main valuation method followed by
other methods stipulated in the WTO Agreement applied in the predetermined
sequence25. 
On the trade taxation side, the value added tax (VAT) is uniformly charged at the
rate of 20 per cent on sales of domestic and imported goods and services, except for a
number of VAT-exempted goods. 
Armenia’s domestic agricultural output sold by farmers is exempted from value
added tax, which appeared to constitute discriminatory treatment of imports in relation
to similar domestic products. The Government enacted legislation that would
eliminate, as of 31 December 2008, the existing exemption. However, it is rather
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25 Admittedly, the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation has proven to be a challenge to
developing countries, many of which have been unable to implement it properly.  
uncertain whether the tax authorities are able to collect VAT from farmers, especially
during the first years, considering a large number of farmers that should be brought
into taxation sphere for the first time, and a widely-spread practice of direct sale of
agricultural product by farmers to consumers.
On the institutional side, custom procedures are riddled with rent-seeking and
corruption, which ultimately leads to regular occurrences of arbitrary tariff
application. Several surveys  of business environment and corruption practices in
Armenia implemented by international organizations are indicating that import and
export procedures are widely regarded by businessmen as one of the most corrupt area
of public administration. In addition, the Custom authorities are regarded as non-
cooperative when it comes to information disclosure and collaboration with the donors
in an evaluation of the administrative capacities of the State Customs Committee.
Nevertheless, Customs modernization proceeds, albeit at a somewhat slow pace.
The Customs applies risk-assessment and post-clearance audit procedures, self-
assessment, and electronic filing via the direct trader input system. Staff deployment in
some areas may be inadequate, although. For instance, only about 10 persons are
employed in the Post-Clearance Audit unit. The World Bank, DFID, and other donors
provide support in Customs modernization, including training in the areas of risk
assessment and post-clearance audit. Nevertheless, according to World Bank surveys,
there has not been a measured improvement in Customs clearance times and cost in
recent years. Further, development of EU-Armenia co-operation with regard to
customs control based on selectivity criteria and with regard to definition of standards
for certification of importers, exporters and transporters, based on best EU practices
would certainly contribute to custom modernization. These targets are defined in ENP
AP but there is a long road ahead to achieve these targets.
Although no legal act indicates this, Armenia has a de facto common customs area
with Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan, which broke
off Azerbaijan in the early 1990’s. (The secession has not been recognized by the
international community.) Since no customs controls exist between Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh, imports into Armenia can be freely traded also in Nagorno-
Karabakh and products from Nagorno-Karabakh receive in practice the certificates of
origin from Armenia, even though no legal act indicates this either. This issue will have
to be taken into account in case of an FTA between Armenia and the EU.
Armenia has signed Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Custom Matters with a
number of EU Member States (including Greece, France, Latvia, and Romania). Due
to a lack of existing independent assessments of the Customs administrative capacity,
it is hard to accurately assess Armenia’s capacity to implement those Protocols.
However, a number of international organizations regard Armenia Customs authorities
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as non-cooperative when it comes to information disclosure and collaboration
requests. Any future agreement will contain a protocol on mutual assistance in customs
matters which will replace all existing agreements with EU Member States for all
matters of Community competence.
Building appropriate administrative capacity for protocol implementation is
certainly possible if the problems of integrity are resolved. As of today, an excessive
level of rent-seeking among custom authorities will not allow the State Customs
Committee (and in particularly the Department within SCC that is responsible for
implementation of the Protocol) to obtain from border check-points and custom
clearance centres accurate and correct information for exchange with foreign
colleagues.
A Deep FTA may provide an extra leverage for the EU to shape the Customs reform
in Armenia. Armenia may be advised to sign the Revised Kyoto Convention on
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures and, more importantly, to
pursue a more robust alignment of its Customs procedures and practices with those of
the EU (and its own framework legislation). The PCA has already helped Armenia to
harmonize to a certain extent the basic Customs legislature. The time has come to move
cooperation beyond that to the harmonization of procedures and practices, as is
designed by the ENP AP. Only once this has been achieved, a Deep FTA would be able
to bring economic benefits to Armenia. Thus, successful reform of custom procedures
based on targets specified in the PCA and ENP AP as well as standards and best
practices listed in the European Community Customs Blueprints is a prerequisite for
effective operation of a possible Deep FTA.
5.3. Competition policy
Regulation of economic competition in Armenia started later than in many
countries of Central and East Europe, including neighbouring Georgia and Russia.
Legal foundations for competition regulation are provided by the Law on Protection of
Economic Competition (the Law on PEC), adopted in November 2000 and later revised
(the latest revision as of March 2007). Despite a short time in the business, Armenia has
made significant progress in establishing competition institutions and developing
appropriate legislative framework. The Law on PEC is supplemented by the following
Government decrees:
• on Definition the Product Market Boundaries and Volumes (March 4, 2002);
• on the Approval of the of Definition of the Dominant Position of Economic Entity
on Product Market (July 9, 2003);
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• on Definition of Sale and Purchase at (artificial) unjustified price (July 9, 2003);
and
• on Definition of Anti-competitive Agreements (September 1, 2004).
Implementation of policy in the protection of economic competition is laid upon the
State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition (SCPEC). The SCPEC
resembles competition authorities in Europe.  It is entitled to investigate infringement
of competition law and to conduct inspections in order to establish the facts behind the
documents submitted; to enforce appropriate sanctions for infringement of legal and
regulatory acts; to implement general sector investigations; and to carry out advocacy
work. According to the Law on PEC, the SCPEC is involved in the following areas:
• Anti-competitive agreements;
• Abuse of dominant position;
• Concentrations;
• Unfair competition; and
• State aid.
Although a part of the executive branch, the SCPEC is an independent body
unsubordinated to any other state agency or the cabinet of ministers. The SCPEC
consists of seven members, which are appointed by the President of Armenia.
Despite recent legislative improvements, the Law on PEC is not fully harmonized
with EU regulations. For instance, the declaration of concentration in Armenia is based
on the value of assets of concentration participants while in the EU on sale volumes.
There is also a need to ensure adequate legal powers for the competition authorities in
Armenia to carry out on-the-spot checks, as ENP AP enacts. Meanwhile, the PCA
directly indicates on Armenia’s commitment to apply competition laws on a concerted
basis in such cases where trade between the EU and Armenia is affected.
Utilities, communications, and postal services fall under the purview of the Public
Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC). It is crucial to separate clearly the regulation
authority of the SCPEC and PSRC. The Law on PEC does not provide an effective legal
framework for the regulation of financial sector. In international practice, the laws on
economic competition include separate provisions on financial sector – but not in
Armenia. The SCPEC did not touch financial sector so far, not only due to this legal gap
but also due to the lack of staff with qualifications in finance.
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The SCPEC regulates state aids in parts that are relevant to economic competition.
The provisions of the Law on PEC regarding state aids, in general, comply with EU
requirements, but they are not as specific as in the EU; consequently, the present legal
framework on state aid in Armenia is deemed rather insufficient (this is indicated in
ENP AP).
Donor-funded investigations reveal that the SCPEC faces serious problems in
personnel qualification, not only for carrying out investigations in the financial services
but also in state aids; consumer protection; carrying out inspectorate functions; and in
harmonization with the EU. A low level of salaries and inefficient distribution of power
among SCPEC staff contribute to the Commission’s malaise. Moreover, a lack of
sufficient knowledge on economic competition among the Judges in Civil (economic)
Courts exacerbates the problems. An effective implementation of the ENP AP, which
stipulates the involvement of the EU in enhancement of the administrative capacity and
the independence of SCPEC, might help to improve the situation.
The cases that the SCPEC investigated most commonly fall under unfair
competition and supply of information by economic entities. Meanwhile, the SCPEC
practically did not investigate anti-competitive agreements and concentrations26. This
is caused by the lack of political will, ineffective cooperation among state bodies, and
a very high share of shadow economy. Meanwhile, concentration in some sectors is
very high propped up by informal monopolies controlled by politically influential
oligarchs.
Favoritism, corruption and rent-seeking approach in decisions of the executive
branch is another serious impediment. The most corruption-prone areas are tax
collection, international trade activity, and licensing or mandatory certification of
businesses. Wide-spread corrupt practices create a largely unfair competitive
environment.
Since the most serious problems in competition policy in Armenia lie in the weak
enforcement of regulations and feeble resolve of the authorities to go against
monopolies and oligopolies, Armenia should focus on the effective implementation of
the provisions on competition included in the PCA and the ENP AP. A possible future
Deep FTA+ should envision flanking conditions that would go beyond the PCA and the
ENP AP.
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26 Only one case on anti-competitive agreement and none on concentration was brought so far.
5.4. Property rights, corporate governance and accounting standards
Property Rights
In general, legal and regulatory frameworks in Armenia in the area of property
rights are relatively well-developed, especially in comparison with other transition
countries. As in other subject matters, the major impediments to business environment
are weak implementation and bureaucratic corruption.
One big problem is a lack of independent judiciary. De facto dependence of the
judiciary from the executive branch (and associated corruption) creates serious
obstacles in adequate implementation of business legislation, particularly in the
protection of private property rights and enforcement of contracts by the courts.
Professional capabilities of judges dealing with business disputes are also insufficient.
The recent reform of judiciary system which led to establishment of Civil Courts is
certainly a positive step in these regards.
While Armenia has one of the best systems of registration of property and businesses
among transition countries, a number of shortcomings remains (length of procedures,
seal, lack of e-facilities and e-signature). Armenia has not yet taken a position as
regards the establishment of a one-stop shop. Liquidation of state-owned companies is
still long and burdensome.
Corporate Governance
Armenia’s corporate governance framework is characterized by a poor awareness
of international corporate practices, concentration of corporate control in the hands of
the majority owner, and absence of corporate governance traditions. In most joint-
stock companies, controlling owners are implementing direct management while small
shareholders appear largely apathetic on management issues. The supervision of listed
companies, brokers/dealers, underwriters, investment funds, and trust management
companies is implemented by the Central Bank of Armenia (CBA). 
The corporate legal framework was last revised in October 2007 with the adoption
of the Securities Market Law, which went into force as of March 1, 2008. However, the
legal framework is still under development. This law was modelled on EU regulatory
approach. The main purpose of the Securities Market Law is to establish the
procedures for public offering and public trading of securities, investment services
provision in the securities market, custody, clearing and settlement of securities, as
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well as activities of the Central Depository, the authorities and obligations of the
Central Bank of Armenia in this area.
According to the Law, no special minimal capital requirements are set forward for
reporting issuers and listed companies. Meanwhile, ArmEx (Armenian sole stock
exchange recently acquired by Scandinavian OMX) is in the process of transformation
and it is clear at this time whether its listing rules will provide special capital adequacy
requirements. The Law provides that the CBA can set capital adequacy, liquidity and
other requirements for investment companies, such as brokerages/dealerships,
underwriters, investment funds, and trust management companies. 
The Law on Joint-Stock Companies adopted in early 2000 is another key law
regulating corporate legal framework. It enacts the minimal capital requirement for
closed joint stock companies equal to AMD100,000 and for open joint stock companies
equal to AMD1 million. 
One of the most essential gaps in corporate governance in Armenia is the absence of
a “Code of Corporate Governance”. Only recently, the Ministry Trade and Economic
Development announced that Armenia was going to develop one. On the sectoral level,
the CBA has incorporated into laws27 significant changes in corporate governance
framework for credit institutions. However, serious problems remain. Key legal
definitions of majority and minority shareholder rights, principles and jurisdiction of
creating the company’s management bodies, supervision mechanisms of company’s
financial-economic activities,  and obligations on information disclosure, in most cases,
are internally inconsistent and immature, and do not facilitate strong corporate
governance.
Report on the observation of standards and codes prepared by the World Bank
indicates that in Armenia compliance with OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
is weaker that the world average. Weighted average compliance rate for each core
principle28 in Armenia is at least 20 % bellow than those of world average. The report
identifies several key steps that need to be undertaken by Armenian Government to
increase the compliance rate, namely: 
• Development clear regulatory rules on establishment and operation of Institute of
Independent directors;
• Improvement of enforcement functions of CBA in the field of disclosure and
reporting;
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27 Namely, the Law on Banks and Banking, the Law on (Universal) Credit Organizations, and
the Law on Central Bank of Armenia, which are the key laws that establish the corporate legal
framework for credit institutions.
28 Such as an effective corporate governance framework; rights of shareholders; equitable
treatment of shareholders; role of stakeholders in corporate governance; disclosure and
transparency; and responsibilities of the board of directors.
• Clearly delineation of the functions of corporate governance bodies, including the
executive, directors and annual general meeting;
• Establishment of the legal basis for active institutional investor community.
Accounting Standards
The present accounting standards were adopted in 200029. These standards were
developed on the basis of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the International
Accounting Reporting Standards (IFRS) elaborated by the International Accounting
Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF). However, the translation of Armenian
Accounting Standards was not implemented in accordance with translation procedures
approved by IASCF and hence not recognized by IASCF as authentic to IAS and IFRS. As a
recent study indicates, Armenian authorities intentionally or unintentionally omitted from
the translation half of the text of IAS and IFRS while half of translated provisions diverge
substantially from the original text. Armenian Accounting Standards do not incorporate
IFRS 1 to 8, which were developed or substantially revised by IASCF after 2001.
The Armenian Government, with support from the USAID and World Bank, is in the
process of signing a contract with IASCF to launch an official translation procedure of
IAS and IFRS. It is anticipated that the translation of IAS and IFRS will be completed
by mid-2009, and these standards will be adopted in their original formats. Discussions
are now under way on the establishment of an independent regulatory body in the field
of accounting. 
PCA, ENP Action Plan and FTA
The PCA and particularly the ENP AP directly indicate the need of convergence
with EU rules and standards in accounting and corporate governance. Provisions
aiming at improvements in property right protection have been included in different
clauses of both the PCA and ENP AP as well.
A Deep FTA with the EU would lead to closer relations between Armenian and
European companies and hence would raise further demand for sound property rights
protection, corporate governance, and accounting standards. Such an improvement
would not come immediately but over a long term, as and when business interests of
EU and Armenian firms became more intertwined.
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29 In 2001, the Minister of Finance and Economy approved new accounting standards. This
order was later annulled, and a parallel identical text of Accounting Standards was approved by
the Decree of the Government of Armenia on December 12, 2005.
5.5. Intellectual property rights
Upon accession to the WTO, Armenia took a commitment to apply provisions of the
WTO Agreement on TRIPS without any recourse to transitional period. A decade ago
the Government started substantial program of legislation reform, aiming to bring legal
and regulatory framework into conformity with international rules on IPR protection
(particularly those of WTO and WIPO) and with Armenia’s commitment under PCA.
This program has brought about a substantial body of new legislation.
Nowadays the list of Armenian primary legislation on IPR includes:
• Civil Code, adopted on May 5, 1998 (Section 10)
• Criminal Code, adopted in April 18,2003
• Customs Code, adopted in December 8, 2004 (Section 14)
• Law on Copyright and Related rights, adopted on June 15, 2006
• Law on Patents, adopted in December 8, 2004
• Law on Legal Protection of Topographies of Integrated Circuits, adopted on
February 3, 1998
• Law on Brand Names, adopted in November 23,1999
• Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Appellations of Origin, adopted in March
20, 2000 
• Law on Protection of Selection Achievements, adopted in November 23, 1999
• Law on Protection of Economic Competition, adopted in November 6, 2000
The Civil Code enacts general provisions on IPR, while the sectoral laws regulate
relations in particular areas. The Law on Protection of Economic Competition
incorporates provisions on protection of undisclosed information and know-how30 The
Criminal Code enacts the remedies for infringement of IPR legislations that are causing
major damage31. The Customs Code contains provisions on IPR control and
supervision during custom procedures32.
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30 At the same time, the Law on Protection of Economic Competition stipulates that it does not
apply to the relations connected with IPR, unless these rights are used for restricting economic
competition. 
31 The Criminal Code provides that illegal use of a subject matter of copyright, patent rights,
trademarks shall entail a fine at the rate of from one hundred to five hundred thousand Armenian
Drams, or corrective labor for a maximum term of two year, or imprisonment for a maximum
term of two years. The case can be brought both by police and the victim. Foreigners enjoy the
same rights as Armenian nationals.
Armenia is a signatory of the full range of international conventions on IPR. It is a
member  of the WIPO and Eurasian Patent Organization. It is a signatory of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Armenia ratified all treaties on
international registration systems and classification systems on industrial property,33
except for the Lisbon System for the International Registration of Appellations of
Origin. Armenia is a signatory of the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works
as well as of several other key international treaties on copyright protection34.
Policy formulation in the field of IPR is carried out by Intellectual Property Agency,
under the MTED. The Intellectual Property Agency is also responsible for approving
industrial property right applications, maintaining the State Register of industrial
property rights, and publishing two Official Gazettes - “Industrial Property” and
“Application of Inventions”. Supervision and enforcement in IPR area is implemented
by the Police, particularly by the Division of Struggle against Crimes in the Sphere of
the Intellectual Property of the Main Directorate for Organized Crime.
Armauthor, an NGO with 1,500 registered members, administers and protects
authors’ rights in Armenia. Consumer Associations are also involved in the IPR area,
occasionally dealing with trademark issues within the scope of consumer rights
protection. 
However, Armenian legal framework is still not fully consistent with EU
regulations. Thus the Criminal Code enacts the remedies for infringement of IPR
legislations that are causing major damage but Code of Administrative Offences
(regulating minor offences) does not contain any provision that will enact remedies for
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32 The code stipulates the relations concerning the application to the Customs Authorities on
protection of IPR, registration of the IPR object with the Customs authority, the management of
the register and  the consideration of suspension request and suspension of release of goods
infringing IPR transported through the border.
33 These are: the Patent Cooperation Treaty for filing patent applications in multiple countries; the
Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks for trade and service marks and
Protocol Relating to this Agreement; the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure; the Hague Agreement
concerning International Deposit for Industrial Designs and Geneva act of this Agreement (the
London Act, the Hague Act, the Complementary Act of Stockholm of the Hague Agreement are not
signed by Armenia); the Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent
Classification; the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and
Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks; the Vienna Agreement Establishing an
International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks; the Locarno Agreement
Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs; and the Budapest Treaty on the
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure.
34 The Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite; the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms,
against unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms; the Rome convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers, of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations; the WIPO Copyright
Treaty; and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
IPR infringements causing less serious damages. Other discrepancies that exist in IPR
area in Armenia and the EU are the following:
• The Law on Selection Achievements is not harmonized with corresponding EU
Directives.
• The Law on Patent does not specify the institution responsible for the annulment
of designs.  
• Armenian legislation does not provide for detailed regulation of legal relations
arising in the field of agricultural products and foodstuffs, particularly
appellations of origin and geographical indications of key agricultural products
and foodstuffs. Moreover, Armenia is not member of the Lisbon System for the
International Registration of Appellations of Origin.
• The Law on Trade and Service Marks and Appellations of Origin lacks provisions
on dispute regulation issues, such as dispute over the registration of trade and
service marks, rights of parties in settlement of such disputes35. 
• Armenian laws are less detailed on details of the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions and legal regulation of technology transfer
agreements than those of the EU.
• The Law on Brand Names does not detail the provisions of registration of names
that use confusingly similar distinctive names (e.g. Armenal, Armenal Holding,
Armenal International) and certain terms, such as Group, Concern, Holding,
which are undefined in Armenian legislation.
• Armenian Law on Copyright and Related Rights does not include detailed and
specified rules on legal protection of copyrights in satellite broadcasting, cable
retransmissions, databases and software.
• There are unresolved issues related to the rights with respect to works of
architecture. Legal relations between the author and the owner of the
architectural object, as well as their rights and obligations are largely undefined.
• Currently, Armenian radio and TV broadcasters and concert organizers are
reluctant to pay due royalties to authors of works of art. The Armenian
Government plans to improve the situation through appropriate legal
amendments. Strengthening the role of authors’ unions would also have positive
impact.
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35 In order to eliminate existing legal gap in this area, the Armenian Government plans to enact
regulations aiming to establish modalities for legal control over the use of appellation of origin
and geographical indications.
An important impediment in IPR area is a lack of adequately trained staff in the
Intellectual Property Agency that has sufficient knowledge of EU regulations in IPR
area. This can be explained by the basic fact that the Agency has few specialists that
have an adequate knowledge in English to deal with EU regulations. Also, the
Intellectual Property Agency does not have its own legal division and the legal division
of the MTED provides legal services to the Agency instead. The Intellectual Property
Agency definitely needs to have specialized lawyers to implement legal reform in the
IPR area.
A solid legal framework is accompanied by a weak supervision and enforcement of
IPR protection by the public authorities. In 2005-06, only 20 cases on IPR infringement
were investigated by the Police and only one case by Prosecutor’s office. The Supreme
Court examined only 4 cases on IPR infringement so far. A lack of public awareness on
IPR issues, adequately trained staff in the Police and general political will to enforce
IPR rules are the main reasons of ineffective supervision and enforcement.
When enacting the PCA in 1999, the Armenian Government committed to
improving the protection in IPR area and providing the level of protection similar to
that existing in EU within five years. Nine years after that date, it is still only an
aspiration. The need to boost resources to guarantee access to justice and proper
enforcement in IPR area is indicated in ENP AP. In addition, ENP AP points to the
need to consolidate relevant institutional structures responsible for regulation and
supervision in this area.
A Simple FTA is unlikely to substantially improve enforcement of IPRs in Armenia.
Flanking measures in a Deep FTA will have more substantial impact but only if these
measures target enforcement rather than a mere harmonization of legislation.
5.6. Public Procurement
The key legal act regulating public procurement is the Law on Procurement adopted
on June 12, 2004 replacing the procurement law adopted in 2000. As the World Bank
and AEPLAC reports indicate, unlike other procurement laws in the region, this Law
provides a good framework for public procurement. The main provisions of the Law on
Procurement are compatible with UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services. Meanwhile, at accession to the WTO, Armenia took a
nonbinding commitment to accede to WTO Agreement on Government Procurement by
December 31, 2003. This commitment is also indicated in ENP AP. Nevertheless,
Armenia did not sign this Agreement so far and even did not commence negotiations
for accession.
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However, the Law on Procurement and corresponding regulations are not
completely harmonized with EU regulations, namely in criteria for the selection of
particular method of procurement; criteria for qualification requirements that enable
participation in restricted and negotiated procedures of procurement; criteria for
selection of the award of the contracts; access to legal recourse; limited use of
exceptions; and requirements on common advertising rules for prompts notification of
procurement process participants. (This is reflected in PCA and ENP AP.)
The main regulatory and implementing agency is the State Procurement Agency
(SPA). All organizations and institutions of the central government are obliged to
implement procurement through the SPA, except the CBA, state non-commercial
organizations and for-profit companies with 50 % or more shares in state ownership.
Local government bodies are authorized to carry out procurement on their own. The
overall policy formulation and supervision in the area of public procurement is
implemented by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of Armenia (MFE). The MFE is
responsible for the procurement process regulation and the budgeting methodology.
World Bank and EU-funded investigations of institutional capacity of Armenian in
public procurement area show that both the SPA and MFE are staffed with qualified
specialists, although without sufficient knowledge and understanding of EU regulatory
framework. Knowledge of English of the staff of both bodies is not sufficient to
understand EU regulations. ENP AP includes a provision on the improvement of the
administrative capacity of the State Procurement Agency.
The major deficiency of the state procurement system is the lack of transparency
and complaint system, which are the key elements of a sound EU-compliant system.
While the Law on Procurement envisages that the MFE should deal with complaint
review procedures, no such unit was established within the MFE. The MFE has put
forward draft decree on establishment and operation of the unit reviewing claims on
public procurement. This draft decree is currently circulated for review and discussion
among stakeholders. Note that both EU and WTO rules on public procurement
stipulate the existence of an intrastate system for dispute resolution and the same
provision is incorporated in ENP AP.
In January 2006, the Armenian Government approved the strategy of introduction
of e-procurement system. However, there were no major developments in the
introduction of the appropriate legal and institutional framework for e-procurement so
far, even though Armenia took corresponding commitment under ENP AP.
Reform of public procurement based on targets designed by the PCA and ENP AP
is a prerequisite for effective operation of a possible Deep FTA. The FTA would increase
the openness and attractiveness of the public procurement system to European firms.
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The pressure on the Government to fully harmonize state procurement rules and
procedures with the EU will probably increase as a result. Such harmonization could
become a clause of the Deep FTA. The emergence of a transparent and fair public
procurement system would be the main benefit of a Deep FTA and would further
improve Armenia’s overall business environment.
5.7. Rules of origin
Rules of origin are specified in the Customs Code. The main secondary legislation
determining the rules of origin is the Government Decree No. 1246 on the Procedures
for Issuance of Certificates of Origin (2001). The Degree specifies three types of the
certificates, one non-preferential and two preferential.  Certificates of origin are issued
by the Armenian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) based on a testing
protocol provided by Armexpertiza LLC – a specially created division of the ACCI.
Three different certificates of origin are being issued for Armenian exporters:
• For all destination countries: general certificate of origin (non-preferential);
• For the CIS free trade area: form ST-1 based on the rules of origin that were
defined by the Decision of Council of Governments of CIS countries, on 30
November 2000 (preferential for the CIS);
• For the EU: Form A based on the rules of origin used for the application of the
preferences assigned by the EU GSP (preferential for EU GSP).
The rules of origin of the Armenian Custom Code are formulated differently in
comparison  to the EU rules for GSP, as defined by EC Regulation No. 2454/93.
On the import side, the certificate of origin must be presented if the goods in
question are subject to quantitative limitation, imports are covered by preferential
trading arrangements, imports are used in healthcare and environment protection, and
when the authorities have inadequate information as to the product’s origin.
Donor reports suggest the exporters are facing complicated procedures and high
fees while obtaining the certificates of origin. The issuance procedures are time-
consuming, non-transparent and involve informal payments. In 2002, the Government
abolished the state fee for obtaining certificates in an attempt to simplify the procedure
and lower cost for business. However, ArmExpertiza has since raised its fees
considerably, justifying the higher cost by arguing that they use more expensive
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experts. Meanwhile, the ACCI reports that the procedures for issuance of certificates of
origin have been improved and shortened to just one day, on the average. However,
field interviews suggest that the majority of exporters have to wait 3-5 days for the
issuance of the certificate of origin.
Preferential Rules of origin are very important for using free trade preferences. In
order to utilize an FTA, Armenian exporters will have to be able to obtain certificates
of origin of a possible agreement that will de facto satisfy EU requirements/standards,
and do it quickly and free of cost. In this respect, Armenian authorities need to
significantly improve their performance. It will also be highly beneficial if the rules of
origin under an FTA allow, at a second stage, for possible cumulation within
Paneuromed system, on condition Armenia has the capacity to negotiate and
implement these rules.  
The Nagorno-Karabakh (a region that broke away from Azerbaijan) poses a specific
problem in the context of a possible future EU-Armenia FTA. This very sensitive issue
will have to be taken into account in case of an FTA between the EU and Armenia.
If an FTA is concluded, the preferential certificate of origin will need to be issued
by the Customs, not the Chamber of Commerce, according to the EU practice which
lead to have the certificates of origin only issued by “governmental authorities”; hence,
an ensuing capacity problem in the Customs. In this case, a capacity building program
will need to be carried out and staff familiar with the issue hired.
5.8. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Sanitary and phytosanitary capacity is important for meeting requirements in
destination markets as well as facilitating effective controls on imported and
domestically produced foodstuffs. Key framework laws on SPS include: the Food
Safety Law, the Law on Plant Quarantine and Plant Protection (both adopted on 27
November 2006), the Law on Veterinary Medicine (adopted on 24 October 2005), and
the Law on Ensuring Sanitary nd Epidemiological Safety of the Population (adopted on
18 December 1992). The Food Safety Law, the Law on Plant Quarantine and Plant
Protection, and the Law on Veterinary Medicine were adopted in new editions and
transposed many articles from European regulations. When compared to previous
laws, these laws provide for additional human, animal and plant health protection but
still do not correspond fully to the EU legislative and institutional requirements, as
specified by Regulation EC 178/2002 (general Food Law), EC 852/2004 (on the hygiene
of foodstuffs), EC 853/2004 (on hygiene rules for foodstuffs of animal origin), and EC
882/2004 (on official controls). The Food Safety Law does not name a single
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implementing authority; it does not provide for registration of establishments,
procedures based on HACCP principles, does not spell out the general food safety
obligations of the producer and residue requirements.
Armenia is a member of the CODEX Alimentarius Commission, the International
Office for Epizooties, European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, as
well as it is signatory of International Plant Protection Convention. This is in line with
Armenia’s obligation to apply its sanitary and phytosanitary requirements consistently
with the requirements of the WTO SPS Agreement without recourse to any transition
period.  The WTO SPS Agreement enacts the obligation of Members to base their SPS
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations.
SPS policy measures are implemented by a number of state agencies: 
• The Ministry of Health regulates human health protection while pre-market
authorization procedures and market surveillance are implemented by the
Hygienic and Epidemiological Inspection. In 2006, based on new edition of Food
Safety Law, the Ministry of Agriculture and its structural division Food Safety and
Veterinary State Inspection36 were also delegated responsibilities in this area.
• The Ministry of Agriculture regulates animal and plant health protection issues
while pre-market authorization procedures and market surveillance are
implemented respectively by the Food Safety and Veterinary State Inspection and
Plant Quarantine and Farming State Inspection. 
• MTED and its structural subdivision Quality Inspection are responsible for
regulating quality standards in general.
• The Ministry of Nature Protection regulates harvesting, import, and export of
gathered and wild products, including fish and crayfish (both wild-caught and
farmed). 
Ineffective regulatory framework creates foundations for regulatory overlap and
control duplication, when different Ministries and Inspectorates inspecting the same
businesses. At the same time, since the division of responsibilities is unclear, it is not
easy to determine whom to take to account in case of a mishap.
Food control responsibilities have been largely transferred away from the Ministry
of Agriculture and Ministry of Healthcare and concentrated within the MTED, after the
establishment of the Quality Inspectorate. Donor-funded investigations (the FAO and
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36 Earlier, the Veterinary Inspection was primarily safeguarding the animal health. 
World Bank) have suggested instead concentrating on food control responsibilities
within the Ministries of Agriculture and Health. 
SPS clearances and inspection services (veterinary and plant quarantine) at present
are stationed at the border. Importers do not have any longer to bring imported plant
and animal materials to sites in Yerevan for clearance. However, border checks are
mostly confined to document checks, since the border posts are not equipped to do
anything else. Another worrying sign of poor SPS import controls is a noticeable
presence on the market of counterfeit European food imports lacking veterinary stamps.
Another issue is the duplication of documentary requirements. Two lists cover food
products that must be approved by the Government for export or import. One list
includes products that must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance (issued by
the MTED), while the second list includes products that must be accompanied by a
phytosanitary certificate issued by the Ministry of Agriculture. These lists need to be
clarified and harmonized so that the same products are not duplicated on both lists.
On the ground, establishments are unregistered and, basically, unregulated.
Slaughterhouses are unregulated and in a dilapidated state. The HACCP system is not
a part of the food control system or manufacturing practices of any but a few largest
producers. Food safety checks are mainly made in the marketplace but they are
sporadic and do not have a strong impact. Consumer unions are still heavily dependent
on donor- and state-provided grants rather than membership. They are seen to lack
integrity and transparency, as they often tend to advocate for state and commercial
interests. 
Inspection services and public laboratories and testing centres are severely under
funded. Testing equipment, monitoring and control capacities and technical skills of
personal are out of line with modern food safety requirements. Most of public
laboratories and testing centres need substantial improvements, before they could be
recognized outside Armenia as a reference laboratory that are corresponding to Good
Laboratory Practice Levels. Regional and border post labs are in the worst shape.
ExLab (a private laboratory with some State ownership) is the only laboratory in the
country with internationally-accredited ISO 9002 certification.
Inspectors often require the companies to follow the GOST standards, although the
GOST standards are voluntary. This happens partly because the authorities have not
enacted yet sufficient number of compulsory regulations in health protection and food
safety that would replace the GOST standards. As food trade has been traditionally
conducted mostly with CIS countries, which use their own standards, Armenian
national standards and analytical procedures have not been substantially harmonized
with international requirements, even in newly adopted compulsory regulations.
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In sum, SPS system in Armenia is, on one hand, overly complex and bureaucratic,
with plenty of opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption and, on the other hand,
ineffectual. Armenian SPS and veterinary certificates are not honoured abroad, and in
the EU for that matter. At the same time, the domestic consumer is poorly protected
from food-born health risks.  
Exports of animal and plant products generally can not meet EU import
requirements. This means that Armenia could potentially export only very few such
products into the EU: only those for which EU do not require official health
certification and for which the exporting industries in Armenia could ensure that they
meet EU food safety criteria (such as wine where mainly industry standards apply). The
only Armenia food export to the EU is crayfish, for which a special certification
procedure was developed. Crayfish are tested in a European-equipped laboratory and
the certificate issued by the Hygienic and Anti-epidemiological State Inspectorate
(considered a relatively strong agency by DG SANCO), although the
exporters/importers of all raw materials of animal origin are supposed to obtain
veterinary certificates from the Food Safety and Veterinary Inspection Inspectorate.
This shortcut allowed circumventing otherwise intractable SPS system. Other food
exports to the EU, if they emerge, will probably have to follow the same route.
Given the state of the SPS system in Armenia, its agro-food products could not
effectively benefit of an FTA with the EU. This could only be the case once Armenia has
the SPS situation under control and is able to guarantee that SPS requirements in trade
are met. In order to achieve this, Armenia should focus on ensuring full compliance
with WTO SPS requirements and effectively implementing SPS provisions of the PCA
and ENP Action Plan.
5.9. Institutional capacity to negotiate and implement commitments
under an FTA
Policy formulation and implementation in the area of foreign trade relations is the
responsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development. It can be foreseen
that Ministry’s Department of World Trade Organization and EU affairs will become
the leading actor during FTA negotiations with EU, while receiving general support
from the Department of Trade and Services and the Department of Foreign Economic
Policy. Other line Ministries and public administration bodies (Agencies, Committees,
Inspections, etc.) such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance and
Economy, the State Customs Committee, and others would play a major role in the
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formulation of Armenia’s position during FTA negotiations and in further
implementation of corresponding commitments.
The following Ministries and Agencies would also be involved, although to a somewhat
lesser extent, in the formulation of Armenia’s position – the Ministry of Healthcare, the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Transport and Communication, the
Central Bank of Armenia, the State Tax Service, the National Institute of Standards, the
Accreditation Agency, the State Quality Inspection, the Armenian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, the Intellectual Property Agency, the State Procurement Agency, the
Hygienic and Epidemiological Inspection, the Food Safety and Veterinary State
Inspection, and the Plant Quarantine and Farming State Inspection. 
The institutional capacity of line Ministries and other public administration bodies
to negotiate and implement commitments of Armenia under an FTA were analysed
under each subject area (product standards, human, animal and plant health, rules of
origin, custom procedures, etc.). Summarizing, a shortage of adequately trained staff
across a number of agencies can seriously hinder Armenia’s FTA negotiation and
implementation capacities. Due to insufficient knowledge of English and other foreign
languages, civil servants are often incapable to familiarize themselves with sector-
specific international regulations and policy documents as well as to learn the best
international practices. The problem is rather difficult, since these documents are
rarely available in Armenian translation. 
Also, the low level of salaries of civil servants leads to continuous brain drain from
public administration bodies to private sector and donor-funded projects. In addition,
in the majority of agencies, the access to the internet is limited, subscription to
professional literature and periodicals is sporadic, training of civil servants is
implemented on occasional basis, and research, testing, and diagnostic equipment and
facilities are out of date.
The experience of execution of Armenia’s National Program within the scope of the
PCA points to a weak inter-agency collaboration, especially when there is a need of
formulation of joint positions over new or unfamiliar topics. An FTA with the EU (and
especially, a Deep FTA), as a theoretical and practical phenomenon, and its policy and
economic implications will be a novelty for the majority of civil servants. Therefore, it
will be particularly important to raise awareness of the MTED and other agencies’ staff
not only of legal and regulatory aspects of a possible FTA between Armenia and the EU
but its economic and policy implications as well. In this regard, ENP AP envisages
enhancing staff training and capacity building in international trade relations.
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Policy formulation tasks are periodically delegated to implementing bodies. A weak
participation of private sector stakeholders in formulation of foreign economic policy
strategies and concepts is another negative factor in policy formulation. These trends
were clearly observed during Armenia’s accession to the WTO and post-accession
negotiations.
A poor enforcement of relatively solid legislation is yet another major problem. It is
manifested in a number of specific areas and has serious political and economic
foundations. The European Commission should be very cognizant of the
implementation problem if and when negotiating an FTA with Armenia.
Neither legislative harmonization nor institutional reforms are implemented
effectively and in sustainable speed. Due to capacity restraints the Government had to
heavily rely on technical assistance from AEPLAC. Consequently, the Government
defined the role of AEPLAC as the main responsible body for assisting the Government
in drafting the PCA NP. But AEPLAC possesses limited financial and technical
resources to lead and implement a large number of activities that are required. With
additional funding from EU some European consulting companies in cooperation with
AEPLAC have implemented two phases of legislation harmonization and
approximation activities, in 2005 and 2007. However, financial and technical
constraints did not allow carrying out that work with the highest quality, while the
Government stopped short in effective utilization of the obtained results.
AEPLAC is currently preparing an administrative capacity evaluation in a number
of trade-related areas with an objective to support the Government in analyzing and
designing administrative structures for execution of the PCA NP implementation.
Ensuing administrative reform will certainly have an impact on Armenia’s capacity to
negotiate and implement commitments under an FTA with EU.
In sum, and as confirmed also in the first ENP Progress Report for Armenia issued
by the European Commission on 3 April 2008, Armenia has so far achieved a certain
degree of regulatory harmonization with the EU acquis in all the main trade-related
areas, in particular as regards approximation of the legislation. Nevertheless,
incongruities still remain high, especially in the areas of IPR, state procurement, and
SPS. The most striking differences with EU regulations in all spheres then lie in
enforcement of the adopted legislation and practices. Even in those areas, where
regulatory harmonization is relatively high, the achievements are mostly in the
harmonization of laws on the books rather than in their implementation. Armenian
regulatory system is, one hand, rather bureaucratic and, on the other hand, ineffectual.
Shady and corrupt practices further undermine the system of enforcement. In the areas
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37 COM (2008) 392, p.8 
of standards and SPS, the impulse towards harmonization depends not only on the
Government efforts but on the private sector as well. The cooperation between the EU
and Armenia needs to focus on the harmonization of implementing regulations and
practices and upgrading of institutional structures in Armenia, as is designed by the
PCA and ENP AP. Once this is achieved, a Deep FTA/Deep FTA+ would be able to bring
economic benefits to Armenia. 
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6.1. Survey method
This section presents the results of the survey of exporters in Georgia and Armenia.
By sample design, the majority of firms were exporting to the EU and the minority – to
CIS countries. Some firms exported to both destinations. The survey included 61 firms:
48 firms exporting to the EU and 13 firms exporting at least to CIS countries. The
survey was conducted in October-November, 2007, by AVAG Solutions, Yerevan.
Detailed description of the sample is presented in Appendix 4.
The questionnaire was modelled on CASE (2006) study of non-tariff barriers in
Ukraine, which, in turn, was based on a survey of recent surveys on NTBs carried out in
developing and transition countries. Respondents answered questions on export
destinations and sectors, certificates of origin, customs procedures, standards and
technical regulations, conformity assessments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and
antidumping and countervailing measures. They also provided background information
about their companies covering ownership, staff, and time in business, etc. The
questionnaire is included in the Appendix 4 Description of the sample and questionnaire.
6.2. Certifying origin of goods
Armenia’s exporters to the EU countries can benefit from the General System of
Preferences, which allows them to apply reduced, preferential or zero tariffs to specific
goods, which were actually produced in Armenia. In this context, the interviews aim at
finding out whether exporting firms from Armenia have experienced any difficulties
when using the GSP, or whether these regulations are very costly with regard to time
and expenses.
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6. Survey of non-tariff barriers in
trade between EU and Armenia and
Armenia with neighbouring countries
Altogether, 88 % of firms obtained certificates of origin during the last year,
although only 79 % of them exported to the EU. The tendency to obtain a certificate of
origin seems to vary a little bit with the firm size. Actually, all firms with less than 51
employees obtained such a certificate, but only 75 % of the firms with 51 to 100
employees and 85 % of the firms with more than 100 employees. 
Within the group of firms which obtained a certificate of origin, each firm obtained
on average 17 times per year such a certificate, but the dispersion was rather high and
ranged from 1 to 95 times per year. However, the median was just ten, implying that
50 % of the firms received between one and ten certificates per year. Furthermore, only
five firms obtained more than 40 certificates per year. The larger numbers of
certificates are highly concentrated in the group with more than 100 employees and to
a clearly lower extent in the group with 51 to 100 employees. For the first mentioned
group, the mean is 25 and the median is 20. Thus, larger firms tend to make more
frequent deliveries to the EU.
With regard to the average costs of one certificate of origin, firms report costs
between AMD 9,000 and 100,000 with a mean of AMD 38,981 and a median of AMD
35,000. Furthermore, again there seems to be no relationship between the size of a firm
and the costs of a certificate.
Firms were also asked to assess the importance of the costs of obtaining the
certificates of origin. Firms here have rather different perceptions. Twenty-eight
percent of the relevant 54 firms considered them as not at all important, 26 % as
somewhat important, 24 % as important and 22 % as very important. Thus, here we
have almost a rectangular distribution.
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.1. Obstacles while obtaining certificates of origin
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Asked about difficulties related to obtaining certificates of origin, 28 % of the
relevant 54 firms complained about the time consuming procedure and 22 % assessed
the procedure as costly. Anyhow 11 % of these firms complained about unclear or
uncertain regulations and 4 % faced other difficulties.
Summing up, it seems that although Armenian exporters used extensively the EU
trade preferences, they faced some difficulties obtaining certificates of origin.
6.3. Customs procedures
Export customs concerning exports to the EU seem to differ widely for Armenian
firms. The firms exporting to the EU reported that they spent between 0 % and 9.0 %
of their export values for export customs, with the mean of 0.686 %. Thus export
customs concerning EU countries were rather low for the majority of firms. In terms
of sectoral differentiation, the costs in three sectors were more than twice the average
– textiles (1.86 %), food and beverages (1.57 %), and metallic mineral products (1.25
%). On the lower side, firms in aquaculture, manufacture of instruments, and basic
metals paid less than 0.1 % of their export value to pass through the Armenian
Customs.
However, the carriers of the firms should spend at the Armenian border while
exporting products to the EU. Twelve firms reported that their carrier spent less than
one day, namely between one at five hours at the border, further 20 firms indicated that
their carrier spent exactly one day at the border. Thirteen firms claimed that this time
lasted longer than one day, namely between 2 and 14 days, whereby 2 clearly is the
most often mentioned value.
Export customs costs to CIS countries are in nearly all cases very low. They ranged
from 0 % to 16 %. The mean is 1 % and the median just 0.2 %. Actually, besides one
firm’s with very high customs costs of 16 %, only three firms reported export customs
to CIS countries between 2 % and 3 %. With regard to time spent at the border the
picture is rather similar to that for the EU exports. Eight firms’ carriers spent less than
one day at the Armenian border, namely between three and eight hours, 15 exactly one
day and nine more than one day, namely between two and five days, again with a
dominance of two days.
With regard to exports to the EU, for 47 of the 48 firms exporting to the EU the
ordering party based in the EU country is carrying all costs related to import customs
procedures. Things look a little bit different for the costs of passing CIS country import
customs procedures when exporting to one of those countries. Here, six firms reported
that they or their representative in CIS countries is carrying all the cost related to
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import customs procedures, while 48 firms indicate that the ordering party is carrying
these costs. Unfortunately, the six firms carrying import customs did not report their
costs.  
In sum, Customs costs and times appear to be quite modest. 
6.4. Technical Regulations
Observance of technical standards in the domestic and the EU market
Forty firms reported that they have to meet domestic technical regulations in order
to sell in domestic markets. Further six firms have not to take such regulations into
account and the remaining 14 firms do not sell in domestic markets. With regard to the
EU market, 28 firms have to meet technical regulations in order to sell to the EU
market; another 18 firms are not confronted with such regulations, while only two
firms indicated that they did not know.
It seems that particularly small and medium size firms have to deal with regulations
concerning the sales in domestic markets, while small and rather large firms are
concerned when it comes to regulations concerning sales at the EU markets. 
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.2. Shares of firms by size that has to comply with technical regulations in order to
sell at the market
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The costs of domestic technical regulations seem to be for most firms lower or at
least the same than the costs of the respective foreign regulations (Figure 6 3). Only a
small minority of firms consider domestic regulation in the areas of product quality,
testing and certification and labelling as more expensive than the same type of foreign
regulations. Furthermore, there is a certain reluctance to assess the relative costs of
regulations in the area  of health and environmental issues.
Firms were also asked what types of EU technical standards were most burdensome
and expensive. Here, firms which consider the burden of any of these regulations as
important are a clear minority (Figure 6 4). The highest rate of consideration as
important yields the area of product quality. The majority of firms consider the burden
of EU technical regulations as not important. The only exception is – at least to some
extent – testing and certification. Furthermore, firms are rather reluctant to provide
information in the area of health/environment and consumer safety issues, probably
because they mix up these requirements with product quality requirements. 
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.3. Costs of compliance with domestic technical regulations compared to foreign
technical regulations for exports
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The actual relative costs of meeting the EU requirements were also quite low, if the
numbers of the 7 to 15 reporting firms are used as a basis. For product characteristics
requirements these firms reported costs between 0.03 % and 5 % of their sales, with a
mean of 1.48 %. The highest costs were reported in the equipment manufacturing
sector (4.35 %) while the lowest in the metal products (0.10 %). With regard to
marking, labelling and packaging requirements costs amount to 0.002 % to 2.65 % with
a mean of 0.54 %. Other technical requirements caused relative costs between 0.10 %
and 10.00 % with a mean of 3.74 %. However, it should be borne in mind that firms in
only three sectors recorded positive costs in the last three areas.
Finally in this context, firms were asked how they would evaluate the ease of access
to the necessary information. Here, 21 out of 40 firms reported that the access was
easy, 13 that it was not very easy and only six found it difficult.
Testing for conformity with technical regulations
The 48 Armenian exporters to the EU were also asked whether their products had
been tested for conformity with foreign technical regulations before they were shipped to
the EU. Actually 65 % of them took such tests, but their assessments of the costs of these
tests differ to a large extent. On the one side, nine firms considered the costs as not at all
important and five firms indicated that they are only somewhat important. On the other
hand, eight firms assessed them as important and further eight firms as very important.
These assessments are dispersed rather randomly over the different size classes of firms.
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.4. Burden and expensiveness of EU technical standards
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The acceptance of test results and conformity certificates issued domestically by the
customs authorities of the EU countries was not a problem for 25 out of the 31 firms,
while six firms reported that their domestic test results and conformity certificates
were not accepted within the EU. 
Furthermore, Armenian firms were willing to answer the question whether their
products actually were tested for conformity with the EU technical regulations in the
destination country over the last year. Twenty-one firms affirmed this question, while 18
firms abnegate it and seven firms answered that they did not know. With regard to the
costs of these tests in the destination countries, the answers are widely dispersed. Six firms
considered them as not at all important, two as somewhat important, eight as important
and one firm as very important. Three firms answered that they could not say it.
Moreover, twelve firms reported that they need to have several product tests if they
export to more than one EU country, while seven firms answers that this is not
necessary. Altogether, the relative costs of product testing (% of last year’s sales) were
rather low. Eight firms numbered them between 0.01 % and 6.32 % with a mean of 1.02
%. Most answers were around 0.08 %. The lowest costs were incurred by metal product
producers and the highest by the food industry.
The problem of duplication of testing to meet both domestic and foreign technical
standards is assessed rather differently by the 14 answering firms. Six firms did not
need duplications and three firms only minor duplications. However, another four
firms indicated significant duplications and one firm needed complete duplication.
Finally, the majority of the firms reported that technical regulations conformity
inspections lasted on average two to four days upon arrival in an EU country.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
Armenian firms did not seem to care much about SPS measures. One out of eleven
firms answering this question reported that it implemented the HACCP system.
Furthermore two of them encountered SPS regulations related to their exports to the
EU which were burdensome for their company: one firm of these two considered
regulations concerning certification and quarantine as impediment to its exports. Five
firms also reported their expenditures in 2006 to ensure compliance with the respective
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. In four cases they were clearly below 1 % of
sales and in one case they amounted to 8.4 % of the firm’s sales. However, the
subjective assessments of the firms were a little bit different: one firm considered the
costs of meeting the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations of the EU as not at all
important, three firms as important and one firm as very important.
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Relative perceived unimportance of SPS measures recorded in the survey stems
from the fact that Armenia does not export agricultural and food products to the EU
except for wine and brandy, and crawfish. In both cases, special systems were put in
place to assure SPS conformity. The rest of the largely agricultural Armenian economy
cannot provide any products for export to the EU, in part due to inability to satisfy SPS
and product quality requirements.
6.5. Other NTBs
The questionnaire for Armenia also asked briefly about other impediments to trade,
namely:
• antidumping duties,
• countervailing duties, and
• other measures affecting prices (e.g. minimum import prices, voluntary export
price restraints).
All 47 answering firms denied the existence of antidumping and countervailing
duties. Two firms indicated that they are affected by other measures (mentioned under
bullet three), while the other 45 firms again denied such an impact. Nevertheless, one
of the two firms affected by NTBs reported that both antidumping and countervailing
duties are very restrictive, while another firm reported that other measures affecting
prices are somewhat restrictive. On the balance, the survey results do not indicate a
significant impact of these NTBs on exports.
6.6. Conclusions
Armenian exporters to the EU tend to sell in the domestic market as well. Only 14
firms out of 62 in the sample do not sell in domestic markets. The majority of the firms
exporting to the EU have been in that market from three to five years, which means that
they have established a firm foothold there.
Although Armenian exporters used extensively the EU trade preferences, they faced
some difficulties obtaining certificates of origin. Customs costs and clearing times
appear to be quite modest.
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The majority of firms consider the burden of EU technical regulations and product
standards as not important, with the exception of testing and certification. This fact is
underpinned with the structure of Armenian exports dominated by minerals, precious
stones, and raw materials which meet the product standards and safety requirements
almost by default.  
Moreover, many export products are manufactured under some sort of the outward
processing scheme, when Armenian firms provide their production services and all the
matters of logistics and marketing are carried out by their European partner. In this
case, Armenian firms are not even aware of the full extent of trade costs. Conformity
with technical regulations and product quality are ensured at contract signing and in
some cases, European partners even provide missing equipment.
Cases in point are textile industry and diamond processing. Typically, the Armenian
textile companies export their production services rather than products. The European
partner imports all the necessary materials and semi-finished products under the
regime of “temporary imports” and local textile companies produce the final product.
In some cases, even the expenses of the certificate of origin are being taken on by the
European partner.
Diamond cutters work in a similar fashion, as outward processing companies. The
cost of imported raw diamonds is not included in their turnover, which only accounts
for diamond cutting services. As to additional expenses associated with EU technical
regulations, the companies can satisfy most quality levels required and charge different
prices for different quality levels. Nevertheless, some Armenian companies
(aquaculture, food industry, sapphire) have to incur additional expenses to satisfy
quality requirements of their European partners. 
Unimportance of SPS measures stems from export composition with no
agricultural and food products to the EU except for wine and brandy, and crawfish. In
both cases, SPS conformity is assured by special arrangements.
The companies that fall short of satisfying European market requirement and
unable to change their technology accordingly simply are excluded from the list of
exporters and this is the absolute majority of Armenian companies.
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Introduction
This section discusses current developments in the services sectors in Armenia and
the likely implications of free trade agreements with the EU or regional trading
agreements. We also analyze current laws, regulations, and practices with respect to
the establishment of business and, where relevant, cross-border issues affecting
services and investment. We identify the areas where increased convergence of
regulatory oversight may assist in promoting services and investment flows. Armenia
made substantial commitments to liberalise trade in services in acceding to the WTO.
At the general level, therefore, the study focuses mainly on the Deep FTA scenario, and
on the flanking measures that will be necessary to make liberalization a reality. In this
section we are working with the Simple FTA and the Deep FTA+ scenarios as defined
in the Introduction. In the area of services a Simple FTA means no formal barriers to
trade and reinforcement of the principles of market access and national treatment. A
Deep FTA+ scenario describes significant degree of regulatory convergence and
introduction of flanking measures leading to a considerable improvement of the
business climate in Armenia.
Services account for around 40% of Armenian GDP, a relatively low figure by the
standards of transition economies, and Armenia has a significant deficit on the balance
of services within the balance of payments current account. So the service sector has
no special direct importance on either the domestic or international dimensions of the
Armenian economy at the present time. But some services sectors will emerge as key
focal points of economic development in the future, because they reflect the country’s
special natural endowments, and/or because they support the enhancement of
efficiency in the general infrastructure of business and administration. In particular the
development of the domestic (ICT-based) business services sector will be of great
110
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
7. Services in Armenia
importance for key industrial sectors like mining, metallurgy and machine-building
which are expected to develop as major export industries in the years to come. So any
agreement between the EU and Armenia which is seeking to accelerate the process of
economic development in that country must focus strongly on the services sector.
The discussion focuses on a number of sectors deemed to be of particular
importance for the Armenian economy, viz.-
7.1. Tourism 
7.2. Information and Communications Technologies (ITC) 
7.3. Construction and engineering services 
7.4 Financial services and banking 
7.5. Energy-related services38
7.1. Tourism 
7.1.1. Introduction
This is an area of great natural advantage for Armenia. Its potential is that much the
greater in that the extensive Armenian diasporas in the United States, Europe and
Russia retain deep attachment to their home country, and love to visit the many historic
sites and architectural legacies scattered around the country. There are some market
access and national treatment restrictions on foreign nationals and companies in the
hotels and restaurants and tourist guide services sectors in the WTO accession
agreement in relation to cross-border supply and presence of natural persons, but they
do not appear to be onerous. Some 20-22 hotels are 100% foreign-owned. The main
issue here is the development of the related services and infrastructure needed to
exploit the full tourist potential of the country. In 2005 318,000 foreign tourists came
to Armenia, rising to 381,000 in 2006 and some 450,000 in 2007. The government is
looking to double the number of tourists coming to Armenia each year in the medium
term, and is currently putting the stress on road development, and on developing
public/private partnerships, perhaps with some of the big hotel chains. A specific
strategy is to develop winter tourism. A Tourism Concept Paper was approved by the
government in February 2008. The Paper foresees an increase in the annual number of
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38 The European Commission did not ask us to look at energy services issues in relation to Armenia.  Interviews
with Armenian policy makers indicated, however, that there are some important regional issues here, so we have
included a short section.
tourists to 1.5 m in 2020 and 3 m in 2030. It lays particular stress on tourism as a
vehicle of regional development, and on the application of ICT to the management of
the tourist industry.   
7.1.2. Tourist infrastructure
Armenia is a land-locked and partly blockaded country, and the full development of
its tourist potential will obviously be dependent on further development of air transport
facilities. A Deep FTA+ would involve Armenia signing up for the ‘common aviation
area’. The EU is currently negotiating on this with the countries of the Western
Balkans, and aims to get all the countries covered by the Neighbourhood Policy into
the common aviation area by 2010. But Armenia has still not signed up for the original
OSCE Open Skies Agreement. This is related to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Air power played a crucial role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war of the early-mid
1990s, and the Armenian government may be reluctant to sign any civil aviation
agreement which weakens its capacity for surveillance of the Azeri airforce. The
government in Yerevan is hopeful of resolving the issue soon, but until it does,
prospects for the development of budget tourist flights to and from Armenia will remain
limited. There is nothing a free trade agreement per se can do to relax those limits.
Road transport infrastructure is a bottleneck for Armenian tourist development. The
country is well endowed with trunk roads, with 3361 km of national and international
roads. Denmark,  a country of similar area and population, has just 1,618 km of trunk
roads. But Armenia has only 4,342 km of local roads, compared to 80,900 in Denmark.
Government proposals to improve the network are crucial for tourist development.
Under the Poverty Reduction Strategic Programme for the period to 2015, the main
stress is on improving the existing international road network, with particular
emphasis on the reconstruction of bridges considered to be unsafe in relation to present
levels of traffic – an obvious priority in a mountainous country. There is also of
programme to improve road signs. In addition, there are programmes to repair and
upgrade national and local roads, some with international (principally US) financial
support. But there are no major programmes of new road building, and it is not clear
that modernizing the existing road network will be enough to accommodate the
country’s tourist potential. It would not be easy or even appropriate, even within the
framework of a Deep FTA, to seek to impose on Armenia ambitious and expensive
programmes to develop the national and local road network. Projects like TRACECA
may help with the development of the international road system, but can hardly be
expected to support the kind of in-depth development of local road links that the tourist
industry needs. This is no doubt one of the areas in which the government would like
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to develop public/private partnerships. A Deep FTA would at least make it easier for
foreign firms to become involved in such partnerships.
Even major road-building programmes will not by themselves solve all the problems
of road transport in Armenia. An important cultural dimension which intensifies the
problem is the way that Armenians drive - generally too fast, and with scant regard for
the safety of pedestrians. The Armenian police do not appear, as a rule, to enforce
traffic laws. The problem is a familiar one throughout the CIS. Some governments,
notably the Kazakh, have taken systematic measures to combat it. International
cooperation for harmonization of traffic laws and enforcement measures would help
here, and there is clearly a role for international financial support in all this. Road
safety is an explicit priority of Armenian government transport policy, and it would
surely not be difficult to nest foreign technical assistance within this policy framework.
Such programmes would have no bearing on a Simple FTA. But they could feature as
flanking measures for a Deep FTA+, with a significant potential effect on the
development of tourism.
There are 842 km of railways in Armenia. The Ayrum-Vanadzor railway line is still
the main transport link between Armenia and Georgia, and is therefore a major factor
of regional economic development in the Caucasus. It suffers from the same kinds of
problems as the road network, in particular old bridges in urgent need of repair. The
World Bank has lent Armenia some US$15 m for a range of railway upgrading projects,
and a number of similar projects are being financed directly from the Armenian budget.
At the present time these developments are marginal to tourism, because the Armenian
railway is largely a goods carrier. But in the absence of direct flights from Yerevan to
Tbilisi and vice versa a good passenger train service from Georgia to Armenia would
surely facilitate development of the tourist industry, and on a regional scale. A Deep
FTA+ could help here, because it would make it easier for foreign investors to commit
themselves to long-term, infrastructural projects.
Sea transport is obviously not of direct importance for Armenia, but it has acquired
substantial indirect importance since the closing of the main land border crossing
between Georgia and Russia in June 2006. A new rail-ferry service has now been
introduced which runs from Poti in Georgia to Port Kavkaz, on the Russian Black Sea
coast. This is a very important cargo link for Armenian exporters, and the Armenian
government is pressing the Russian government to allow it to expand. It could
conceivably in the future, with appropriate backup in terms of rail services upgrading,
develop as a link for Russian tourists bound for Armenia. But this issue will turn on the
evolution of Armenian-Russian relations, and, more important, Georgian-Russian
relations, and an FTA would have little impact on it.
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With infrastructural investment the crucial variable in relation to the development
of tourism, a Simple FTA could not be expected to have much impact. It would take a
Deep FTA+ to stimulate the kind of international investment initiatives needed to
finance large-scale infrastructural programmes.
7.2. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
7.2.1. Introduction
ICT is of particular importance in Armenia, as in other emerging economies,
because it provides the technological basis for the economy-wide increases in
organizational efficiency which lay the foundation for the catch-up process. It is a
crucial input for every sector of the economy.
7.2.2. The sector in outline
The computer services sector is already highly liberalized in Armenia. But as Table
71 shows, Armenia is comparatively poorly endowed with computers and has a low
rate of internet usage – partly, perhaps, because internet services are comparatively
expensive. There are ten main internet providers in Armenia. The leader in the market
is Arminco. The second-largest internet provider is CallNet/Cornet, bought by the
Russian Comstar in 2006.  
In telecoms, ArmenTel’s fixed telephony state monopoly was originally scheduled to
survive in Armenia until the end of 2013.39 That has now been brought forward to 2008.
In that context, regulatory convergence with the EU is a short-to-medium-term rather
than short-term issue for Armenia. In the light of that, the best way forward would be
to seek to assimilate the parts of the acquis communautaire relating to telecoms, using
the 1998 set of telecom regulations. The EU itself has now moved on to a new set of
regulations promulgated in 2002. But these are designed for advanced countries with
substantial capacity for self-regulation. The 1998 package is a more detailed and
specific set of documents, and is more relevant to the needs of emerging countries. In
the case of the countries of South-Eastern Europe, the European Commission has
facilitated regulatory convergence in the telecoms area through a combination of
regular reports, working group meetings and technical assistance (CEPS, 2006, p.93).
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39 According to WTO accession documents.  Local sources say 2017.
The same approach could be used in the Armenian case, and full convergence could, in
principle, be achieved soon after the signing of a Deep FTA+.  
As Table 7.1 shows, Armenia is comparatively well endowed with telephone land-
lines, but poorly endowed with mobile phones. ArmenTel has about 40% of the mobile
market. K-Telecom, recently bought by the Russian MTS, which entered the market
when ArmenTel’s monopoly over mobile telephony was ended in 2005, has most of the
rest.
Convergence in technical standards for telecoms equipment may be an issue for
Armenia to the extent that the old Soviet GOST standards are still being used within
the country. But this is an area where the more liberal EU New Approach to conformity
assessment is dominant. And Armenia does not actually make much telecoms
equipment itself. So convergence should be mainly a technical issue, albeit a
complicated one. It will take the form primarily of continuing negotiations between the
EU authorities and the Armenian government, with EU-supported user-groups also
playing a role. Full convergence might require several years of operation of a Deep
FTA+.
About 10% of total Armenian exports are accounted for by IT goods and services.
Armenian service providers have difficulty registering abroad. This presumably relates
to issues like data retention. Thus non-EU providers who have connectivity into the EU
have to agree to comply with the data collection regulations operating within the EU.
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Source: IBM Business Consulting Services (2007), p.79
Table 7.1. Telephone and computer endowment: some regional comparisons
 Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia 
Lower 
Middle 
average 
Average 
for the 
ECA 
region 
High 
Income 
Average 
World 
Average 
Communications 
Telephone Mainlines 
per 1000 peoples (2003)  
114 148 133 175 228 560 183 
Mobile Phones per 
1000 peoples (2003) 
128 100 (2005) 107 207 301 708 223 
Computers and Internet  
Personal Computers 
per 1000 peoples (2003) 
n/a 15.8 31.6 35.6 73.4 466.5 100.8 
Internet users per 
1000 peoples (2003) 
37 37 31 75 161 377 150 
Monthly price for  
20 hours of use of 
Internet UD $ (2004) 
108 45 26 30 26 23 37 
In the context of Armenian ambitions to develop a knowledge-based economy, access
to foreign markets for Armenian IT companies would obviously be crucial. It is not
clear how an FTA would affect these registration issues. 
7.2.3. The ArmenTel case
In 1997 a majority share in ArmenTel was sold to the Greek OTE. The deal involved
maintenance of ArmenTel’s monopoly over fixed telephony, wireless telephone
networks and internet connections with the outside world. In 2006 OTE sold out to the
Russian Vimpelcom, after the government announced in late 2004 that the mobile
telephony monopoly would be brought an end in 2005 and the fixed telephony
monopoly at the beginning of 2008. Interpretations of these events vary. The Armenian
government charged that OTE had fallen down on their investment commitments,
especially in relation to development of the wireless network, and were using their
Armenian operation as a means of money-laundering. The unofficial version is that
OTE were punished for refusing to work with local politicians, contractors and
providers. There are probably elements of truth in both versions. Mobile telephony is
certainly underdeveloped in Armenia, as we saw above. On the other hand, our general
understanding of the Armenian political economy may incline us to give some credence
to the unofficial version. Whatever the balance of truth, the case raises important issues
relating to free trade issues. The Armenian government has now moved from an
interventionist to a liberal policy stance on terrestrial telephony. But they have done so
in an arbitrary way, and without much concern for contractual commitments. They
have supported ArmenTel’s attempts to stop independent providers offering cheap
internet-based telephone services using their connections, while assuring the public
that ArmenTel’s monopoly power in this area will be removed in 2008 along with all its
other monopoly powers. Having moved to a more liberal position, the government
might, with equal arbitrariness, subsequently move back to a more interventionist
position. It should in any case be stressed that the abolition of the state monopoly may
change little in terms of short-term business realities, since the incumbent retains
control  of all the telephone infrastructure, without, as far as can be ascertained, any
commitments to open up that infrastructure to third-parties. A Simple FTA would not
affect any of this. A Deep FTA+ would have to posit a movement to a much more stable,
less politicized system, where potential investors could gauge the prospects for
investment on the basis of a clear understanding of the prospective evolution of the
regulatory framework. It would also have to involve a thoroughgoing reform and
upgrading of the Armenian competition and monopoly authority.
116
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Against the background of a fairly liberal sectoral regulatory framework, a Simple
FTA would have only a slight impact on the ICT sector in Armenia. A Deep FTA+ could
have a much greater effect, but only if flanked by far-reaching measures of an
essentially political nature as detailed under Priorities 1 and 2 of the EU/Armenia
Action Plan (in particular strengthening of democratic structures and rule of law and
fight against corruption and fraud).
7.3. Construction and Engineering services 
This relates primarily to the import of construction services, where cross-border
supply is generally unbound under the Armenian WTO agreement, with regard to both
market access and national treatment. Armenia also exports some construction
services. So there are some minor Simple FTA issues here.
Provision of management services for building projects: there is only one specialist
construction project management company in Armenia. Given the scale of building
activity in Armenia right now, free market access for foreign construction project
management organizations is clearly important. While a Simple FTA would establish
this on paper, it would probably take a Deep FTA+ to guarantee it. Armenian
organizations do not appear to be currently involved in the export of management
services for building projects. However, Armenian companies are expected to supply
construction services (probably mainly management services for building projects) as
well as building materials for the Winter Olympics to be held in Sochi, Russia, in 2014.  
Organisation of distribution of imported building materials: there are no limitations
in the sphere of wholesale trade services in Armenia’s agreement on accession to the
WTO, except in relation to presence of natural persons. But there is only one major
importer of building materials in Armenia. There must be some suspicion that there is
in this sector, as in other key import sectors in Armenia, a de facto monopoly situation,
supported by local political elites. A Simple FTA would in do little to break such a
monopoly. Rather it would require a Deep FTA+, flanked by a thoroughly revamped
and upgraded Armenian monopoly and competition agency.
Provision of design and architectural services: there are a number of Armenian
companies active in this area, so that there is probably a fair degree of competition on
the domestic market, and possibly also some export activity. Even a Simple FTA and
the more a Deep FTA+ would reinforce both competition and competitiveness, though
the impact would likely be fairly marginal.
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Much of the construction currently going on in Armenia is financed by remittances
from abroad. This must make the issue of free import of building materials that much
more important.
Trade in construction and engineering services in Armenia is substantially
liberalised in formal terms, and conclusion of a Simple FTA would have a degree of
impact here only in completing the process of formal liberalisation. It would take a
Deep FTA+, flanked by far-reaching measures to strengthen the implementation of
competition law, to have a significant impact. 
7.4. Financial services and banking  
7.4.1. Introduction
The Armenian financial sector is among the smallest relative to GDP in the World
Bank’s Europe and Central Asia region.  
Under the WTO accession agreements, the banking sector is largely liberalized in
Armenia. But the sector remains 50% domestically-owned and predominantly
Armenian-owned (when account is taken of banks owned by Diaspora Armenians).
Comparison with the experience of other transition countries, where banking
liberalization has generally been followed by substantial foreign penetration, suggests
that key flanking measures are not in place here. Under the WTO agreements the
insurance sector remained subject to considerably restrictions in Armenia. These have
now been removed. There is a degree of foreign penetration in the Armenian insurance
market.  
The Armenian government would like to develop Armenia as an international centre
for financial services. This may be over-ambitious, but it provides scope for positive
interaction between government policy and the process of deliberation with the EU
over norms for regulatory policies.  
7.4.2. The banking sector in Armenia
The banking system accounts for some 90% of the assets of the Armenian financial
sector, and is 100% privately owned. There are at present 21 banks in Armenia. The
biggest of them is HSBC Armenia, which holds 15% of the total assets and accounts for
20% of the total lending in the sector. In 2006, the French Crédit Agricole took a 28%
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share in ACBA (Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Armenia), the largest bank by
capitalization in the country. In 2004 the Post Office Savings Bank was taken over by
the Russian Vneshtorgbank (VTB)  and renamed Vneshtorgbank Armenia. In 2007 the
German Procredit established a microfinance bank (PCB Armenia) with the support of
the EBRD. The Dutch International Post Service Group plans to establish a postal bank
in Armenia. There are also Kazakh and Ukrainian (and other Russian) interests in the
Armenian banking system. Around 50% of the total capital stock of the Armenian
banking sector is foreign-owned. Some of that 50% is owned by diaspora Armenians. 
Banks differ greatly in size, outreach effort, and customer base. Around half of all
Armenian banks are very small with negligible market shares in deposits and loans,
which contribute to the sector’s overall low banking productivity. A number of these
banks concentrate their activities in trade financing, money transfers, and private
banking, rather than in deposit-taking and loan-making. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that several small banks serve as ‘pocket banks’ of enterprise groups or wealthy
individuals, which use them for treasury operations, or as sources of cheap liquidity,
and equity investment [8-10 banks come into this category]. Other banks serve a large
number of small scale depositors and borrowers. While they may have comparatively
large shares of the overall deposit and credit markets, the size of financial service per
customer can be extremely small, with some banks having average loans and deposits
as low as US$200 per customer. (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier, 2007, p.10)
A large proportion of bank assets in Armenia are held in the form of low-yielding
assets like cash, inter-bank accounts and treasury bills. Because interest rates on
deposits are relatively high, the banks have to charge high rates of interest on loans, in
order to maintain profitability. Partly as a result of this, the bulk of bank liabilities in
Armenia are short-term, with companies tending to baulk at the cost of longer-term
borrowing. Dollarisation tends to push up interest rates even further, since banks have
to pay very high rates of interest to attract dollars, and because they have to make
provision for the risk of currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. That in turn
means that they have to charge rates of between 20 and 35% per annum on dollar
loans, which tends to produce adverse selection problems (Mu et al., 2004, pp.5-7). 
There is no evidence that foreign banks in Armenia charge lower interest rate
spreads than domestically-owned, and in this respect Armenia is an exception to the
usual pattern of transition countries (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier, 2007, pp.13-14).
This may be a reflection of the fact that there is only one first-tier international bank in
Armenia, namely HSBC – most of the other foreign-owned banks in the country are
owned by diaspora Armenians who are not professional bankers (Norris and
Floerkemeier, 2007, p.6). So HSBC may feel little competitive pressure to lower its
spreads. Spreads have, nevertheless, come down a bit over the last few years, from an
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average of around 14% to a still high 11% (See Table 7.2). Crédit Agricole/ACBA is now
extending its operations outside the agricultural area. If it emerges as an effective
competitor for HSBC, we can expect spreads to go down even more.
The ownership pattern in Armenian banking gives rise to a number of related
problems. It is, indeed, often difficult to know exactly who owns particular banks,
and there is little transparency. Partly as a result, corporate governance is weak and
connected lending is widespread. In the context of all of this, it would clearly do the
Armenian banking system (and in particular its customers) an immense amount of
good if new first-tier international banks could be tempted to enter the market.
Detailed analysis confirms that flanking measures, specifically measures to
strengthen corporate governance, strengthen the supervisory role of the Central
Bank of Armenia and strengthen accountancy and audit practice would be crucial.
Thus banking in Armenia is clearly a Deep FTA+ issue, with comprehensive flanking
measures such as supervision and corporate governance as essential conditions for
the increased foreign involvement in the sector. As far as audit is concerned, the
current situation is that the international banks use the audit services of international
audit firms like PWC. Domestically owned banks do not, and there seems to be no
pressure on them to raise their standards in this respect. This, does, indeed, seem to
be a general pattern in the Armenian business sector. Local reports confirm that
Armenian-owned companies have a poor understanding of the importance of
accountants, lawyers etc. This has serious implications for the economy as a whole,
particularly on the dimension of foreign trade. It also means that there is little scope
for the development of local accountancy firms and the like – what might be called
ancillary financial services. Against this background, government plans to develop
Armenia as an international financial centre seems far-fetched. It should be noted,
however, that Basle-2 principles of risk assessment have been introduced in Armenia
last year (2007). 
7.4.3. The insurance sector in Armenia
The insurance sector in Armenia is very small. In 1999 it had the second lowest
gross premium volume in the CIS, with only Kyrgyzstan below it (Mu et al., 2004,
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Source: AEPLAC, 2007, p.46
Table 7.2. Average interest rates of commercial banks
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Lending rate, %  31.6 26.7 21.1 20.8 18.6 18.0 16.5 
Deposit rate, %  18.1 14.9 9.6 6.9 4.9 5.8 5.8 
Spread, % 13.5 11.8 11.5 13.9 13.7 12.2 10.8 
p.14). The insurance sector as a whole is under-capitalised and overstaffed. There
are a number of regulatory issues affecting the sector. The regulation on reserve
allocation is not in accordance with the principles of liquidity diversification. The
sector is largely non-compliant with IAIS core principles. There is an Insurance
Inspectorate, but it is understaffed, under-funded and under-qualified. The
Inspectorate was developing a strategy paper a few years ago which the World Bank
considered to be over-ambitious (Mu et al., 2004, pp.5-7). No further information on
this has come to hand. The Armenian insurance sector suffers from all the same
corporate governance problems as the banking system. Against this background, the
EU/Armenia Action Plan singles out the insurance sector as a key development
priority.
The residual restrictions relating to insurance in Armenia’s accession agreement
with the WTO, notably the restrictions on foreign companies selling life insurance, have
already been removed. At present, Armenia has four foreign insurance providers,
including HSBC Insurance and the Russian-owned Gosstrakh-Armenia. Whether a
Simple FTA would have a big impact on their business strategies is doubtful. Here,
perhaps even more than with banking, it is the flanking measures that would come with
a Deep FTA+ that would really make a difference. General issues of corporate
governance and supervision apart, there are key training issues. At present there are no
actuaries in Armenia. As a result, it is simply not possible to sell life insurance on a
large scale on the Armenian market. It should be noted, however, that USAID, in
collaboration with the Central Bank of Armenia and the UK Society of Actuaries, is
running a programme of basic actuarial training in Yerevan March/April - December
2008. A new law on insurance and insurance activity was passed on 30 September
2007, covering matters such as licensing, registration and the organisation of
information. The question of compulsory third-party insurance for drivers is currently
being considered by government departments. 
Given how limited the insurance sector is in Armenia, the impact of a Deep FTA+
here could be very significant, though only to the extent that continued economic
growth allows the development of a solvent market for insurance services.   
7.4.4. The Armenian stock exchange
The Swedish OMX Nordic Exchange took over the Armenian stock exchange in
2007. At present 29 companies are listed on the Armenian stock exchange.
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7.4.5. The financial regulatory framework
Armenia’s ambitions to develop finance as an area of national specialization will
require harmonization with the financial regulatory framework of the EU. It is, in fact,
probably not appropriate for Armenia simply to copy all the sections of the acquis
communautaire relating to the financial sector. As has been argued in relation to
Ukraine (Emerson et al, 2006, p.9), those sections are drafted to take account of the
needs of countries with highly sophisticated financial markets. Armenia is not in that
category, and will not join it for some time to come. The important thing for Armenia
is that legislation should be acquis-compatible, reflecting passive compliance with the
EU system. Even so, on the more substantive issues of financial regulation, progress
will be slow, and the conclusion of an FTA would not, in itself, do much to accelerate
it. A Deep FTA+ would have a significant medium-term impact.  
Among key corporate governance/audit/accounting flanking measures, Armenia has
already made the EU International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) compulsory
for listed companies. As noted above, however, many areas of corporate governance
remain opaque in Armenia (NB the great majority of companies are not listed), and it
would likely take several years of a Deep FTA+ to make a significant impact on this
situation.
The Armenian financial services sector is largely liberalised, and conclusion of a
Simple FTA would, accordingly, not have a big impact. A Deep FTA+ could have a
much greater impact, but it would have to be flanked by wide-ranging measures on
supervision, corporate governance and training. The last of these in particular could
only be expected to show its full impact after a considerable time-lag.
7.5. Energy-related services
This covers a wide range of transit issues, and also issues relating to domestic
distribution of energy. There is no mention of energy-related services in Armenia’s
WTO accession agreement, so, presumably, there are no restrictions in this area. So,
once again, it is the Deep FTA issues that are paramount here. One investment project
currently under consideration is the construction of an oil refinery to process crude oil
from Iran and then reexport it, in the form of refined oil products, to Iran. A new rail
link would have to be built to handle these reexports. The project would be financed by
Russian interests. Its implementation would probably depend on the successful
completion of the negotiations for an FTA between Armenia and Iran, expected in
2008. Another similar project would involve the construction of a hydro-electric station
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near the border with Iran. There is also a project to build a gas pipeline from Iran to
Armenia. The first stage of the pipeline was completed in March 2007, and the whole
project is due to be completed by the end of 2008. Ownership of this project has just
passed to ArmRosGazprom, the Armenian national gas distribution company (58%
owned by Gazprom) on condition that it spends US$150 m plus on completing the
project on time.  
In all of this the regional dimension looms large. There is a ‘natural’ seasonal
pattern of trade in electricity between Armenia and Iran, with Armenia exporting in
summer and importing in winter. And there is a natural market in energy-deficient
Turkey for Armenian energy, if the political problems can be solved, and if Armenia can
develop the infrastructural means to deliver that energy. It is not surprising, then that
the Armenian government is keen to organize a regional energy market, with Armenian
trade in electricity with Iran expanding, and exports of electricity to Georgia as well as
Turkey. A high-voltage transmission line to Georgia is currently being built with
German money. A high-voltage transmission line to Turkey already exists. It only needs
a normalization of relations with Turkey to start to create a regional energy market.
Completion of the edifice would, of course, also require a normalization of relations
with Azerbaijan.  It should be stressed that, with all the countries involved apart from
Iran being signatories of the Energy Charter Treaty, the framework for cooperation on
transit investment already exists. It only needs political normalisation to set it in
motion.  
Realisation of Armenia’s regional energy ambitions would also require a
normalization of Armenia’s nuclear generating capacity. At present 40% of the
country’s electricity is generated by the Metsamor nuclear power plant, an old Soviet
plant which is considered to be unsafe. The plant is operated by a Russian company,
Inter RAO UES, a subsidiary of the Russian electricity company RAO UES and the
Russian nuclear energy organisation Rosenergoatom. The EU/Armenia Action Plan
contains a commitment to an early decommissioning of the plant. There are plans to
develop alternative sources of power, notably hydro-power and renewables, but
Armenia’s future as an electricity-producing and elecricity-exporting country will
depend crucially on the fate of the proposal to build a new, 1,000-MW nuclear plant, at
a cost of some $1.5 bn. Both Russia and the United States have backed the project 
The Armenian government has a vision of Armenia as an exporter of energy and
energy services in the form of transmission, including possibly transit transmission. In
relation to the procurement of energy, transition from a single buyer system to a
competitive energy market was scheduled to take place in 2006-7. No precise
information on the progress of this transition has come to hand, but the Armenian
energy market does seem to be fairly highly liberalized at the present time. So we can
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conclude that the regulatory foundation for Armenia’s energy vision has been laid. A
Deep FTA+ with the EU would help Armenia to realize the vision to the extent that it
facilitated inward investment in the energy industry from EU countries. Whether the
Russian interests who have such a large stake in the Armenian energy industry would
be happy with such a prospect is doubtful. And it must be stressed that realisation of
the vision is also dependent on a full normalisation of political relations with Turkey
and Azerbaijan. At present the prospects for such a normalisation still seem distant. If
the project for a new nuclear power plant does not materialise, Armenia’s energy
ambitions may in any case have to be limited to transit, rather than export.
In the largely liberalised energy-related services sector, the impact of a Simple FTA
would be slight. A Deep FTA+ could have a much greater impact, but only if combined
with far-reaching flanking measures including political agreements at the regional
level.
7.6. Likely changes to investment climate due to FTA
Consideration of international experience shows that there is no clear pattern of
response to FDI flows to trade agreements. The FDI boom in China predated the
accession of that country to the WTO by a number of years, and accession did not
produce any clear-cut upward shift in the FDI trend. In the Central-East European
countries, the FDI boom started as soon as transition began (Poland was something of
an exception), and accession to the EU did not result in any sharp break in the FDI
trend. (There was a leap in FDI inflow in Poland in 2004, but it was not maintained.)
Likewise in Russia, we have seen a very sharp upward trend in FDI over the past few
years, culminating in a jump to a total of over $30 bn and a per capita level comparable
to that of the CEECs in 2006, during a period in which Russia’s relations with the rest
of the world have come under strain, and in which concerns over the special difficulties
of doing business in that country have increased rather than decreased.  
How do we make sense of these patterns? In Central-East Europe companies may,
with some justification, have anticipated ultimate EU accession on the part of the
countries of that region. The same thing can be said of FDI in China and Chinese
accession to the WTO. It may equally plausibly be argued that multinational firms use
FDI primarily in order to gain access to the specific resource endowments of particular
countries, or to the markets of those countries. Cheap labour in the case of China,
(relatively) cheap skilled labour in Central-East Europe, energy resources in Central
Asia, access to CEEC markets, have clearly all been important drivers of FDI in the
transition countries. In the Russian case, access to energy resources, and to the large
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Russian domestic market, have been of central importance. Cheap labour has been less
important in Russia because of uncertainties about Russian productivity and anxieties
about how easy it would be to develop modern management systems in Russian
conditions. Reference to patterns of factor availability hardly explains, however, the
huge leap in foreign investment in Russia over the last year or so. High oil prices,
leading to high economic growth and rapidly increasing domestic consumption, may
lie at the heart of the process, but it is, again, difficult to adduce conclusive evidence.  
CEEC accession to the EU put FDI in the new Member States under the legal
protection of the acquis communautaire as well as admitting them to the single market.
Still, there was no dramatic leap in FDI. Remaining legal uncertainties and widespread
corruption in China have not stopped FDI continuing to grow in that country.
Improvements in the business environment must surely ultimately have positive effects
on investment flows. But they may have relatively minor effects on the strategies of oil
companies used to fishing in troubled waters and retailers working on relatively short
planning horizons. Where the business environment may be much more important is
in relation to the scope for building whole complexes of companies in the form of
supply chains and design/production matrices.
One of the major impacts of FDI in CEEC has come in the form of a build-up of
supply networks centering on major investments, especially in the automotive and
consumer electronics sectors. Leading these new supply hierarchies have been the first-
tier suppliers, making complex components and cooperating actively with lead
companies in relation to technological development and design. Examples from the car
industry include engines and gear boxes. Below that level, second- and third-tier
suppliers have been engaged to make individual components (ranging from
technologically advanced down to simple) for the finished products. Patterns of
development of supply hierarchies in CEEC have not been wholly satisfactory from a
development point of view. The great majority of first-tier suppliers are themselves
wholly or partly foreign-owned, and Slovenia is the only new Member State of the EU
to boast of a significant number of domestically-owned first-tier suppliers. In China
FDI has given a tremendous boost to the development of supply hierarchies. But here,
there is a significant number of Chinese-owned first-tier suppliers, some of them
exporting all over the world (Dyker, 2006).
How do these various factors affect Armenia? It has no significant hydrocarbon
reserves, but as we saw earlier, the government has a vision of Armenia as a transit
country for electricity. Armenia does not offer a big domestic market, mobile telephony
apart. Supply network-building in Armenia is undeveloped, though there may be some
hint of a start here in relation to metals and metal-processing. A Simple FTA would
help to facilitate this kind of development, and a Deep FTA would help even more. The
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experiences of Central-East Europe and China have shown, however, that productivity
and relative labour costs count for more here than free trade agreements.
7.6.1. MFN pre-establishment
Armenia’s WTO membership should in principle guarantee MFN for the great
majority of sectors. One major exception was fixed telephony, which under the WTO
accession agreement could be kept under a state monopoly until 2013. As we saw
earlier, however, this restriction is to be removed from 2008. There are problems of
MFN in Armenia, but they relate not to laws and regulations, but to the
oligopolistic/oligarchic structure of key importing sectors. As we saw in an earlier
section, it is very difficult for any outsider companies, domestic or foreign, to challenge
incumbents in these sectors. By the same token it is impossible to guarantee that the
oligopolists/oligarchs are not discriminating in favour of particular suppliers and/or
countries in their procurement operations, and any joint ventures they might undertake
on the investment side. It would require changes in legal institutions and patterns of
political behaviour going beyond even what is normally included even under the rubric
of Deep FTA+ to make a significant impact on these de facto MFN restrictions.  
7.6.2. National treatment
Again, Armenia’s WTO membership should in principle guarantee this, and a
Simple FTA would merely reinforce this guarantee. In practice, the oligopoly/oligarchy
problem impinges here as well. In addition, there is the problem of the sheer
complexity and difficulty of doing business in Armenia (see Table 7.3), which tends to
impinge unequally on foreign companies. More directly discriminatory is the
incompetence and dishonesty still widespread in the courts. And, of course, tax evasion
it is easier for local firms than for foreign firms. On all these counts, only a
comprehensive Deep FTA+ would make a significant impact.
7.6.3. Market access restrictions
Again, these largely disappeared in formal terms with WTO accession, apart from
in fixed telephony, as discussed above. A Simple FTA would in principle clear up any
remaining formal obstacles. But the oligopoly/oligarchy issue once more rears its head
here. For a foreign company to force entry into, for example, the wheat or oil importing
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business would be extremely difficult. Guaranteeing market access in these sensitive
sectors would probably demand an even more far-reaching Deep FTA+ measures than
those calculated to guarantee MFN, with root-and-branch reform of the legal system
and courts being the top priority.
7.7. Conclusions
Against the background of a high degree of liberalisation at the level of regulations,
the services sectors in Armenia would be affected only marginally by the conclusion of
a Simple FTA. A Deep FTA+ holds out much more promise of substantial impact, but
to be effective it would have to be heavily flanked, not just by further regulatory reform,
strengthening of the competition authority etc, but also by measures to strengthen
democratic structures, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and to combat
corruption and fraud, as laid out under Priorities 1 and 2 of the ENP EU/Armenia
Action Plan. These latter measures should be seen as essential conditions for the
effective implementation of a Deep free trade agreement.
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Source: World Bank Doing Business database
Table 7.3. Selected indicators of doing business in Armenia, with regional comparisons
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Baltic countries 
Starting a business 
    Procedures  (no)      10.0 8.0 14.0 6.3 
    Duration (days) 25.0 21.0 115.0 25.7 
Dealing with licenses  
    Procedures  (no)      20.0 29.0 28.0 15.7 
    Duration (days) 176.0 282.0 212.0 142.3 
Registering property 
    Procedures (no)      4.0 6.0 7.0 5.3 
    Duration (days) 6.0 9.0 61.0 40.7 
Enforcing contracts 
    Procedures  (no)      24.0 18.0 25.0 20.7 
    Duration (days) 185.0 375.0 267.0 163.3 
   Cost (% o  debt) 17.8 31.7 19.8 10.0 
FDI inflows into Armenia averaged around USD200 million annually in recent
years (see Table 8.1). Inflows of this magnitude have been observed in the CIS for
Belarus and Moldova, and in the Balkans for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Among the Southern Caucasus states, inflows of FDI to Armenia are roughly half of
these to Georgia, although they have been comparable in the past. Inflows to
Azerbaijan are much higher, due to investment in the extraction of energy resources.
The stock of foreign investment in per capita terms in Armenia was close to USD500 in
2006, which is lower than for the average of CIS states or Central European transition
economies. For more statistics on FDI see Appendix 5 (Appendix 5 Table 1 through
Appendix 5 Table 3).
After the Russian financial crisis of 1998, foreign investment was momentarily
much increased, accounting in that year for ¾ of all Armenian investment, and such
high share reflected the scarcity of domestic resources at that time. However the role
of foreign capital soon decreased along with the development of the economy, although
128
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
8. Likely changes in FDI flow due 
to an FTA 
Source: UNCTAD and www.armstat.am
Note: * - own estimate
Table 8.1. FDI statistics, Armenia, 1998-2006
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FDI inflows  
in million of USD 
232 135 125 88 144 157 217 220 251 
FDI stocks  
in million of USD 
372 507 632 719 869 1024 1005 1225 1476* 
FDI stock  
in USD per capita 
119 164 205 235 285 337 332 406 489* 
FDI inflows in %  
of total investment 
75.7 44.6 35.4 23.4 28.8 24.4 26.9 16.2  
still remaining substantial. In 2005, FDI accounted for 16% of all Armenian
investment.
FDI in recent years went primarily into telecommunication (investors from Greece,
Lebanon and Russia in 2005-2006), mining (mainly from France), air transport
(Argentina), production and distribution of energy (France and much smaller part by
Russian investors), extraction of metal ores (Canada), construction (Canada and
Russia), production of food and beverages (France, Luxemburg, Lebanon), hotels and
restaurants (Canada and the US) and other business services (the US and the
Netherlands).
On average, about one third of FDI in 1988-2006 came from Russia. However, the
share of the capital of the Russian origin decreased recently. In 2006 Russian investors
put capital into production and distribution of electricity, construction and provided
loans to the metallurgical plants in Armenia. On the other hand, the role of French
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Source: Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia 
Note: foreign investment here states for FDI + credit lines + some portfolio investment
Table 8.2. FDI inflows to Armenia, by sectors, 2004-2006
2004 2005 2006 NACE Name 
foreign 
invest- 
ment 
of 
which: 
FDI 
foreign 
invest- 
ment 
of 
which: 
FDI 
foreign 
invest- 
ment 
of 
which: 
FDI 
FDI 
in % 
of total 
64 communication 75.1 43.2 132.1 56.1 15.1 61.9 25% 
14 other mining 
and quarrying 
39.6 39.6 97.5 97.5 48.1 48.1 19% 
62 air transport 30.4 24.4 14.9 14.9 55.6 26.6 11% 
40 production and 
distribution 
of energy 
32.3 32.3 0.1 0.1 18.1 18.1 7% 
13 extraction  
of metal ore 
3.4 3.4 0.9 0.9 17.9 17.9 7% 
45 construction 3.3 1.0 16.4 4.4 17.2 14.4 6% 
15 food and  
beverages 
38.7 34.7 26.4 26.4 16.9 11.4 5% 
51 wholesale 
trade 
5.9 4.4 4.0 2.7 12.9 10.1 4% 
55 hotels and 
restaurants 
13.1 3.1 7.1 6.6 10.0 9.2 4% 
74 other market 
services 
2.5 2.1 3.4 2.8 10.8 8.4 3% 
72 computer 
engineering 
8.0 5.0 14.4 6.9 12.8 7.1 3% 
65 financial 
intermediation 
20.4 11.9 0.9 0.0 11.7 0.0 0% 
27 Metallurgy 6.0 0.0 53.3 0.4 45.2 n/a 0% 
 Other 26.9 21.6 29.0 24.8 151.8 17.5 7% 
 Total 305.6 226.7 400.4 244.4 444.1 250.7 100% 
capital increased and in 2006 around 1/3 of FDI came from France (into extraction of
minerals, food processing, production and distribution of electricity, distribution of
water). Other important sources of FDI were: Germany (11% in 1988-2006 on
average), the US (9% in 1988-206), Canada (8% in 1988-2006), Greece (5% in 1988-
2006), Argentina, UK, Cyprus (probably offshore Russian/Armenian capital; not any
more in the statistics in 2006).
About 25% of FDI coming to Armenia during 1998-2004 can be attributed to
diaspora-connected investments (Hergnyan, Makayan 2006). These investments are
rather small and predominantly motivated by the ethnic or patriotic feelings rather
than by the real business interests. Only about 40% of the diaspora-connected investors
interviewed in 2006 declared  that business interest was a key motivational factor
affecting their investment decision. On the contrary, ethnic identity was important for
nearly 90% of them (Hergnyan, Makaryan 2006). For this reason, these are not
investment that would be very strong in terms of boosting productivity. However, it is
claimed that their existence created possibility for big business-motivated
multinationals to enter Armenian market at a later stage (Hergnyan, Makaryan 2006).
Diaspora-related FDI went mainly to ICT, gems and jewellery, tourism,
agribusiness/food processing, and construction. One third of diaspora-connected
investors come from Russia, USA and Iran. The rest mainly from France, Syria and
Lebanon (Hergnyan, Makayan 2006).
8.1. Motives driving foreign investment
The reasons driving foreign direct investors into Armenia may be of various types.
One can broadly classify them into those that seek markets, resources, and/or efficiency
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Source: Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia
Table 8.3. Countries of origins of foreign investors, 1988-2006
% share in   
foreign investment FDI 
Total 100% 100% 
Russia 33.4% 32.6% 
US 9.7% 9.1% 
Greece 8.8% 5.0% 
Germany 7.7% 10.9% 
France 7.1% 7.9% 
Canada 6.4% 8.5% 
Lebanon 5.6% 1.2% 
Argentina 4.7% 4.3% 
UK 3.2% 3.8% 
Cyprus 2.3% 3.2% 
(Dunning, 1993). In the case of still high barriers to external trade, foreign investors
are usually market-driven, aiming at overcoming high protection. However, it is
possible that along with economic expansion of host economies and a fall of barriers to
trade, investors may be willing to make use of existing resources (like cheap labour) or
even seek efficiency outsourcing part of production there.
Market-seeking FDI
This is the motive that has been probably predominant in Armenia. Armenian tariff
rates, although not extremely high40 and levied on selected products, are nevertheless
a cost for importers. Transport costs and closed borders with some of the neighbours
make the costs of trading (see Appendix5 Table 4) across borders even higher. The
additional burden probably originates as a result of excessive bureaucracy: an
Armenian exporter or an importer needed in 2007 27 days on average to satisfy
procedures connected with external trade (data from WB Costs of Doing Business
2007). The comparable indicator for the OECD countries is 10 days. A recent study by
Djankov et al (2007) estimated that each additional day that deliveries are delayed to
the border on average reduces aggregate trade by more than one percent.
The current structure of foreign investment confirms strongly this reasoning. The vast
majority of FDI is domestically-oriented and goes into sectors like: telecommunication,
air transport, distribution of energy, construction, partly production of food and
beverages, hotels and restaurants and so on. These are also the sectors that are highly
protected; either by home or foreign regulations or by the nature of an investment
(tourism). Only Deep FTA (including implementation of some of the provisions of the EU-
Armenia Action Plan, such as those related to alignment of regulations and practice on
technical and sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms, functioning of customs, harmonisation
of regulations concerning some service sectors, competition policy including state aid
and public procurement) can alter the outlook here.41
For the manufacturing sector the barriers to trade are mainly due to the costs of
transport and the oligarchic control of imports (see material on this elsewhere in this
report). This should have created enough motivation to establish production facilities
in Armenia. However, so far it has happened in few export-oriented and resource-rich
industries only (drinks and beverages, gems and jewellery, metallurgy). A Simple EU-
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40 Either 0% or 10%, see earlier text on trade regime of Armenia.
41 See also parts 9.3 and 9.4 for the description of the deep free trade scenario and how the effect that originates
in harmonisation works through prices of goods and services.
Armenia FTA alone would most likely not change the outlook for market-motivated
foreign investors. However, a Deep FTA+ building on the provisions of the EU-
Armenia Action Plan can help in improving the general business environment in
Armenia, thus impacting incentives to capture domestic market and at the same time
to reduce the costs of imported goods.
Resource-seeking FDI
About a quarter of FDI in 2006 went into Armenian mineral resources (mining and
extraction of metal ores). This is to say that significant part of FDI follows the natural
resource endowment.
Foreign investment in Armenia at present does not seem to be significantly
motivated by the cheap labour force. While labour in Armenia is indeed cheap, its
productivity is relatively low (see IMF 2007a: 8). The situation is due to low skills. There
are chances that skills have been improving; yet there is still a lot to be done (see UNDP
2007). Only the Deep FTA+ building on the provisions from the EU-Armenia Action
Plan can create possibilities for the efficient use of Armenian labour, once its price to
productivity ratio is favourable and barriers for doing business lower.
Efficiency-seeking FDI
There is very little scope for just-in-time deliveries and effectively integrated
production processes with those located elsewhere. Transport costs are high and will
stay high for significant part of time. Existing infrastructure cannot be considered as
good, and years if not decades are needed to improve it. The unresolved Nagorno
Karabakh conflict makes investors cautious about expanding businesses in Armenia.
On the top of it, Armenian borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed. Cargo can
go either through Georgia or through Iran, but this increases transport costs further.
Therefore, it is hardly plausible that Armenia will soon transform itself into a
location capable of exploiting economies of scale and scope. A precondition would be
to open at least the border with Turkey (closed since 1993), and so profit from the
access to the Turkish Black Sea ports and the exchange of goods with Eastern Anatolia.
This would create possibilities for the expansion of foreign businesses. The opening of
borders is conditioned upon sufficient political will on both sides, and it is not linked
(at least not directly) to the EU-Armenia FTA, even to the Deep FTA+.
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8.2. Black Sea regional integration and future FDI flows
Armenia’s limited attractiveness for FDI might be enhanced if there were greater
integration within the Black Sea region, as actually happened in the early years of
CEFTA. Of course there are at present serious political obstacles to such a scenario for
Armenia, given the blockage of the land frontiers with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
However, once these are somehow overcome, the integration might perhaps bring
results in terms of FDI. We look first at the experience of CEFTA in boosting FDI.  
CEFTA experience
CEFTA – the Central European Free Trade Agreement – was signed in December
1992 and was designed to re-build economic integration between Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and to revive trade
between these countries after they had collapsed with the dissolution of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), an economic organisation made up of
several communist countries.42 The elimination of tariffs for industrial products and
reduction of tariffs for agricultural goods in the first half of the 1990s within the CEFTA
had no significant immediate impact on bilateral trade flows. In general, trade flows
among the early CEFTA members started to grow intensively only in the 2000s, and the
multilateral trade agreement was widely viewed as disappointing in terms of an
immediate boost to trade.
However, the effects of the early years of CEFTA’s functioning were not limited to
trade in goods. The regional trade agreement brought other indirect gains as early as
the 1990s. For example, it facilitated inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from
developed economies (Dangerfield, 2004). These FDIs have had many positive effects
in terms of increasing production and modernisation of technologies in the CEECs. In
the case of smaller countries, like Hungary or the Czech Republic, FDI has been
primarily export-oriented with foreign investors often targeting the regional CEE
markets (but the EU was at the beginning the most important market). With a free trade
area in place, producers have been able to serve all CEE markets from a single location
(Damijan et al., 2006,) document the importance of structural reforms and FDIs that -
combined with improved market access – are a major factor explaining the remarkable
export performance of CEECs. Moreover, the existence of the CEFTA allowed for the
development of vertical production chains, with plants located in different CEE
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42 Later on, Balkan states joined CEFTA, and from 2007 geographical coverage of CEFTA is mainly ex-Yugoslavia
(except Slovenia) plus Albania and Moldova.
countries. The development of the automotive industry in the region is a good example.
These investments were behind the boost in intra-CEE trade in the 2000s.
Feasibility of boosting FDI flows in Armenia
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of CEFTA? First of all, one should
not have overly optimistic expectations. It is possible that even if FDI inflows continue
to increase year by year, their result on boosting export from the region can be seen
with a lag. A lowering of trade barriers among relatively poor partners may result in
little immediate gains (no chances for modern intra-industry trade). However, once this
is coupled with the overall opening of an economy and domestic reforms building
conditions for sustained economic growth, medium-term welfare gains can be
substantial. There is clearly a case here for Deep EU-Armenia FTA, including or
building on some of the provisions of the EU-Armenia Action Plan.
A Deep FTA is expected to lower some of the non-tariff barriers. For example those
related to technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.43 Additional
gain could be achieved if the origin of goods exported either to the EU or to Turkey or
to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy could be “cumulated”.
That is, if material from let’s say Georgia used to produce an Armenian good could be
treated as of Pan-European origin while exporting either to the EU or to the ENP/Black
Sea countries. This is to say that inclusion of non-Paneuromed ENP countries in the
Paneuromediterranean system of cumulation of origin would create additional
incentive to consider Armenia (or any Southern Caucasus location) as a host country
for the development of business activities.
The signing an FTA with Iran (expected soon) will also enhance the possibility to
boost investment and trade in the region. Armenia-Iran FTA will be of the “simple”
kind. It will phase out tariffs for the majority of goods. On the Armenian side, tariffs
will remain for certain goods that are subsidised in Iran.
Investment in transport infrastructure and opening of borders with Turkey and
Azerbaijan are crucial for boosting FDI flows into Armenia. In this view, the first step
does not have to be large modernisation of the railway that links Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Turkey (Kars-Yerevan-Baku), but rather its re-opening. Simultaneously, all
productive initiatives with TRACECA should indirectly support investment flows into
Armenia. On the contrary, building new Transcaucasian railway (Kars-Tbilisi-Baku)
that bypasses Armenia will rather diminish possibilities to attract FDI into Armenian
manufacturing.
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43 That will be also in line with the provisions on sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues of EU-Armenia Action Plan.
Another important issue is related to the fact that the original CEFTA agreement
provided for only a partial liberalisation of the agricultural trade. Agricultural
production had a large share of the partner countries’ GDPs at the end of the 1980s and
it therefore appears that CEFTA could have played a much more important role if
agricultural markets had been more substantially liberalised at an early stage and not
only in 2004, when the four initial signatories of the CEFTA joined the EU. Therefore,
the regional integration of the Southern Caucasus countries can be more beneficial
(also in terms of FDI) if agricultural markets were not protected.
8.3. Perspectives for spillovers from FDI in Armenia
It is widely known that FDI can lead to positive spillover effects on other domestic
firms and/or industries. These spillovers can be of the following types:
• the cooperation with local domestically-owned firms (primarily by buying local
supplies), or due to 
• higher competition (thus forcing local firms to invest more and be more
productive) or due to
• the flow of efficient managers from foreign to domestic firms.
There is evidence that these types of spillovers have been at work in the new EU
Member States in the 1990s and influenced productivity. The most relevant examples
may be those of Romania and of Lithuania (see Javorcik and Spartaneu 2006,
Altomonte and Pennings 2006, Smazynska-Javorcik 2004). 
Looking at the sectoral distribution of FDI, one can think of services as of almost
the only sector that may generate spillovers in Armenia. This is for the reason that for
the spillovers to take place, there must be established foreign presence. Also, personnel
have to learn some universal on the job skills, in order to be able to use them elsewhere.
On the top of it, use of ICT equipment is correlated with higher productivity, and highly
productive sectors are more likely to generate technological spillovers. This is to say
that we expect business activities that use intensively ICT to generate spillovers to other
sectors of the economy. For these reasons, the spillovers are most likely to originate in
communication, perhaps hotels and/or financial intermediation. Indeed, there are
signs of improvement of skills of the workers employed in the financial intermediation.
Unit labour costs in financial services have been rising over the next years (IMF 2007a:
8), which probably means improvement of human capital. There seem to be potential
for outflow of those skilled to other services or to other financial firms.
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There are signs that human capital in Armenia has improved over the years.
Number of students in higher education institutes (both subsidised by the state and
private) has been steadily increasing. For example, in the academic year 2000/01 47
thousands students enrolled at universities. This number was higher every year, to
reach 74 thousands in 2005/06. Budget for vocational education is on the rise (UNDP,
2007). High degree of mismatch between the needs of the labour market is still a
problem, yet the skills of the majority of young graduates that start working tend to
match professional needs. If the overall progress continues and is coupled with the rise
in the quality of education, it will increase capacities for absorbing technological and
managerial knowledge by Armenian workers. And thus increase possibilities for
spillovers.
Having listed factors creating possibilities for the absorption of skills and
knowledge from foreign firms, one needs to look also at the constraints. First of all,
presence of foreign firms in Armenia is still very low. Still low FDI inflows mean low
overall potential for spillovers. According to experts in Armenia, the prospective
industries for foreign investment in the next few years belong either to the non-tradable
or to low-processed good sectors (mining, metallurgy, energy, banking and insurance,
and food processing), and only the Armenian Development Agency (responsible for
attracting investment) assesses higher chances of developing soon capacities in middle-
tech manufacturing industries.
Secondly, spillovers at the moment are likely to be absorbed also by the non-
tradable sector only, because this seems to be the main area of business activity in the
country.44 Therefore, there is little hope at the moment that currently incoming FDI
will create additional boost to Armenian export through the spillover effects, of the kind
that have operated in the current new EU Member States.
An FTA with the EU would help in this regard, through additional impulse to trade
and through lowering of trade barriers. Even a Simple FTA can probably have a
positive impact in creating conditions for the emergence of spillovers in
manufacturing. However, the possibility for spillover effects increases greatly only with
the Deep FTA+ and with the regional integration. For the moment, only non-tradable
sector seems to develop quickly.
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44 Industry accounted for only 15% of Armenian GDP in 2006. Agriculture – for 18% of GDP, and services for over
60%.
8.4. Potential FDI in Armenia
An impact of a free trade agreement on the level of inward foreign direct investment
is a relatively researched area. Still, the research has mainly been conducted in the
Northern American (NAFTA) and European (EU) contexts. This research show that
inward direct investment into a country increases following an FTA, as outsider MNCs
(multinational companies) take advantage of the increased market size of the area
(Globerman and Shapiro 1999, Buckley et al. 2001). Also, liberalization of internal
tariff regimes causes upstream FDI (i.e. production facilities) to shift to locations with
lower cost of production, hence, it also has a positive effect on FDI in countries with
lower effective production cost in the region (Buckley et al. 2001, Dunning 1997, Eden
2002). Another reason for an increase in FDI following an FTA is related to the fact that
MNCs are likely to divert production from more efficient, non-member countries to less
efficient fellow regional integration agreement member countries to take advantage of
the lowered trade barriers following integration (Rugman and Gestrin, 1993;
Globerman and Shapiro, 1999).
The research of FDI determinants in the CIS/EEC context had rarely considered a
direct impact of an FTA on the inward foreign direct investment in the area. In this
analysis we are following an approach employed by the only econometric study we
were able to locate (conducted by CEPS, i.e. Brenton and Manchin (2002)) which
analysed an impact of the EU FTA with Russia through the use of the Economic
Freedom Index. The authors argue that “an FTA will enable Russia to ‘lock-in’
economic reforms and achieve a higher degree of liberalisation than would otherwise
be possible”. They further estimate a model of FDI which provides an estimate of the
impact of this enhancement of reform (measured by the Economic Freedom Index) on
FDI inflows into Russia from the main European investing nations. The effect is
considered to be similar to the one a Deep FTA+ would have had. We will employ a
similar approach in this study to estimate a potential impact of a Deep FTA+ between
the EU and Armenia on FDI flows into Armenia. 
Within the EU context, the prospect of EU-Armenia Deep FTA+ might be viewed by
potential investors as reducing country risk; both because it serves as an external
validation of progress in the transition process, and because it signals higher macro-
economic, institutional, legal and political stability. In our econometric work, we
therefore analyse the indirect impact of EU-Armenia Deep FTA+ via the impact of a
transition progress index (produced by the EBRD). We choose the EBRD index as it is
the only index of the kind which offers systematic coverage of Armenia and Georgia. 
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We expect the EU-Armenia Deep FTA+ to have a significant positive effect on FDI
inflows into the country. Following a reduction in trade barriers, FDI flows are
expected to take off due to the increased market size of the area (i.e. access to the EU
markets). Also, liberalization of internal tariffs should open a door for FDI seeking
lower cost of production. Moreover, overall improvement in the country’s economic
effectiveness following a Deep FTA+ should also contribute to Armenia’s improved
attractiveness as an FDI destination. 
The forecasts are made on the basis of the gravity model (estimated for 10 Eastern
European receiving countries and 31 OECD countries-donors). A detailed description
of the model is presented in the Appendix 6. We model FDI inflows in the host country
as a function of the countries’ GDP and geographic distance, populations, labour cost,
the host country’s indebtedness, a degree of openness of its economy, WTO and EU
memberships and host country’s progress in transition. The dependent variable in our
analysis is FDI inflows. Both FDI inflows and stocks have been successfully used as
dependent variables in the earlier analysis of FDI determinants (Bevan and Estrin,
2002; Carstensen and Tourbal 2004, Janicki and Wunnawa 2004, and Kaditi, 2006).
FDI per capita is not normally used as a dependent variable in this analysis, as there
are no economic models which would explain this type of flows.
The key variable of interest in this model is the EBRD transition progress index, as
this is the variable which we employ to make forecasts with respect to the FDI inflows.
The index is based on the EBRD transition indicators which are available at the EBRD
website. 
The EBRD assesses progress in transition through a set of transition indicators.
These have been used to track reform developments in all countries of its operations
since the beginning of transition. Progress is measured against the standards of
industrialised market economies, while recognising that there is neither a ’pure’
market economy nor a unique end-point for transition.
The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+ (4.33), where 1
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+
represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. The reform scores
reflect the assessments of EBRD country economists, which are made in the following
nine areas: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and
enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system,
competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets
and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure. For purposes of our research
we use an average index of all of the above indicators apart from the
infrastructure.Figure 8.1 presents the evolution of the TPI since 1989 (when it was first
introduced) until 2007. At its introduction, the TPI for the majority of CEE countries
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was equal to 1 with the exception of Hungary and Poland (which were assigned values
of 1.33 and 1.29 in 1989 correspondingly). However, the progress in transition was
different among the members of the Eastern block. Current new Member States (NMS)
made a drastic leap in their transition to the market economy which was mirrored by
the TPI, which surpassed the value of 3 for most of them in 1993. At the same time, ex-
USSR republics were making much slower progress that was reflected by the TPI again
- they started approaching values of 3 about a decade later, in 2003-2004. Currently,
the majority of NMS are assigned values close to 4 on TPI, whereas Armenia (as well
as other post-Soviet countries) scored only 3.21 in 2007. We also should notice that the
overall pace of Armenian transition slowed down in recent decade when compared
with that of the early 1990s. This is not highly surprising as more advanced reforms are
typically more difficult to implement than the basic ones. Therefore we expect that it
still will take a number of years for Armenia to approach the level of NMS in its
transition efforts.
A gravity model which we describe in the Appendix 6 offers the similar estimates to
the earlier studies which analysed FDI in the context of transition/developing countries
(Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Carstensen and Tourbal (2004). The gravity variables
(distance, and GDP home/host countries) as well as population and the level of
indebtedness were found to be statistically significant determinants of FDI into these
economies, which is in line with the earlier research in the area (see for example,
Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Carstensen and Tourbal 2004, Janicki and Wunnawa 2004,
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Figure 8.1. Transition Progress Index (TPI): Evolution
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and Kaditi, 2006). The key variable of interest – the transition progress index (TPI) -
was also found to be statistically significant and having a positive impact on FDI
inflows.
Our model shows that one percent increase in the value of TPI will result in 3.89
percent increase in the amount of FDI inflow into Armenia. The estimated coefficient
is similar to the estimates in the prior studies (see for example, Brenton and Manchin’s
(2002) estimate of an impact of the Economic Freedom Index on FDI into the CEEC,
and Bevan and Estrin’s (2002) estimate of the impact of a country credit rating on FDI
into the CEEC; both studies use gravity models similar to the one used in this analysis).
Janicki and Wunnawa’s (2004) estimate of an impact of country risk (Institutional
Investor rating) and Carstensen and Tourbal’s (2004) estimate of an impact of country
risk on FDI in the CEEC yield somewhat higher coefficients, which is explained by a
different scale on which country risk index is measured).
As we already mentioned, we estimate an impact of a Deep FTA+ with Armenia by
estimating an impact a significant improvement in its transition progress will have on
FDI. More specifically, we consider improvements that will bring the level of transition
progress in Armenia close to the levels of advanced CEE countries. As a result, we
estimate a change in FDI inflows to Armenia considering its transition progress index
improves by 5%, 10% and 15%. Table 8.4 presents the values of TPI for a range of
countries under consideration for the years 2000-2006. We can see that an increase by
10% in Armenia’s TPI (from 3.21 to 3.54) brings the level of transition progress in
Armenia to the level of Bulgaria in 2006, while the largest improvement in transition
progress considered in this study (15%, TPI value 3.69) corresponds to Armenia’s
progress in transition almost reaching the level of Poland in 2003. Based on our earlier
analysis, we deem that it will take a number of years for Armenia to achieve the level
of transition progress which corresponds to the last scenario.
140
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Source: EBRD Transition Report
Table 8.4. Transition Progress Index, EBRD, 2000-2006
Country 2000 2003 2006 
Armenia 2.75 3.04 3.21 
Bulgaria 3.17 3.42 3.54 
Czech Republic 3.67 3.75 3.87 
Georgia 3 3 3.13 
Hungary 3.87 3.87 4 
Kazakhstan 2.87 2.96 3.04 
Poland 3.62 3.71 3.83 
Russia 2.67 3 3.08 
Slovakia 3.5 3.67 3.83 
Ukraine 2.67 2.87 3.04 
Using the estimated equation, we calculate the impact (a change) in the dependent
variable (FDI flows) as a result of changes in our key independent variable – TPI index.
As our model is estimated in logarithms, we then interpret the estimated coefficients as
elasticities and estimate the percentage changes in the dependent variable (FDI flows).
Taking the above mentioned three consecutive increases in the transition progress in
Armenia we estimate that the amount of potential FDI inflows into the country will
increase by 21%, 45% and 72% respectively (see Table 8.5). In absolute terms it means
that annual FDI flows into Armenia will increase from USD 220 mn (2005) to USD
266mn, 319mn and 379mn corresponding to 5%, 10% and 15% improvement in its
transition progress (which corresponds to different evaluations of an impact a Deep
FTA+ might have). This is, of course, a lower bound estimate for FDI as it does not
include potential changes in other variables (which have a sizeable impact also), like,
for example, GDP, GDP per capita etc. 
Furthermore, we have estimated an impact of the Deep FTA+ with the EU on FDI
stock in Armenia until 2020. We are making an assumption of Armenia transition
progress being gradual over the next 15 years (2005-2020) that corresponds to a
gradual increase in FDI inflows starting from their current level (i.e. 2005, USD
220mn) to their estimated levels according to our 3 scenarios (Table 8.5), i.e. USD
266mn, 319mn and 379mn in the year 2020. We assume a linear annual increase in
FDI flows. According to these assumptions, we estimate that FDI stock will increase
from USD 1,225mn in 2005 to USD 4,917mn; 5,315mn and 5,797mn in 2020 or 401%,
434% and 473% increase of the current value according to our 3 scenarios (please see
Table 8.6). This is a lower bound estimate of an increase in FDI stock due to the impact
of EU-Armenia Deep FTA+ only (not considering changes in the GDP and related
variables).
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Source: own calculations.
Table 8.5. Estimated changes to FDI flows to Armenia
TPI  change % increase in FDI flows to Armenia Estimated FDI flows, USD mn 
5% 21 266 
10% 45 319 
15% 72 379 
Source: own calculations.
Table 8.6. Estimated changes to FDI stock, Armenia, 2020
TPI  change % increase in FDI stock in Armenia Increase in FDI stock, USD mn 
5% 401 4917 
10% 434 5315 
15% 473 5797 
8.5. Summary
FDI inflows into Armenia averaged around USD200 million annually in recent
years. The role of foreign capital has gradually decreased along with the development
of the economy, although still remained substantial. In 2005, FDI accounted for 16%
of Armenian investment.
On average, about one third of FDI in 1998-2006 came from Russia. However, the
share of the capital of the Russian origin decreased recently. On the other hand, the
role of French capital increased and in 2006 around 1/3 of FDI came from France.
Other important sources of FDI were: Germany, the US, Canada, Greece, Argentina,
UK, and up to sometime Cyprus. About 25% of FDI coming to Armenia during 1998-
2004 can be attributed to diaspora-connected investments. These investments are
rather small and predominantly motivated by the ethnic or patriotic feelings rather
than by the real business interests.
At the moment, foreign direct investors into Armenia seem to be primarily market-
driven and go to highly protected service and food-producing sectors. Mineral
resources (precious stones, metal ores) also attract smaller part of the FDI. Investors
are not yet willing to use the relatively cheap Armenian labour and outsource part of
production there. This, however, might be changed by implementing a Deep FTA+ .
The full realization of the benefits of a Deep FTA+ would be only possible with
achieving an opening of border crossing points with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
A possibility of boosting FDI into Armenia due to the regional Black Sea integration
seem to be rather a longer-term prospect, and will have to follow a comprehensive set
of bilateral FTAs with the EU by CIS states as well as a lifting of the present border
blockages. A Simple EU-Armenia FTA would probably have no impact on FDI. The
Deep FTA+ could have a positive impact. However, for maximum benefit even a Deep
FTA+ would have to be accompanied by additional initiatives such as major
improvement of regional infrastructure, introduction of diagonal cumulation of origins
of goods, and deeper trade integration in the region (covering also agricultural goods).
There is a little chance for knowledge spillovers from FDI located in Armenia at the
moment, of the type seen in the new EU member states, affecting productivity of
manufacturing and construction industries. The possibility for spillover effects
increases greatly only with the Deep FTA+ and with the regional integration.
The estimates of potential foreign investment suggest that a Deep free trade
agreement with the EU is likely to have a substantial impact on FDI inflows into
Armenia. If economic, institutional and political reforms are entrenched and enhanced
(that will result in Armenia’s moving in its transition towards the level of advanced
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CEE countries), the country will enjoy a sizeable increase in FDI inflows. For example,
if Armenia is to achieve the current level of transition of Bulgaria, its annual FDI
inflows increase from USD 220 million (in 2005) to USD 319 million (additional
increase can be motivated by growing Armenian GDP). A Deep FTA with the EU can
become one of the vehicles/triggers for these reforms, however the country’s own effort
in the transition reforms remains paramount. Hence, a Deep FTA+ with the EU should
not be regarded as a substitute for domestic reforms, but as a complement and, as a
matter of fact, a consequence of internal institutional and economic development of
Armenia.
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9.1. CGE Model
The model employed in this study is a standard static computable general
equilibrium model. It includes several price-wedge distortions such as factor taxes in
production, value-added taxes, import tariffs and export subsidies. Factor taxes in
production and value-added taxes remain unchanged across simulations. Production
involves combination of intermediate inputs and primary factors (capital, skilled and
unskilled labour). We assume a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function over
primary factors and a Leontief production function combining intermediate inputs
with factors of production composite. Primary factors are mobile across sectors within
a region, but immobile internationally. Each region has a government, whose revenue
is held constant at the benchmark level and a single representative consumer. The trade
balance is also held constant in counterfactual simulations.
Demand for final goods arises from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The demand
structure is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Within each region, final and intermediate
demands are composed of the same Armington aggregate of domestic and imported
varieties. The composite supply is a nested CES function, where consumers first
allocate their expenditures among domestic and imported varieties and then choose
among imported varieties. In the imperfect competition case firm varieties enter at the
bottom of the CES function. This approach allows for the differentiation in preferences
for home and imported goods. 
A detailed description of the model equations, calibration and parameters employed
is provided in the Appendix 7 CGE model equations. It is built on the basis of the MRT
– Multiregional Trade Model – by Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (HRT) implemented
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9. CGE Model and Simulations
in their evaluation of the impact of the completion of the Single Market (HRT, 1996b),
but has been modified in several ways to fit this analysis. Similar analysis has been
recently applied in two feasibility studies for Russia and Ukraine prepared for the
European Commission (Dabrowski, Emerson, Maliszewska Eds. (2007) and Ecorys
and CASE-Ukraine (2007)) and earlier in the analysis of the Eastern EU Enlargement
(Maliszewska, 2003a, 2003b) and Albanian Integration with the EU (Maliszewska and
Kolesnichenko, 2004).
The data for Armenia along with the data for all other regions but Georgia is based
on GTAP7 pre-release 3 data base. The GTAP database includes the national and
regional input-output structures, bilateral trade flows, final demands pattern and
government intervention benchmarked to 2004. A social accounting matrix (SAM) for
Armenia for 2004 was based on Jasper Jensen’s and David Tarr’s submission to the
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) data base45. The same authors compiled also the
SAM for Georgia, which has been imposed on the GTAP data using a code developed
by Thomas Rutherford (www.mpsge.com/gtap6)46. The benchmark data includes
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, and remaining CIS countries, EU27,
Turkey and the Rest of the World (ROW). It includes 33 sectors out of which 11 are
subject to increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in the imperfect competition scenarios47. 
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45 The submission by Jaspers Jensen and David Tarr was part of the ENEPO project coordinated by CASE and
financed by the European Commission (FP6 STREP).
46 The original SAM for Georgia was not introduced correctly into the pre-release GTAP data, which is still in the
testing stage. The Armenian and Azeri data submitted along with the Georgian data used in the present study
was introduced properly. Other adjustments have been made to the GTAP data to update tariff data to 2004
levels.
47 These are food, beverages and tobacco; textiles and wearing apparel; leather; paper products, publishing;
petroleum and coal products; chemical products, rubber, plastic; mineral products, metal and metal products;
transport equipment; machinery and equipment; other manufacturing products.
Source: HRT (1996a).
Figure 9.1. Demand structure in the IRTS scenario – firm level product differentiation within
an Armington aggregate
We apply the CGE model to study the implications of the liberalisation in the EU-
Armenia bilateral trade that took place between 2004 and 2006 (baseline scenario),
Simple and Deep FTAs. Before studying the implications of various versions of an FTA
we need to study the effects of trade liberalisation on the Armenian and EU’s side
respectively (in particular Armenia’s unilateral lowering of import tariffs and EU’s
granting Armenia tariff preferences under the general arrangement of its new GSP)
that took place over 2004-2006 period. The changes due to tariff and other trade related
policies are already taking place and will need between 5-10 years to take their full
impact on the Armenian economy. Without modelling of these policy changes we would
be wrongly attributing their impact to the implications of FTAs. The Simple FTA
scenario involves scrapping the tariffs in the EU27-Armenia trade with the exception of
agricultural products where tariffs are only halved. Recent experience of the EU’s FTAs
with Mediterranean countries indicates that agriculture may not be completely
liberalized. Here we take a simplifying assumption of a 50% average tariff cut on
agricultural and food products. The level of aggregation of the model does not allow for
a more detailed dissaggregation of agricultural and food sectors. However, we run also
separate simulations with full liberalization of all tariff lines – Simple FTA BIS.
Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a significant
elimination of barriers to trade and investment throughout various sectors of the
economy. This would also result in a more extensive commitment to the reform of
domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in Armenia. Finally, the
comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with more wide-
ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead to a re-
branding of Armenia as a favourable investment location. This is our scenario Deep
FTA+ where we assume that Armenia would achieve a notable reduction in the
perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Armenia
as a favorable and safe place to invest. 
9.2. Tariffs 
Section 4.3 above describes in great detail Armenian trade policy. Here we only
present the tariffs according to the model classification. As a member of the CIS free
trade area Armenia enjoys duty free access to the CIS markets. Hence Table 9.1 below
provides tariffs only in trade with the EU27, Turkey and the ROW. The 2004 data on
tariffs originates from GTAP and is consistent with the country submission to WITS.
The 2006 tariff data has been provided by the Armenian authorities. The tariffs applied
in this study are trade weighted based on the 6-digit HS imports/exports data from the
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UN Comtrade data base. Similarly to take into account the impact of the granting of
the GSP status, EU27 import tariffs on exports from Armenia have been reduced
accordingly in 2006.
9.3. Non-tariff barriers
One of the studies ordered by the European Commission before completion of the
Single Market looked at the perception of European Community producers as to the
importance of barriers to be removed by the formation of the Single Market. It showed
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Source: GTAP, WITS and own calculations.
Table 9.1. Armenian tariffs on imports from the EU27, Turkey and the Rest of the World (ROW)
according to the CGE model classification (in %)
EU27 Turkey ROW  
2004 2006 Simple
 FTA 
2004 2006 2004 2006 
Grains, fruits,  
vegetables, crops nec  4.8 3.1 1.5 9.5 7.3 3.9 3.0 
Livestock 0.9 0.2 0.1 16.1 16.1 2.5 2.5 
Forestry 2.9 2.9 1.5 10.8 10.8 0.3 0.3 
Fishing 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 
Coal 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Gas 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0  
Mining and quarrying  0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0 0.0 
Food products,  
beverages and tobacco  9.1 7.63 3.8 8.3 5.3 9 6.5 
Textiles and  
textile goods  8.4 7.1 0.0 6.4 6.4 5.2 5.2 
Leather products  9.7 9.7 0.0 6.0 6.8 5.6 5.6 
Wood products  4.9 4.3 0.0 3.1 5.2 2.7 2.7 
Paper products,  
publishing  12.9 1.5 0.0 11.4 0.8 11.1 2.8 
Petroleum,  
coal products  12.8 0.0 0.0 12.9 5.1 11.8 0.0 
Chemical, rubber,  
plastic products  0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Mineral products nec  6.9 6.9 0.0 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.7 
Metals and  
metal products  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Transport equipment  6.6 6.6 0.0 7.1 7.1 5.1 5.1 
Machinery and  
electronic equipment  0.8 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 
Manufactures nec  2.7 2.7 0.0 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 
that the elimination of physical frontiers, costs and delays, harmonisation of national
standards and regulations, and government procurement were the most important
barriers to trade before 1992. Similar conclusions were reached after a survey of
barriers to exports to the EU faced by the Ukrainian exporters (see Jakubiak et. al.
2006). Elimination or lessening of these impediments to trade will also likely bring
major benefits to Armenia especially if it gains improved access to the Single Market
thanks to the creation of a Deep FTA covering NTBs. In modelling of a Deep FTA we
focus on reduction in border costs and delays, as well as reduction in costs of
compliance with varying national standards and technical regulations. In addition we
also study the impact of a reduction of barriers to foreign providers of services. 
9.3.1. Border costs
One of the most observable barriers to trade is due to the existence of borders and
customs formalities, which involve delays and various kinds of administrative costs. At
the moment all goods from Armenia exported to the EU and vice versa are stopped at
the EU border for customs clearance. In the CGE exercise border costs are modelled
as additional purchases   of a domestic transportation good, which includes shipping,
handling and warehousing for customs purchases. 
As discussed in chapter 5.2 the custom procedures are riddled with rent-seeking
and corruption and arbitrary tariff application is a common practise. Import and
export procedures are widely regarded by businessmen as one of the most corrupt area
of public administration. The survey conducted in Armenia in the late 2007 (chapter 6)
also indicates that the costs of exporting are very high. In selected sectors the cost was
as high as 60% of the value of exports (see Table 9.2). However the low number of
positive observations by sector does not allow us to make the assumptions about border
costs at the sectoral level48. However, we use them as guidance in formulating the
assumptions about the level of border costs in 2006. 
The survey results do not allow us to analyse border costs over time. Hence we refer
to the “Cost of Doing Business” World Bank report (see Table 9.3). These data show an
important improvement in the import and export procedures over 2004-2006 period.
In 2004 the cost to export and import was about 50% higher in Armenia than in
Ukraine. Ukrainian border costs are approximated by the costs of customs clearance
faced by the Ukrainian exporters to the EU in 2006 (Jakubiak et al 2006). These costs
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48 Since it is not possible to distinguish zero responses from the lack of response, the above results might be biased
downwards.
amounted on average to 7% of the value of exports. This indicates that the border costs
in Armenia were about 10.5% in 2006, which is consistent with an average for all
sectors from the survey. In 2004 these costs were about 20% higher (see cost to import
and export in Table 9.3). 
The Simple FTA is assumed to reduce those costs by a further 5%. The argument
behind this rather modest reduction is that a Simple FTA will not by itself imply that
149
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ARMENIA
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Source: see chapter 6 for more details.
Table 9.2. The share of customs-related costs when exporting to the EU in total exports to the
EU by NACE sectors
 Average Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
of non- 
zero 
responses 
Zero 
responses 
Agriculture, hunting, and 
related service activities  
17% 0 17.20% 2.30% 1 55 
 Fishing, aquaculture, 
and service activities 
incidental to fishing  
0% 0 0.03% 0.00% 1 54 
Mining of Metal Ores  NA 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 56 
Other mining and quarrying  2% 0 1.69% 0.23% 1 55 
manufacture of food  
products and beverages  
13% 0 86.42% 13.50% 13 39 
manufacture of tobacco products  3% 0 3.75% 0.53% 2 53 
 Manufacture of textiles 19% 0 26.79% 3.84% 2 54 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing  and dyeing of fur 
21% 0 50.00% 7.54% 4 51 
Manufacture of wood and of products 
of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw 
and plaiting materials 
0% 0 0.00% 0.00% 1 54 
 Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products 
1% 0 1.69% 0.25% 2 48 
 Manufacture of rubber 
and plastics products 
NA 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 56 
metallic mineral products 60% 0 181.25% 24.22% 3 52 
Manufacture of basic metals 6% 0 11.90% 1.59% 2 54 
 Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
1% 0 0.59% 0.08% 1 55 
Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
0% 0 0.00% 0.00% 1 55 
 Manufacture of radio,  television 
and  communication 
equipment and apparatus 
NA 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 56 
Manufacture of medical, precision 
and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 
0% 0 0.06% 0.01% 2 54 
Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c. 
2% 0 3.08% 0.61% 5 51 
Average for all sectors  10.4% 0.0% 181.3% 27.3%   
customs procedures and operations will be reformed and improved. However, the
elimination of some tariff lines will leave less scope for corrupt activities at the border.
In a Deep FTA these costs are assumed to be reduced by 50%, which is assumed to
reflect a long-term improvement in customs and transit procedures.
9.3.2. Standards costs
The European Community has been concerned with the elimination of the technical
barriers to trade since its creation. However, the major effort of elimination of barriers
to trade imposed by differing national regulations and standards was undertaken with
the creation of the Single Market. The Single Market measures consist of 2,556
different mandated standards. This number rises to more than 20,000 when voluntary
standards are considered. 
The differences in technical regulations and standards, which vary between
domestic and the EU markets, require producers to manufacture or package goods in
forms, which are different than for their domestic markets. Standardisation costs
therefore increase the cost of production for exports and they are modeled as additional
value added in each sector where trade takes place. This approach ignores the fixed
cost elements of implementation of new standards. However, these are mostly one-off
investments and their magnitude is not likely to be significant.
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Source: WB Costs of Doing Business report 2006 and 2008. 
Note: The reports for 2006 and 2008 cover data for Jan 2005 and Jan 2007 used to represent here the status quo
in 2004 and 2006. 
* Cost measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in U.S. dollars. All the fees associated with completing the
procedures to export or import the goods are included, such as costs for documents, administrative fees for
customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges and inland transport. The cost measure
does not include tariffs or trade taxes.
Table 9.3. Border costs in Armenia and Ukraine in 2004 and 2006.
Armenia Armenia/Ukraine Ukraine  
2004 2006 2004 2004 2006 2004 
Documents for export  
(number) 
7 7 1.17 1.17 6 6 
Time for export (days) 34 30 1.10 0.97 31 31 
Cost to export  
(US$ per container)* 
1600 1165 1.53 1.11 1045 1045 
Documents for import 
(number)  
6 8 0.60 0.80 10 10 
Time for import (days)  37 24 0.95 0.62 39 39 
Cost to import  
(US$ per container)*  
1750 1335 1.64 1.25 1065 1065 
In the survey mentioned above, CASE and CASE-UA investigated NTBs faced by
Ukrainian exporters to the EU (Jakubiak et al 2006). Among others, respondents (over
500 companies) were asked to assess costs associated with meeting EU technical
regulations and the duplication of efforts related to compliance with both national and
the EU standards (existing for the majority of surveyed firms). 
As discussed in chapter 5.1, progress with the adoption of EU legislation regarding
technical barriers has been very slow. In the survey conducted as part of this study we
were able to obtain very little information regarding the costs of meeting the EU
product characteristics requirements, the costs of packaging, labelling and marketing
requirements, product testing and meeting any other technical requirements. The
reasons were twofold: the companies were either producing much unsophisticated
products not covered by technical regulations or in the majority of cases the importing
EU company made sure that all necessary tests have been concluded and the technical
requirements have been met. This suggests that the costs of compliance with technical
requirements are very high if the vast majority of domestic firms do not even get
involved in this process. This is supported by the information gathered during our visit
to Armenia as discussed in chapter 5.1. There are no conformity assessment centres
established in Armenia that could issue certificates of compliance recognized by the
EU. This imposes significant costs on firms willing to export to the EU, which must pay
for the services of accreditation centres based in the EU or in other countries. 
Given that we were not able to obtain standards costs for Armenia we are relying
on Ukrainian estimates. However, due to reasons discussed above we assume that in
2004 these costs were 50% higher in Armenia than they were in Ukraine. Costs of
meeting EU standards for Armenian producers are given in Table 9.4. In many of those
sectors Armenia does not have any exports to the EU. There might be several reasons
for this e.g. Armenia may not be producing particular products, the quality of domestic
production is insufficient or simply the barriers to exports are too high. However, in all
those cases the assumptions on NTBs need to be established; hence the reliance on the
Ukrainian data.  
The reasons why we expect the costs of compliance with technical regulations to
decrease following a Deep FTA is greater availability of conformity assessment centres
in Armenia, which would result in lower costs of testing and compliance, better
availability of information and greater cooperation between the EU and Armenian
firms that comes with increased integration. Hence we make a rough assumption that
the standards costs decrease by 50% in a Deep FTA. The experience of the new EU
members and EU firms following the formation of the Single Market indicates that
these costs have indeed gone down.
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Our assumptions so far applied to Armenian exports to the EU. We do not know of
similar estimates for the other export destinations for the Armenian products and in
any case the impact of an Armenia-EU FTA on the costs of complying with regulations
of other importing partners is not clear. Hence in the simulations we assume that these
costs apply only to exports to the EU. Any harmonization of legislation with the EU,
wider availability of conformity assessment centres and with that lower prices of
certification that would follow a Deep EU-Armenia FTA would lead to a reduction of
these costs for Armenian exporters to the EU. On the other hand, for Armenian firms
which have been producing only for domestic market, the introduction of EU
regulations to be compulsory on the domestic market as well may impose additional
investment. A certain part of this investment will be undertaken in the normal course
of replacing existing equipment over the coming years. However, in some cases the
costs of compliance may be significant. Nevertheless even those firms are likely to
benefit from the ability to export to the enlarged EU and wider availability of the
assessment centres. Overall, it seems likely that all firms will experience some
reduction in standards costs. 
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58 This section is based on the information gathered by Svetlana Taran.
Source: own calculations and assumptions based on survey described in Jakubiak et al (2006)
Note: * - simple average
Table 9.4. Costs of compliance with the EU technical barriers in 2004 as a share of exports to
the  EU (in %)
 2004 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Deep  
FTA 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops nec 21.0 21.0 21.0 10.5 
Livestock 21.0 21.0 21.0 10.5 
Forestry 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.3 
Fishing 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.3 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Food products, beverages  
and tobacco 15.6 15.6 15.6 7.8 
Textiles and textile goods 34.4 34.4 34.4 17.2 
Leather products 8.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 
Wood products 31.4 31.4 31.4 15.7 
Paper products, publishing 22.5 22.5 22.5 11.3 
Petroleum, coal products 15.0 15.0 15.0 7.5 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products  8.3 8.3 8.3 4.1 
Mineral products nec 44.0 44.0 44.0 22.0 
Metals and metal products 9.6 9.6 9.6 4.8 
Transport equipment 18.5 18.5 18.5 9.2 
Machinery and electronic equipment 15.0 15.0 15.0 7.5 
Manufactures nec 23.0 23.0 23.0 11.5 
9.3.3. Barriers to trade in services49
We have not conducted any survey on the barriers to trade in services for the
purpose of this study. To the best of our knowledge, such estimates exist only for Russia
and Ukraine within the CIS countries. Given that Ukraine is also a member of the WTO
and embarking on a process of negotiations of an enhanced FTA with the EU, we
decided to adjust the Ukrainian values to make assumptions for Armenia. We base our
estimates on the barriers to foreign direct investment in services estimated by IERPC
(2007). The authors estimate tariff equivalents of barriers that discriminate against
foreign providers of telecommunication, transport and financial services and we use
simple averages of the values for sub-sectors as estimated by the IERPC (2007). The
authors used the assessments of the regulatory environment in Ukraine through the
implementation of business surveys and other information sources and converting
these into an index of restrictiveness in telecommunication, financial sector and
transport sectors. Then these indexes were converted into ad valorem equivalents of the
existing restrictions. It should be noted that distinctions were made between barriers
faced by specifically foreign investors vs. restrictions incurred by both foreign
providers along with domestic firms (through the separate calculations of foreign
discriminatory restrictiveness index (applicable only to foreign suppliers) and overall
foreign restrictiveness index (applicable to both foreign and domestic producers). In
order to adjust Ukrainian values for Armenia we look at the Heritage Foundation
indices of investment and financial freedom as presented in Table 9.5. The indices of
investment and financial freedom indicate a much more investor-friendly environment
in Armenia than in Ukraine. Still, it should be noted that these indices capture the
wider definition of investment and financial freedom including regulatory formal
restrictions, as well as corruption, contract enforcement, implementation of laws etc.,
than mere restrictiveness of regulatory environment affecting investment in service
sectors. 
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Source: The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm
Note: Distribution of Global Economic Freedom: 80-100 – free; 70-79.9 – mostly free; 60-69.9 – moderately free;
50-59.9 – mostly unfree; 0-49.9 – repressed. 
Table 9.5. Index of economic freedom, 2008
 Rank Global economic  
freedom 
Investment 
freedom 
Financial  
freedom 
Ukraine 133 51.1% 30% 50% 
Armenia 28 70.3% 70% 70% 
Georgia  32 69.2% 70% 60% 
49 This section is based on the information gathered by Svetlana Taran.
Based on our own perception of barriers to FDI in service sectors based on
interviews in Yerevan and the fact that the Heritage Foundation qualitative remarks
stress the corruption problem in Armenia, we assume that the barriers to foreign
provision of services are 25% lower in Armenia than in Ukraine. We model those
barriers as additional purchases of value added in the amount equal to tariff
equivalents by exporters or providers of those services from all regions. Hence we
assume that in order to provide financial services (banking, insurance) in Armenia
foreign companies face costs higher by 18 % than local provides. The additional costs
in transport sector amount to 12% and in communications to 4.5%. In simulations we
assume that all foreign providers of services will face an improved access to the
Armenian market following a Deep EU-Armenia FTA. Even though access to services
sectors in Armenia has been liberalized, relatively low penetration of the local market
by foreign providers indicates that significant barriers still remain. We assume that in
a Deep FTA those barriers would be halved. The above discussion of modelling
assumptions has been summarized in the Table 9.6.
9.4. Implications of the 2006 scenario, Simple FTAs and Deep FTAs
In each simulation we can calculate the impact of a given trade policy change
assuming constant returns to scale in all sectors, increasing returns to scale in selected
sectors, as well as the short run impact (no change in capital stock) and the long run
impact (allowing for the adjustment of capital stock in response to a change in return
to capital). The calculation of steady state growth effects follows HRT (1996a). In the
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Table 9.6. Summary of modelling assumptions
 Benchmark 
2004 
Initial 
liberalization 
2006 
Simple FTA Deep FTA 
Tariffs 2006 tariffs Zero tariffs in trade 
between Armenia 
and the EU on 
industrial products, 
50% off tariffs on 
agricultural and 
food products 
Zero tariffs in trade 
between Armenia 
and the EU on 
industrial products, 
50% off tariffs on 
agricultural and 
food products 
Order 
costs 
20% off 2004 
level 
25% off 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
Standards 
costs  
2004 level 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
Barriers  
to trade 
in services 
Initial levels 
as described 
above 
2004 level 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
short run scenarios the price of capital is allowed to vary within each country, while
capital stock is held constant. In the steady state scenario capital stock in Armenia is
allowed to adjust, while the price of capital is held constant at its benchmark level. This
approach assumes that there exists an invariant capital stock equilibrium. It is defined
as a set of prices, production and investment levels for which the economy is able to
grow at a steady rate with constant relative prices. 
This approach provides an upper bound of the potential welfare gains as it ignores
the adjustment costs and foregone consumption necessary to increase investment. For
sufficiently high discount rates the costs of forgone consumption could overturn the
benefits of capital accumulation. Although in the steady state scenarios, as well as in
the short run scenarios we measure welfare as equivalent variation as a share of GDP,
it has to be born in mind that incorporation of the cost of the investment required to
build up the capital stock may substantially reduce the estimates of welfare gains cited
below. On the other hand our approach does not incorporate the potential gains due to
productivity improvements or endogenous growth theory “learning by doing” effects. 
Below we display major results of the CGE simulations. Apart from welfare changes
(equivalent variation as a share of GDP), we also present changes in wages of skilled
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Source: own calculations.
Table 9.7. Welfare, and factor returns results of the CGE simulations
 2006 
Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
Deep  
FTA 
DEEP  
FTA+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia  0 0 -0.001 0 0.002 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.006 
Armenia  0.381 0.559 0.456 3.756 8.333 
Azerbaijan  -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 0.008 0.018 
Georgia  0.031 0.027 0.013 0.171 0.217 
Turkey  0 0 0 -0.003 -0.004 
EU27 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
CIS -0.001 0 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.001 -0.002 
GDP (% change) 
Russia  0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.060 
Ukraine  0.174 0.172 0.171 0.179 0.180 
Armenia  0.403 0.580 0.479 3.755 8.342 
Azerbaijan  0.015 0.015 0.015 0.037 0.045 
Georgia  0.115 0.115 0.092 0.252 0.298 
Turkey  0.093 0.093 0.092 0.089 0.088 
EU27 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.029 
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
ROW  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 
and unskilled workers and changes in capital stock in the long run scenario. Since we
believe that increasing returns to scale are prevalent in several industrial sectors, we
only report results of the IRTS scenarios. However, all other estimations are available
from the author on request. The results of simulations for output, price changes,
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Source: own calculations.
Table 9.7. cd
 2006 
Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
Deep  
FTA 
DEEP  
FTA+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change)  
Russia  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Ukraine  0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.006 
Armenia  0.450 0.897 0.825 4.405 8.446 
Azerbaijan  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.046 0.061 
Georgia  0.032 0.028 0.012 0.183 0.238 
Turkey  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
EU27 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
ROW  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Wages of skilled workers (% change)  
Russia  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ukraine  0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.004 
Armenia  0.357 0.762 0.743 2.922 6.483 
Azerbaijan  -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 0.064 0.078 
Georgia  0.025 0.023 0.016 0.071 0.096 
Turkey  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
EU27 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
ROW  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia  0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.007 
Armenia  2.926 6.13 7.361 21.807 30.217 
Azerbaijan  -0.099 -0.098 -0.1 0.119 0.102 
Georgia  0.149 0.149 0.094 0.626 0.906 
Turkey  0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.012 
EU27 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 
CIS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
ROW  0 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia  0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.008 
Armenia  1.631 3.187 3.732 13.824 18.029 
Azerbaijan  -0.04 -0.039 -0.038 0.006 0.028 
Georgia  0.074 0.065 0.037 0.329 0.477 
Turkey  0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009 
EU27 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006 
CIS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.004 -0.005 
Capital stock (% change) 
Armenia 0.66 1.017 0.81 7.551 20.173 
exports and imports are presented in the Appendix 8 CGE Model Results - Armenia50.
When analysing the results of Simple or Deep FTAs it has to be borne in mind that the
benchmark for all simulations is 2004 hence the Simple and Deep FTA scenarios also
include the impact of the initial trade liberalisation in 2006. The effects of the 2006
liberalization will take several years to fully materialize. Therefore to look at the
additional welfare gains from a Simple FTA beyond the impact of the 2006
liberalisation, one needs to subtract welfare implications in column (1) from the result
in column (2) and similarly for the benefits of a Deep FTA one needs to subtract welfare
impact in column (1) from welfare implications in column (4) etc. These net effects are
presented in Table 1 of the Appendix 8 CGE Model Results - Armenia.
9.4.1. 2006 Liberalization
Our results indicate that in the long-run the liberalisation of 2006 is likely to add
very little to the Armenian GDP – less than 0.4% (see Table 9.7). The impact on the
remaining countries and regions is negligible. Following trade liberalisation Armenia
experiences (albeit small) welfare gains, because its tariffs are being reduced by a large
margin in the majority of sectors and so there are efficiency gains to be reaped. With
cheaper import goods domestic prices falls in several sectors, notably in mineral
products; wood products; textiles and wearing apparel (see Appendix 8 CGE Model
Results - Armenia). Output in several sectors expands: mineral products; metal and
metal products; fishing. Increased competition on a domestic market coupled with
cheaper intermediate inputs reduces the prices of most manufacturing goods in
Armenia. Lower prices raise demand for their products abroad and lead to production
and exports expansion. Sectors that expand are overall more unskilled-labour intensive
as wages of unskilled workers grow at a slightly faster pace than those of skilled
workers (0.45% vs. 0.36% relative to the benchmark 2004 level). 
When interpreting the output results one has to keep in mind that the overall
employment is held constant in simulations, hence decreases in production of some
sectors are compensated by increases in production in other sectors as skilled and
unskilled workers shift between sectors. The changes in output are only indicative of
the mechanisms at work and should not be treated as a forecast. Similarly, the trade
balance is held fixed in the simulations hence an increase in total exports is
accompanied by a compensating increase in total imports. The direction of changes in
exports and imports by sector is however a good indication of the likely implications of
trade policy changes.
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50  The appendix includes only detailed results for Armenia as the impact on other countries is zero or negligible.
However, full set of results is available from the author on request.
9.4.2. Simple and Deep FTA scenarios
In the case of a Simple FTA involving the elimination of remaining industrial tariffs,
halving of remaining agricultural tariffs and elimination of all quantitative restrictions
in the bilateral trade with the EU the additional welfare gains amount to only a 0.18%
GDP over the expected gains from the 2006 liberalization. This is not surprising given
that in 2006 Armenian tariffs are almost all zero and Armenia enjoys GSP access to the
EU market. The welfare changes for other regions are negligible. The changes in wages
are slightly higher, and again unskilled workers gain relatively more. 
Column 3 in Table 9.7 presents results for a Simple FTA BIS eliminating all tariffs
and quantitative restrictions in the EU-Armenia bilateral trade. However, the results
are very similar to a Simple FTA. The main reason why elimination of tariffs on trade
in agricultural and food products does not have any noticeable impact is due to the fact
that NTBs (i.e. standards costs as well as border costs) are higher than the actual tariffs
and their assumed reduction is driving the results in both scenarios. The Simple FTA
scenario assumes already a 50% reduction on tariffs on agro-food products; hence the
additional benefits from the removal of the remaining low tariffs are not a significant
policy change compared to changes in NTBs. As compared to Simple FTA scenario,
Armenia is eliminating its tariffs mainly on food, beverages and tobacco (see Table 9
1) of 3.8% and tariffs on grains, fruits, vegetables and forestry products of 1.5%. These
are low tariffs, but imports in those sectors constituted respectively 18, 20 and 14% of
domestic consumption in 2004. In terms of better access to the EU market for its
exports, Armenia benefits from the elimination of post-Simple FTA tariffs on fishing
products of 3.2% (trade weighted average) and on food, beverages and tobacco of 1.4%.
Even though initially exports of fish products are non-existent, the Simple FTA BIS
leads to some imports of fish products from other regions and their exports to the EU.
This however does not have any significant impact on welfare; the major impact is of
food, beverages and tobacco, where production falls further than in a Simple FTA and
is crowded out by imports. Since we have a single representative consumer in the
model, the loss of tariff revenue and a smaller increase in factor rewards outweigh the
gains from lower consumer prices and increased efficiency of production. This points
out that again tariff barriers are not the major obstacle to the expansion on Armenian
exports to the EU, only quality improvements and reductions of non-tariff barriers can
lead to significant benefits for the agro-food sector.
There are several reasons why we should expect the elimination of NTBs to be
beneficial to Armenia and the EU. The reductions in barriers to trade and transport
costs decrease the prices of goods for consumers, as well as prices of intermediates and
capital goods for producers. The extent of these gains depends on the amount of trade
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between the trading partners and the trade creation and trade diversion effects. Apart
from increased efficiency of resource allocation, as demand shifts to regions with the
lowest cost suppliers, additional gains stem from increased competition. However all
gains from trade also involve adjustment costs and may be associated with potentially
painful restructuring in Armenia and significant redistribution effects. 
Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a more complete
elimination of barriers to trade and investment. This would result in a more extensive
commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in
Armenia. We operationalize this scenario by looking at the effects of the removal of
NTBs such as border and standard costs and barriers to foreign provision of services
as defined above. The estimates of the magnitude of those barriers in Armenia are not
perfect, yet they provide a useful tool to gain insight into the magnitude and direction
of sectoral changes in trade, prices and output. Our results indicate that the impact of
a Deep FTA here narrowly defined as only the removal of NTBs would bring significant
benefits to Armenia. Our model results indicate that the welfare gains could amount to
3.76% of GDP or 3.38 percentage points above the 2006 liberalization scenario. The
impact of a Deep FTA on the EU27 is still lower than 0.1% of GDP, but this is to be
expected given that the share of Armenia in total EU imports and in total EU exports
is less than 0.5%. The implications for other regions are also negligible. 
Finally, the comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with
more wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead to
a re-branding of Armenia as a favourable investment location. These effects are very
difficult to quantify, but one way to analyse this kind of implications is to look at a
reduction in the cost of capital. This is interpreted as a lowering of risk premium
associated with locating the capital in Armenia. A similar approach has been adopted in
the study on the Eastern EU Enlargement (Baldwin, Francois, Portes, 1997) and in the
feasibility study for the EU-Ukraine FTA (CEPS, 2006), where a reduction of the price
of capital of 10% was assumed. Clearly a deep and comprehensive FTA could result in
a strong boost to the investors’ confidence in Armenia and to illustrate its possible
consequences we study the implications of a reduction in the cost of capital in Armenia. 
Hence we look at the Deep FTA+ scenario (column 5 of Table 9-7), which is the
closest to the definition of a deep and comprehensive FTA as understood throughout
the report. Along with the reduction of NTBs as in the previous scenario, we assume
that the change in the business environment brought about by an enhanced FTA would
lead to a boost to investors’ confidence and a lowering of the risk premium on
investment in Armenia by 5%. In this scenario the welfare implications increase to
8.33% of GDP or 7.95 percentage points above the gains achieved by the 2006
liberalization. 
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Again in the Deep FTA+ scenario output of unskilled labour intensive sectors is
growing faster than output of sectors where skilled workers are used more intensively
and wages of unskilled workers grow relatively faster. This is mainly explained by the
expansion of unskilled labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and wearing apparel;
leather products; manufactures nec (not elsewhere classified) and mineral products.
Increase in real wages stems from a more efficient allocation of resources as tariff and
non-tariff barriers are being eliminated. However is also related to the nature of the
experiment. As we allow the capital stock to increase by 20% in response to changes in
return to capital following a Deep FTA+ holding total employment fixed, the higher
capital to labour ratio leads to an increase in wages. This is coupled with falling prices
across the majority of sectors due to lowering of tariffs and several NTBs leading to an
even sharper increase in real wages.
Prices fall across majority of sectors with the impact on selected industries now
being determined by changes in standards costs, by changes in relative barriers to
foreign providers  of transport, financial and communication services and their trade
intensity. The impact of the liberalisation of the access to services sector seems to be
very small. The majority of output changes seem to be determined by changes in border
and standards costs. Output of many sectors increases dramatically e.g. textiles and
wearing apparel. However, an increase of the order of 230% is not that impressive
given that the base production level was very small (less than 1% of the total value
added was generated in each of those sectors in 2004). The biggest fall in output is
recorded in wood products; transportation and storage and banking services, which
are being replaced by imports. 
Trade changes are highly correlated with changes in output (see Appendix 8 CGE
Model Results - Armenia). A decrease in domestic production is often associated with
a dramatic expansion of imports to replace domestic production. Exports increase the
fastest in sectors where prices fall the most, hence the products become much more
competitive on the world markets. 
9.5. Conclusions
Overall, the conclusions of this analysis are consistent with those of chapter 4 where
the impact of FTAs was analysed using the Sussex Framework. The welfare gains from
the tariff liberalisation on the Armenian and EU’s side respectively that took place in
2006 are likely to be very small i.e. less than 0.4% of GDP. The same can be concluded
about a Simple FTA/Simple FTA BIS, as the tariff barriers on both sides are already
very low. The additional gains of 3.38% of GDP could be reaped from a Deep FTA that
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would lock in further domestic policy changes such as conformity with EU regulatory
standards, improvement in customs procedures and further facilitation of foreign
provision of services. If as a result of a Deep FTA accompanied by flanking measures
on e.g. competition and corruption Armenia achieved also a notable reduction in the
perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Armenia
as a favorable and safe place to invest, the total gains on the top of the ones achieved
out of the 2006 liberalisation might reach around 7.95% of GDP (scenario Deep FTA+).
However for this scenario to materialize, the domestic policies would need to change
dramatically. The boost to investors’ confidence in the country can be only brought
about by significant harmonization with the acquis and a consistent effort to break up
various monopolies, eliminate corruption, strengthen the rule of law and improve
general business environment in Armenia. 
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This chapter explores the prospects of selected important sectors in Armenia,
highlights potential issues and discusses the likely implications of free trade
agreements. The selected sectors are: agro-food, mining, and processing of precious
stones. We describe the agro-food sector in much greater detail than mining and
precious stone processing because an impact of an FTA on the agro-food sector may be
much more substantial than an impact on the other two sectors.   
10.1. Agro-food sector
10.1.1. General Performance and Current Issues
Armenia’s agriculture sector has traditionally been the foundation of its economy,
and has been experiencing a great deal of reform since its privatization after the fall of
the USSR. Capitalism brought land redistribution and land fragmentation resulting in
over 300,000 privately owned farms (Armenian Economics Association, 2007).
Although currently 70% of land is in private hands, the agro-processing industries,
as well as the development of financial market transaction mechanisms, have been
lagging. This is a serious problem since agriculture continues to be a key sector,
contributing approximately 30% to GDP and comprising 40% of total employment
(Mitra et al 2007). While the share of agriculture in GPD has declined from 25.5% in
2001 to 18.1% in 2006, the production in agriculture and food industry increased
(Figure 101 and Figure 102).51
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10. Sectors of importance
51 The decrease of the production index from 2005 to 2006 was coupled with a sharp increase of output sales prices,
where the respective index was 111.9 in 2006, which was the highest value for Armenia for at least the past 7
to 8 years (AEPLAC, 2007).
The organisation of the sector in Armenia has changed fundamentally since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, household’s farms dominate the sector while
commercial organisations are a small minority. This is due in part to the haphazard
distribution process, which was conducted rapidly and chaotically and resulted in a
lack of clearly defined property rights (especially with regard to water rights and farm
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Source: NSS Armenia, AEPLAC (2007), GII Calculations
Figure 10.1. Share of Value Added Agriculture in GDP, Armenia
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Figure 10.2. Agro-Food Production Indices  for Armenia (Base period: 1999-2001)
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equipment). Shares are calculated from figures of the Statistical Yearbook Armenia
(2006).
This fragmentation of land ownership is an important constraint to Armenia’s
agricultural sector, and therefore also to food processors. This not only makes land
tilling difficult, but also precludes many types of economies of scale. Additionally, not
everyone who received land wants or has the resources to farm, and many parcels lay
idle. Land can be purchased and a few processors have purchased several contiguous
parcels in order to further guarantee the supply of raw material. The land
fragmentation problem is further exacerbated by an almost total lack of properly sized
farm machinery available in rural areas. This means that agriculture remains largely a
labour-intensive sector. The amount of unskilled labour involved in agriculture has
caused the sector to grow slower than others (adding only .1% of a marginal increase
to the GDP in 2006; Mitra et al, 2006).  
The output structure of the agricultural sector in Armenia has remained, at least
with regard to the large product groups, rather stable since 1992. The first six product
groups only changed places moderately within this class (Figure 10.3). 
In recent years, the nominal output food has been growing continuously, but with
rather volatile growth rates (Figure 10.4). Moreover, the calculation of real growth
rates based on changes in the wholesale-producer price index shows that real growth
in 2004 was negative.
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Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 10.3. Production of food and agricultural commodities with rank 1 to 6 in 1992 (1000
US$   based on 1999–2001 international prices)
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For the further growth of the food processing industry, it must be taken into account
that there is little land for the expansion of agricultural production. On the other hand,
Armenia has a favourable climate for horticultural production and for early-season
fruits and vegetables, especially in the south. Moreover, there are also some other basic
factor conditions for further growth. These include Armenia’s reputation for tasteful
products free from the use of chemical fertilizers, a strong reputation within the CIS
for good quality, as well as inexpensive farm and factory labour.
The wine industry, a sector of focus, has some problems common to the whole food
industry, and also has sector-specific problems. Generally, the bulk of production in
this industry is low quality, low cost wine. According to our interview of the president
of the Armenian Wine Producers Union, Avag Harutyuanyan, on 11 October 2007, 80%
of the Armenian wine production is used for the distillation of brandy. Some
investment in developing knowledge, promotion and presentation of finer wines took
place, primarily for experienced domestic and the Armenian Diaspora in France and
America market, Armenia’s strongest historical investors. Initial conditions for the
production of wine are positive, including a centuries’ old tradition of winemaking,
heirloom grape production for specialized niche markets and proper climatic
conditions in most years. Remaining disadvantages for the development of the wine
sector include the following:
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Source: NSS Armenia, Global Insight Report: Armenia, GII Calculations
Figure 10.4. Food processing growth in Armenia
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Pe
rc
en
t
Growth rate
Real  growth rate
Output  of food products
M
ill
io
n 
D
ra
m
s
• Small land size precludes the use of machinery in most cases, but some
consolidation of land is possible.
• Traditional technologies for grape breeding and fermenting result in
unpredictable quality.
• Root stocks are susceptible to phylloxera (a common grapevine pest).
• There is no production of wine bottles and the imported are costly (USAID, 2004).
• Armenia is exposed to strong competition from other low quality producers.  
Another important problem of the agricultural sector is rural finance. As in other
developing countries, banking is not easily available to rural dwellers. 
Armenia’s total exports of agricultural goods increased from $50.195 million in
2001 to $109.745 million in 2005, while its total imports of agricultural goods
increased from 208.208 million in 2000 to 299.543 million in 2005. Similarly, food
exports grew from 6.674 million in 2001 to 13.948 million in 2005, while food imports
grew from 140.216 million to 198.019 million during the same period. The RCA for
agricultural goods moved from a slightly negative specialisation in 2001 (-14.4) to a
slightly positive specialisation in 2005 (+8.3), while the RCA for food stood between 90
and 95, indicating a very strong positive specialisation.
The main agricultural export goods of Armenia are distilled alcoholic beverages,
with a share of 73% in total agricultural exports in 2005. Roasted coffee and green
coffee are in second and third place with shares of 3.7% and 3.1%. According to our
interview of the president of the Armenian Wine Producers Union, 93% of brandy
exports and 83% of wine exports goes the CIS (Armenian brandy has a market share of
47% in Russia). Small amounts of wine and brandy also go to France, to be bought by
the large Armenian Diaspora residing there. 
Firms that would like to certify their export production need three certificates,
which he considers a hindrance to exports. First, they need to certify their whole
company and production. Beside this first certificate they additionally need a second
certificate of origin for the shipped quantity. Finally, the third certificate is the quality
certificate, for brandy accompanied by a certificate of the region of origin. Asked about
problems with the customs authorities, Mr. Hrutyuanyan pointed out that production
of wine is a highly politicized sector where Armenian Customs is used as a means to
monitor production and export volumes as well as export destination. This information
is often supplied to competitors. Usually, however, customs problems only exist with
regard to the Russian market, but not with exports to the EU. 
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10.1.2. Relations with the EU
The share of agricultural products of EU-25 total imports from Armenia has been
rather small and has not increased over time. In 2002 it was 2.6% (4 million euro) and
only 1.9% (6 million euro) in 2006 (DG Trade 2007).52 The share of agricultural
products in the total exports of the EU-25 to Armenia was 10.3% (or 27 million euro)
in 2002 and 9.4% (or 43 million euro) in 2006. Thus, Armenia has a persistent trade
deficit with the EU in the area of agricultural products. However, it can be expected
that the share of agro-food products in Armenia’s imports from the EU will further
decline with parallel increases in Armenian agro-food exports. Actually, Armenian
producers have been able to meet the domestic demand for these products increasingly
better. Thus, domestic demand and enlarged production capacities are the major
drivers of the described trend. Dairy, poultry and meat sectors were already able to
meet the domestic demand for fresher and “with-no-preservatives” products and to
move to import substitution (World Bank, 2005).
European FDI in the Armenian agro-food sector is concentrated on brandy
distillation and other beverage production. Yerevan Brandy Company (YBC) became
part of Pernod-Ricard Group in 1998 producing a range of different brandies and
pursuing a very strict quality control policy. YBC clearly dominates the Armenian
brandy industry, producing more than the half of the brandy exported.53 However,
access to high quality grapes is the greatest limiting factor to expansion of the firm.
Land in the Ararat valley that is appropriate for grapes is becoming scarce. Fine brandy
requires a limited number of grape varieties. In order to overcome this problem, the
firm started to plant grapes outside the Ararat valley or encourage farmers to do so, and
has begun contract farming with selected growers. The firm has between 2,500 and
3,000 farmers contracted for five to ten years to produce particular varieties. 
Furthermore, Castel, a French company, established two joint ventures in 1997 to
produce mineral water “Bjni” and beer “Kotayk”. Today, Castel owns 71% of the shares
of the Abovian Brewery, the producer of Kotayk. The Coca-Cola Company was also
among the first to enter the Armenian market and opened a bottling plant near Yerevan
in 1996. The Coca Cola Company is also an exporter of local water, bottled under the
brand name Bonaqua. Furthermore, there is also some FDI in the tobacco and
cigarettes industry. Out of seven major tobacco wholesalers, five are importers.
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52 Based on raw data from Eurostat, DG Trade processed these figures for its publications concerning EU-
Armenian trade relations only for the EU-25 countries. 
53 The main competitor of YBC is Great Valley, but there is also some competition from imitators and label
falsifiers (USAID, 2004).
Relations with the EU are not limited to purely market transactions via foreign
trade and FDI, but include also funding from various EU programmes. The Armenian
medium term expenditure framework indeed is aimed with regard to the agricultural
sector at (1) the maintenance and improvement in soil fertility, (2) the improvement in
agricultural yields through better pest management, (3) food safety and security, (4)
prevention of diseases, and (5) improvement in seed and sapling. Accordingly, the
Government’s agricultural spending is to be aimed at improving infrastructure,
broadening scientific research, introduction of new technologies, as well as expanding
educational and advisory services, but the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget falls short
in allocating adequate funds to the mentioned key priorities (World Bank, 2005). Thus,
ongoing donor programs and their respective counterpart financing have primarily
financed these activities, and, in addition, the Ministry receives budgetary support from
the EU Food Security Programme, aiming at, among other things, financing veterinary
measures and livestock disease surveillance.
Besides its membership in the WTO and the obligations under the EU-Armenia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in July 1999,
the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan for
Armenia, which was endorsed by the EU-Armenia Cooperation Council on 14
November 2006, is also an important instrument influencing Armenia’s trade relations
with the EU. The ENP Action Plan goes clearly beyond the PCA and offers the
opportunities for an increasingly close relationship with the EU, involving a significant
degree of economic integration as well as a deepening of political cooperation. One
year after the adoption, the food security programme (100 million Euros over 10 years)
is considered by the EU as very successful. This programme aims at supporting the
Armenian government’s poverty reduction efforts by providing budgetary support as
well as technical assistance for key land and agricultural reforms, but also public
finance management and social sector reforms. Key objectives of the Action Plan
affecting international trade and also foreign direct investment are:
• improvements of the business climate as well as public sector modernisation,
• further efforts to tackle corruption and fraud, 
• reforms of tax and customs administrations and legislation,
• gradual regulatory approximation of the Armenian legislation and practises to the
main EU trade-related acquis. This is particularly important, because – as it can
be concluded e.g. from our survey – the great majority of Armenia’s production
cannot be currently effectively exported to the EU due to the incapacity of
domestic firms to comply with the EU regulatory requirements.
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Moreover, access to many export markets (including the EU market) depends on
technical quality certification of food products to international standards (such as
Codex Alimentarius, EU directives, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards of the WTO
- ?). Quality certification is also required for trade of agro-food products and of
processing facilities under ISO and HACCP. As a WTO member, Armenia is now
introducing the development of a national standards reference laboratory supported by
various donors. Also, under the EU-Armenia PCA and in particular the ENP Action
Plan, Armenia has undertaken to a gradual regulatory approximation with the EU and
international standards in the area of quality certification.
At the moment, Armenia’s agro-food producers are at very different points on the
way to ISO and HACCP accreditations. Generally, companies do not have the volume
of fresh produce exports to the EU to warrant investment in the comprehensive and
stringent private sector EUREP-GAP or British Retailer’s Code of practice (World
Bank, 2005). Many Armenian fresh and processed food producing companies have not
the infrastructure and organisation needed  to meet the basic requirements for Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMP) as recognized in the EU, which, on the other hand, is
the reference standard chosen by the Armenian government for harmonisation
purposes. Most firms use an incremental approach, improving their facilities,
equipment, and practices as their business volumes grow. 
This whole process, however, can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, some
Armenian firms have shown the capability to meet importer quality standards once the
public regulatory system has been strengthened for a specific product. A good example
is the export of live crayfish (World Bank, 2005). With EU funding, technical assistance
was used to bring an entire value chain, including the identification of a competent
authority for inspection and certification that would pass muster with the European
Commission. Solving the regulatory problems has caused an immense increase in live
crayfish exports. On the other hand, it should be avoided that the currently very
positive development of small and medium-size enterprises is hampered by too rigid
and too costly food safety criteria. Additionally, criteria need to be adjusted, with the
exception of public health standards, to the markets for which the products are
intended and not all business should be subject to highly elaborated licensing and
tracking mechanisms if their market does not require this (World Bank, 2005).
10.1.3. Potential Impact of an FTA
The agricultural sector will undergo considerable changes in the upcoming years in
relation to Armenia’s commitments to the WTO. Armenia has committed to start
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taxation of agricultural product beginning on January 1, 2009. This will not only bring
about significant changes in the development of this sector, but can also affect the
whole economy (AEPLAC, 2007).
With regard to a Simple FTA, it can be expected that it will not have further large
effects on the agro-food sector, since Armenia has rather low tariff rates on agricultural
products (Figure 10.5) due to its commitment to the WTO. The binding coverage for
agricultural products is 100 % and the final bound duties are 15 % for most of these
products at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS).54 Table 10.1 shows that there are a
few lower final bound duties for some animal products as well as for some products in
the group of coffee and tea, so that the final bound duties are here 14.9 % and 14.2 %.
Furthermore, within the product groups “oilseeds, fats and oils” some products (9.2 %
of the imports of this product group) and other agricultural products (0.7 % of the
imports of this product group) are duty free.
Most favoured nation (MFN) applied duties are in most cases even lower. Here, the
maximum is in most agricultural product groups 10 %. Exceptions are, on the one
hand, beverages and tobacco with a maximum of more than 1000 % and average
duties of 26 %, and, on the other hand, cotton, where 100 % of all products are duty
free (see also Table 10.1). In the former case, the average duties are according to the
WTO above the maximum of the final bound duties of 15 %. However, although tariff
rates are low both by CIS as well as international standards, in the view of AEPLAC,
the administrative handling of customs is a larger problem, since many of decisions are
dependent on the goodwill of poorly paid civil servants.
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54 According to the WTO the binding coverage is defined as the share of HS six-digit subheadings containing at
least one bound tariff line.
Source: WTO
Figure 10.5. Tariff lines and import values for Armenian agricultural products, %
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Furthermore, Armenia is also not allowed to use special safeguards against
increased imports of agricultural products. With regard to domestic support measures,
Armenia undertakes towards the WTO to keep its “amber box” subsidies to the “de
minimis” minimal support level, which is 10 % of agricultural production (the limit for
developing countries) until 31 December 2008, and 5 % (the limit for developed
countries) from 1 January 2009.55
With regard to other non-tariff arrangements, the Armenian Government generally
follows WTO rules from a formal point of view since early 2003. It committed to the
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement without any transition period.
Nevertheless is the Armenian SPS system is still incompatible with EU regulations. The
way out this predicament is to create separate certification arrangements for individual
export products rather than wait for full SPS reform in Armenia, which can be a long
time off. Moreover, Armenia took similar commitment in respect of domestic rules on
custom valuation, import licensing and origin certification of products. 
Finally, the system of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection is another
significant component of trade policy formulation in agricultural field. Particularly, the
rules on registration of trade marks, geographical indications and appellations of origin,
rules on protection of selection achievements and biotechnological inventions are of
interest of entities involved in trade of agricultural products. In this area, again,
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Source: WTO.
Table 10.1. Tariffs by product groups
Product groups Final bound duties MFN applied duties 
 Average Duty free 
in % 
Max. Binding 
in % 
Average Duty  
free in 
% 
Max. 
Animal products 14.9 0 15 100 7.5 24.7 10 
 Diary products 15.0 0 15 100 10.0 0 10 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 15.0 0 15 100 9.1 9.0 10 
Coffee, tea 14.2 0 15 100 9.6 4.2 10 
Cereals & preparations 15.0 0 15 100 5.3 46.8 10 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 13.6 9.2 15 100 5.6 44.2 10 
Sugars & confectionery 14.7 0 15 100 8.8 12.5 10 
Beverages & tobacco 15.0 0 15 100 26.0 13.0 >1000 
Cotton 15.0 0 15 100 0.0 100.0 0 
Other agricultural 
Products 
14.6 0.7 15 100 3.2 67.6 10 
Fish & fish products 15.0 0 15 100 9.5 5.3 100 
55 According to the WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified by “boxes” which are given the colours
of traffic lights: green (permitted), amber (slow down — i.e. be reduced), red (forbidden). In agriculture, things
are a little bit more complicated. The Agriculture Agreement has no red box, although domestic support
exceeding the reduction commitment levels in the amber box is prohibited; and there is a blue box for subsidies
that are tied to programmes that limit production.
Armenian legislation was formally brought into conformity with WTO rules, without any
transition period upon Armenia’s accession to WTO. But, similarly to the previous
paragraph concerning other trade regulations, there are still a lot of problems in the real
world. One problem e.g. is the black market of agricultural products like brandy and
vodka. Companies violate granted trademarks that threaten FDI in this sector. Here, as
well as in the above mentioned areas, the level of ambition of the relationship between
Armenia and the EU will clearly depend on the degree of Armenia’s commitment to
common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities, in
compliance with international and European norms and principles. One ambitious
project would be a Deep FTA+, and from the viewpoint of Armenia, adopting EU
regulations and quality standards actually may also allow some products to capture
larger market shares within the EU as well as enhance the confidence of EU exporters
and foreign direct investors into the Armenian market. In this context the discussion
presented in the previous section with regard to food security and quality standards is
here also directly relevant. 
Coming against this background to the potential implications of an EU-Armenian
FTA, it can be expected that the parties will aim at ensuring a reciprocal liberal trade
regime in the field of agriculture and tackling effectively border and behind-the-border
trade barriers in the bilateral agricultural trade. Any Deep FTA with the EU would be
therefore likely to affect Armenia’s trade policy approach for this sector. The
Government would certainly need to improve a number of trade policy instruments and
practices, which are inconsistent with international obligations of Armenia and with
the best international practice (particularly those of the EU).
Referring to those instruments that already have been applied in EU FTAs signed
with developing nations, the following issues arise:
1. All implemented EU FTAs include provisions on tariff reductions (on
agricultural products). While reviewing Armenia’s tariff scheme the following
inconsistency with the EU customs legislation and practises becomes
obvious. As mentioned already, Armenia’s applied import tariff rate is 10 %
for around 65 % of product lines of agribusiness commodities, while for the
rest of product lines 0 % import tariff rate is applied. Thus, the majority of
product lines is subject to ad valorem tariff duties. Meanwhile, the Custom
Code of Armenia also enacts specific tariff duties for limited type of products.
Particularly, brandy, wine, beer and other alcoholic drinks are subject to
specific tariffs – depending of the type of alcoholic drink approximately at the
rate 0.10-2.5 Euro per litre of the imported product. As a result, it is not
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certain whether for comparatively less expensive imported alcoholic drinks
these rates do not exceed the bound ad valorem equivalent rate of 15 %.
2. Another major inconsistency in tariff arrangements is a wide-spread practice
of using reference pricing during custom valuation of imported goods. Thus,
although the Custom Code of Armenia is sound with WTO rules enacting the
possibility of utilization of reference pricing only in exceptional cases,
importers and donor funded investigations report that reference pricing is an
ordinary practice rather than an exceptional one.
3. As an option for flexible adjustments to a partner’s market access, EU FTAs
reaffirm the WTO requirement of national treatment for imported products.
As we noted above, nowadays, Armenia’s domestic agricultural output sold
by farmers is exempted from value added tax. This practice constitutes
discriminatory treatment of imports in relation to similar domestic products.
Meanwhile, according to Armenia’s WTO commitments, VAT exemption
should be eliminated no later than December 31, 2008. However, it is
uncertain whether authorities will be capable of promptly enforcing this
measure, especially during the first years, considering wide spread practice
of direct sale of agricultural products by farmers to consumers and a huge
number of businesses (farmers) that should be brought into the tax area.
4. In implemented EU FTAs, specific rules of origin for agricultural product
ensure the exclusive application of preferences only to goods originating in
the FTA parties. At the regulatory side AEPLAC investigations suggest that
the rules of origin of the Armenian Custom Code are not in full alignment
with the EU rules of origin. At present, within the scope of effective utilization
of EU GSP schemes the Government targets to follow AEPLAC’s proposal to
make appropriate amendments that would ensure that rules concerning the
origin criterion comply with EU rules as it is provided in Articles 66-79 of the
EC Regulation No. 2454/93.
5. Investigations implemented by donor funded projects in Armenia indicate
that Armenian exporters, particularly those exporting modest quantities of
goods, are strongly discouraged by issuance procedures of Certificates of
Origin, which are described as time-consuming, non- transparent and
requiring non-formal payments. 
6. In the SPS area definitions of norms and standards are predetermined by the
WTO rules. Therefore, EU FTAs mainly emphasised facilitating the
application of the WTO SPS provisions. Thus, in conformity with Armenia’s
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commitments under the WTO  as of December 31, 2004, enforcement of
GOST standards is discretionary. However, so far public authorities have not
enacted a sufficient number of compulsory regulations in the food safety
control area that would replace GOST standards. As agro-food trade has been
traditionally with CIS neighbouring countries, national standards and
analytical procedures have not been as substantially harmonized with
international requirements even in newly adopted compulsory regulations.
7. A serious overlap and duplication in control and examination authorities of
state agencies involved in food safety control in Armenia can be observed.
World Bank and FAO financed analyses consider the recent trend of
transferring food control responsibilities to the Quality Inspectorate of the
Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, along side with keeping
similar responsibilities at the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of
Healthcare, as not effective.
8. Implemented EU FTAs also emphasise the specification of technical
assistance in SPS issues. In this respect, it is important to point out that
inspection services, public laboratories and testing centres in Armenia are
under-funded, which does not allow for testing equipment, monitoring and
control capacities and technical skills of personal to be in line with modern
food safety. Also it is worth to be mentioned that the HACCP system is not
part of the food control system or manufacturing practices of any but the few
largest producers.
9. With regard to IPR protection in the agricultural sector, a few provisions on
protecting certain geographic indications can be found in some FTAs.
AEPLAC surveys concluded that – compared to EU legislation – the Armenian
legislation does not provide detailed regulations of legal relations arising in
the field of agricultural products, particularly appellations of origin and
geographical indications of key agricultural products. Armenia is also not a
member of the Lisbon System for the International Registration of
Appellations of Origin. 
10. Other regulatory gaps in the IPR protection area that the Armenian
Government might fix before signing a Deep FTA are (reported by AEPLAC)
the divergence between legal protection mechanisms of selection
achievements and biotechnological inventions set forward by Armenian
legislation and the corresponding EU directives.
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Beside foreign trade, FDI may also be affected by different forms of FTAs.
Generally, the policy of the Armenian Government in FDI attraction area is considered
as liberal as the one in foreign trade area. Particularly, in agro-food sector foreign
investors have the same right to establish and run businesses as Armenian entities. The
Law on Foreign Investments56 of Armenia establishes that foreign investors enjoy the
National Treatment regime in Armenia.57 No additional fiscal and regulatory burdens
(e.g. in the form of licensing or in the form of minimum capital requirements) are
envisaged for foreign investors in agricultural sector, except that foreign natural
persons may not own land but are permitted to lease it. There are no restrictions or
controls on the holding of foreign exchange accounts, current transfers and
repatriation of profits. The Law on Foreign Investments provides guarantees to foreign
investors and protects investors from changes in the business related laws for 5 years.
It also includes clauses on proper compensations of loses of foreign investors in case of
expropriation and nationalization of properties.
Furthermore, Armenian tax legislation is an important incentive for investors,
particularly those entities that invest into shares of Joint-Stock Companies, since
profits in the form of dividends exempted from tax in Armenia. Generally, all
companies with foreign participation and the share of the foreign partner exceeding
500 million Drams are benefiting from 100 % forgiveness of the profit tax for two
years. However, this tax exemption will end in 2010. Meanwhile, agribusinesses also
enjoy full exemption from land tax for newly planted and young vineyards and fruit
gardens until their complete fruitfulness.
At the institutional side the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade and
Economic Development are responsible for designing the state policy for attracting
investments into the agricultural sector. In the policy formation area the government
receives additions support from the FAO, World Bank, AEPLAC and other donors. The
Armenian Development Agency acts as a “one-stop shop” agency for foreign investors
in general, assisting them in setting up their business in Armenia, helping in project
implementation, performing a liaison role with the Government, etc. The Centre for
Agribusiness and Rural Development, supported by US Department of Agriculture, and
some other donor funded initiatives provide a set of integrated technical and marketing
services with the aim to develop existing agribusinesses and to facilitate the
establishment of new ones.
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56 HO-115, adopted in July 31, 1994 
57 According to the Law on Foreign Investments a “foreign investor” is any foreign company or citizen, a person
without citizenship, an Armenian citizen permanently residing outside of Armenia, or an international
organization that invests in Armenia. 
With regard to the potential implications of an FTA, the above described regulatory
framework certainly shows that, at least from formal point of view, the Armenian
Government adheres to a liberal approach in FDI attraction policy area in general and
particularly in the agro-food sector. But formal commitments are not necessarily
reflected in actual steps executed by the Government for bolstering a business-friendly
investment climate in Armenia. However, although nothing indicates that the
regulatory and institutional framework particularly and deliberately creates
impediments for foreign investors, a number of surveys of donor funded projects and
international think tanks indicate investment climate in Armenia is far from being
sound and secure, both for local and foreign investors.
Weak implementation of legislation and corruption in the bureaucracy are the
major obstacles that investors face in Armenia. The wide-spread practice of judicial
dependence from the executive branch and corruption create serious obstacles in the
sound protection of private property rights and enforcement of contracts by the
courts58. The most quoted types of informal payments collection among public
authorities appear during tax collection, in exports and imports and during licensing
or mandatory certification of businesses. A rent-seeking stance within the control and
examination authorities of state agencies involved in food safety control in Armenia is
a particular impediment for agribusinesses. The government also is not able to
effectively protect competition in a number of domestic markets, including a few
markets of primary agricultural goods, such as sugar, eggs, butter, some cereals.
Research by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
indicates that in recent EU FTAs with developing countries investment-related
provisions are not as comprehensive as those of traditional bilateral investment treaties
(BIT). In general, BITs are inferior to WTO agreements in their deepness of regulations
of rights and responsibilities of contracting parties in the formulation and
implementation of particular policies (investment policies in case of BITs and trade
policies in case of WTO agreements). In other words, BITs do not create
comprehensive mechanisms for the sound and secure protection of investors rights,
compared to WTO agreements that are mostly covering trade relations. In EU FTA
investment regulations are implemented even “lighter” than in BITs.
Consequently, only a Deep FTA+ with a robust dispute settlement mechanism and
strong investment provisions could significantly increase the attractiveness of Armenia
as a safe place to invest. As indicated above, investors are facing non-competitive
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58 Note that property rights (including land ownership) registration issues and business registration issues in
Armenia are at the opposite edge. As surveys of the World Bank, Heritage Foundation and other think-tank
indicate compare with other transition countries Armenia has one of most effectively operating institutional
frameworks in these areas.
practices in a few markets of primary agricultural goods. The agricultural sector, in
particular, could gain from the inclusion of the provisions on competition policy in case
of a Deep FTA+. A Deep FTA+ with a comprehensive chapter on competition would
certainly require from the Armenian government to bring their competition regulation
instruments into accordance with the best international standards.
10.2. Mining
10.2.1. General Performance and Current Issues
Armenia possesses important reserves of copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, iron, and
gold. It is also rich in construction stones (tuff, marble, granite, basalt, and limestone),
semiprecious stones (obsidian, agate, jasper,) and other materials such as bentonite,
perlite, zeolit, and diatomite. The mining industry is now the second largest producer
of industrial output after food and is still expanding. It increased its share in industrial
output from 6.5% in 2001, 9% in 2002 and 11% in 2003 to a little over 17% in the years
leading up to 2006. In absolute numbers, we observe a strong increase of nominal
output from 20.23 billion drams in 2001 to 94.2 billion drams in 2004, while the
increase in the next year was moderate up to 113.2 billion drams, followed by
stagnation in 2006 (Figure 10.6). The calculation of real growth rates base on changes
in the whole-producer price index yields a rather similar picture. The industrial sector’s
growth has been attributed to, in part, a strong growth in the mining industry.
Productivity in this sector has increased significantly from 2005-2006, growing from a
base productivity index of 95.6 to 106.2, year-on-year (Asian Development Bank, 2006). 
As of 2005, all mining resources have been privatized, and most Armenian mining
companies now have commitments with (mostly foreign) investors to upgrade facilities
and expand production capabilities. Many of the privatized facilities have been taken
over by Western investors, resulting in an influx of euro- and dollar-based funding, and
more usage of Western standards and technology. The largest of these is the Kajaran
copper-molybdenum mine in southern Armenia (containing reserves of up to 450
million tons), sold to international investors for $120 million (Baghdasaryan, 2007).
This facility was privatized in late 2004. There are several other recent examples of
foreign purchases. US-based firm Comsup Commodities purchased the Agarak copper-
molybdenum plant in 2003 and invested $3.5 million into the facility in 2005, and joint
US-Canadian firm Metal Prince owns mining and exploration rights for five mines in
the industry-heavy northern Lori region. 
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Due to increases in international market pricing for copper and molybdenum,
foreign acquisitions have been growing in Armenia. The mining sector is clearly a
popular target sector for foreign direct investment. According to the latest available
country profile of the UNCTAD, FDI stocks in the sector “mining of metal ores”
increased from $29 million in 1998 to $37.9 million in 2002, while the FDI stocks in
the other sector “other mining and quarrying” grows from zero in 1998 to $9.1 million
in 2002, whereby the main foreign investment of $8.5 million was in 1999.
Despite the growth in the mining sector, several issues are important to note. One
is the recent conflict between the government and foreign investors. For example, in
August of 2007, a preliminary contract was signed regarding the forced sale of the
Ararat Gold Recovery Company, by the then-owner Indian national Anil Agarwal, to
the Georgian company Madneuli. Accusations of concealing gold reserves and
initiation of legal action forced Agarwal to sell the company. In another situation,
Global Gold began an international arbitration process against the Armenian
government in March 2007, where the Ministry for Environmental Protection was
accused of refusing to extend exploratory permits on certain mines. Both cases have
not yet been resolved (Baghdasaryan, 2007). 
Another issue is the degree to which mining processes in Armenia are
environmentally unsound, creating concerns for both those who live near the mines
and global environmentalists alike. In one instance, the creation of a mine at Tehgut
(Tekhut), a copper-molybdenum site in the Lori region, will lead to the destruction of
127,000 trees and 670 hectares of land. Additionally, 55 mammal species and 191 plant
species will be destroyed. The Lori region is already considered to be an environmental
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Source: AEPLAC (2007)
Figure 10.6. Mining industry output in Armenia
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and health disaster zone by many Armenian and international environmental activists
(Grigoryan, 2007).
The large players in this market are Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Plant, CJSC,
with a market share of 39.1%, Pure Iron Plant (19.9%), Armenian Molybdenum
Production (12.3%), Agarak Copper Molybdenum Plant (7.3%), Dino Gold Mining
(2.3%) and Armenian Copper Programme (1.43%).59
It is a nontrivial task to assess the exports of the mining sector because product
coverage of industry and foreign trade statistics vary greatly across sources.60
Assuming that the product groups “base (non-precious) metals and products of them”
and “mineral products” has a high congruence with the kind of output of the mining
sector, following development can be observed. Absolute exports of base metals
increased from $43 million in 2001 to $322 million in 2005. This implies an increase of
the share in the total exports from 12.5% to 33.1%. At the same time the initial trade
deficit of $45 million for these products in 2001 changed into a trade surplus of $89
million in 2005. For “mineral products”, the situation looks a little bit different. Exports
grew more moderately, from $38 million in 2001 to $93 million in 2005, while their
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Armenia (2006).
Figure 10.7. Armenian exports of mining products
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59 Market shares according to our interview with AEPLAC on 12 October 2007.
60 The Report “Armenia Trade Diagnostic Study” of the World Bank in 2002 mentions the same problem (p. 141).
share in total exports hovers around 10% to 11%. Moreover, the trade deficit for
mineral products increased from $69 million in 2001 to $255 million in 2005.
10.2.2. Relations with the EU
In 2006, the EU-25 countries imported base metals and articles of base metals from
Armenia with a value of 198 million euro, which constituted 61.9% of their total
imports from Armenia. On the other hand, the EU-25 exports to Armenia in this
product group were only 14 million euro (or 2.9% of the total EU-25 exports to
Armenia) (DG Trade 2007)61. Thus Armenia has a clear trade surplus with EU in this
area (184 million euro), while Armenia’s total trade deficit is 139 million euro. The only
other product group with a trade surplus was mineral products, which amounted to 3
million euro.
10.2.3. Potential Impact of an FTA
Since a large share of the exports of the mining industry already goes to the EU-25
countries, and because EU import tariffs for these products are mostly very low or zero
we do not expect any impact of a Simple FTA. The impact of a deeper FTA will not be
significant either, since standardization and similar issues are not important for the
sector. If dispute settlement mechanisms are included in an FTA, this may lead to better
protection of foreign investments  in Armenia, which will reduce the risk of investing
in Armenia. 
Transportation of mining products is costly and difficult, among other things,
because of the closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. While the precise effect is
difficult to quantify, removal of these trade barriers might increase trade and FDI
significantly. This highlights the importance of resolving outstanding conflicts and
disagreements with Azerbaijan and Turkey (World Bank/IDA, 2007).
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61 Based on raw data from Eurostat, DG Trade processed these figures for its publications concerning EU-
Armenian trade relations only for the EU-25 countries. 
10.3. Processing of precious stones
10.3.1. General Performance and Current Issues
The processing of precious stones has traditionally been a key industry in Armenia
due to the availability of skilful diamond cutters with competitive wage rates, modern
equipment and tax privileges (no taxes on the import of raw materials and on the
export of finished products). During the 1960s, the Soviet Union designated Armenia
as its diamond capital, importing raw stones to be refined, and then exporting the
finished product to the rest of the world. In recent years, the sector employed
approximately 4,000-5,000 workers.
However, this sector has quickly been losing traction as a top sector over the past
several years. The decrease in diamond refining and overall jewellery exports has been
due to falling global demand for precious stones, as well as the inability of Armenian
craftsmen to compete with Western methods of production and certification. In the
first months of 2007, Armenia’s processing of diamonds fell by 34.5% from the previous
year. This sector now generates less than 1% of gross industrial output after
experiencing a significant contraction in 2004.  This has been attributed to the fall in
demand from developed countries. The American credit crisis has not helped the
situation, leading to considerable losses in the industry. Other reasons include the lack
of preparation of Armenian companies for Western competition and the interruption of
diamond raw materials supply from Russia beginning in 2006. In response, the
country’s largest diamond-cutting company, Shoghakn (owned by Lev Leviev
Diamonds of Israel,) cut over 1,000 jobs in 2007 before suspending its manufacturing
operations in June of that year. Its share of the industry was 35% (Armenian economy:
Diamond sector loses lustre, 2007). 
The industry relies heavily on imports, coming primarily from Belgium, Israel, and
Russia, which are coincidentally Armenia’s top three trade partners. Armenia imports
raw diamonds and other precious stones, processes them in mainly by foreign-owned
firms and re-export them. This operation adds about 15% of value. The two subsectors,
diamond cutting and jewellery making, operate in many respects in largely different
spheres, receive their raw materials from different sources, use different technologies,
and sell to different market. With regard to diamond cutting, Armenia has specialized
in larger diamonds, leaving smaller stones to cutters in India62. Firms have invested in
sophisticated, modern equipment and produce international good quality at a low cost.
Thereby, a few large factories dominate the industry, which is in contrast to the
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62 The further description of the two subsectors -- diamond cutting and jewellery making -- follows largely USAID
(2004).
industrial organization of the jewellery industry, where many small and medium firms
are also involved. Furthermore, at the moment the jewellery industry still caters to a
low to medium-end market of traditional designs. 
However, it has recognized the need to improve quality and to move to a higher
value, design, and service led basis. In this process, it is necessary to upgrade skills and
provide certifications. Here, capabilities for formal training to supply the industry as
well as local design capabilities have to be built up. Summing up, the jewellers, as well
as the gem cutters, face the challenges  of product differentiation, market identification,
and quality control. Here, a stronger cooperation of firms and the better layout of
supporting organisations would be helpful. Although three associations for the
jewellery industry exist, collaboration among them is insufficient. This concerns also
the establishment and promotion of quality and skill standards.
While, as already mentioned, the jewellery industry relies on its strong history with
remaining skills and reputation, the diamond cutting industry has moved forward to in-
house training and apprenticeships. Armenia has very good, skilled cutters and the
quality of cutting is good. However, formal training availability is insufficient.
Furthermore, there are only few direct linkages with retailers or customers, which lead
to little knowledge about the value factors for the customers (e.g., security and image).
The diamond cutting industry is to a large extent based on contract cutting, with little
backward and forward contacts or awareness. The management of diamond processing
firms is production oriented rather than market oriented. This goes hand in hand with
a thin product differentiation and poor customer awareness. In addition, there is no
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Armenia (2006).
Figure 10.8. Armenian exports of precious stones and metals 
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salutary collaboration with technical or training institutions - solutions are searched at
the company level instead. On the other hand, there is a demonstrated ability to share
information and to undertake joint initiative. Furthermore, there are some linkages
between diamond processors and the precision engineering and jewellery industries.
Finally, there is also some local production of cutting equipment.
Armenia’s exports of “precious stones and metals” increased from $123 million in
2001 to $336 million in 2005, while the imports increased in the same time from $188
million to $297 million. As a consequence, the trade balance changed its sign in 2002,
and reached a positive peak with $172 million in 2003, thereafter returning to a surplus
of $39 million in 2005. In the year 2003 there was also the peak of the share of this
product in total exports, which reached 51.2% and returned to 34.5% in 2005 – a
similar figure to 2001. The share of “precious stones and metals,” in imports falls after
2002 from previously approximately 22% to a level around 15% (16.4% in 2005). For
2006, AEPLAC (2007) reports a share of “precious stones and metals, things of them”
in exports of 31.9% and in imports of 14.2%. Furthermore, they point out that that the
reduction of both shares until 2006 is caused by the shrinkage of the diamond
processing volume. Thereby, it is noteworthy that Armenia did not import raw
diamonds from Russia in 2006 because of high prices and imported only from Israel
and Belgium. Before 2002, Armenia could import an unlimited amount from Russia. In
1999, this reached a high of 30,000 carats for jewellery cutting and 1,000,000 carats for
industrial purposes. However for the period from 2002 to 2007, Armenia and Russia,
by mutual agreement, entered into an annual quota system that limits the number of
carats that can be imported from Russia to 400,000 with an increase to 450,000 by
2007. As a result, Russian diamonds have become more expensive and Armenia has
been increasing its diamond purchases from Israel and Belgium. Diaspora investors
have in some cases established a connection with DeBeers. In December 2007, talks
began between Armenia and Russia. These are designed to help the lagging diamond
industry along. Following an agreement, four Armenian diamond-cutting firms have
received a total of $1 million worth of uncut diamonds and ALROSA, the Russian
diamond monopoly, plans to deliver $28 million more over the course of the next year
(Shoghikian, 2007). 
10.3.2. Relations with the EU
The character of Armenia as a processing location for precious stones is also
reflected in the foreign trade in this area with EU-25. The EU-25 countries exported in
2006 precious or semi-precious stones with a value of 127 Mio Euro to Armenia (27.6%
of their total exports to Armenia) and imported goods from the same product group
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with a value of 82 Mio Euro (25.6% of EU-25’s total imports from Armenia) (DG Trade
2007).63 However, trade is concentrated on a few large players in the European market,
because the jewellery industry is highly concentrated, both with regard to the number
of firms as well as to the number of geographical locations. Thereby, clear geographical
patterns are observable. Besides diamonds, which are imported from Belgium,
Armenia imports raw gold from Germany, Luxemburg and Poland. With regard to
exports, cut diamonds go to Belgium, jewellery and precious metal scrap to Germany
and gold to Great Britain.
10.3.3. Potential Impact of an FTA
The Armenian government’s policy of export-oriented growth and FDI attraction for
diamond processing have already played significant role for the advancement of this
industry. Together with a tariff free regime, the diamond-cutting industry benefited
from the minimisation of possible transactions costs associated with import and export
procedures. Thus, the time for customs clearance is reduced to one day and in-house
clearance is conducted, instead of the wide-spread use of reference pricing during
custom valuation the invoice value is accepted for the import of diamonds.
Furthermore, for diamonds no VAT is levied at the border, while most other imports
are subject to VAT taxation at the border. Consequently, diamond processors do not
face the risk with delays of VAT drawback upon exportation (such delays are common
practice that Armenian exporters face).
The jewellery industry also enjoys a tariff free regime for import of precious metals
and stones, while any processed output from those metals and stones is subject to an
import tariff of 10 %. However, export oriented jewellery industry is not entitled to the
described exempts from the VAT refund scheme and effective custom clearance
procedures like the diamond-cutting industry.
Concerning FDI attraction issues, it has been already mentioned in the section on
the agro-food sector that the government of Armenia, in general, has undertaken not to
create any significant formal obstacle to the attraction of FDI. This policy has been
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63 Based on raw data from Eurostat, DG Trade processed these figures for its publications concerning EU-
Armenian trade relations only for the EU-25 countries. 
64 The importance that Armenian Government attaches to the development of jewelry and diamond-cutting
industries can be assessed also by the following facts. At institutional side, in 2007 the Government established
specialized Jewelry and Goldsmith's Craft Development Agency within the structure of the Ministry of Trade and
Economic Development. In 2003 the Government has also enacted and approved a program of Government’s
actions aiming in development of these industries until the beginning of 2008. This kind of mid-term
programming is implemented for those sectors, which are considered to have strategic role for economic
development in Armenia.
applied for the jewellery and diamond-cutting industries as well64. These industries are
also less challenged by informal barriers to FDI in Armenia that were also discussed in
the chapter on agro-food sector. Particularly, unfair competition practices cannot be
observed in the jewellery and diamond-cutting industries. Thus, a few large factories
(mainly under foreign ownership) dominate the export oriented diamond industry,
while in jewellery industry many small and medium size companies are involved.
With regard to the potential implications of an EU-Armenia FTA, it has to be
emphasised first of all, that Armenia enforces a liberal foreign trade regime for jewellery
and diamond-cutting industries. The same can be stated for the EU, which is not levying
tariffs for imports of diamonds from any country. Armenian jewellery exporters can
enter the EU market on tariff-free bases under EU Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) scheme. Therefore, the sector under consideration already is subject to Simple
FTA conditions and an anticipated FTA should not create significant economic impact
for jewellery and processed diamond trade between Armenia and the EU.
Thus, at a first glance, one would assume that a Simple FTA will have no impact on
the diamond processing industry. However, due to the small number of large suppliers,
the European market for final products (processed diamonds) is at the moment closed
for Armenian firms, and several members and officials of the Armenian government
interviewed by the project team mentioned, that there is some hope in Armenia that this
could change with a Deep FTA+. A Deep FTA+ could lead to increase investment in
the sector in Armenia and hence facilitate Armenian access to the European market for
final products. Moreover, with regard to the impact of a Deep FTA and Deep FTA+, it
might be relevant, that in the gems and jewellery industry, buyer confidence is directly
correlated to profit margins, as stones and jewellery containing mounted stones or
precious metals do not sell at full retail value if the consumer is not sure of their
authenticity, no matter how good the design. Certification of the quality of stones,
mounted and un-mounted, and of the purity of precious metals (platinum, gold, silver)
would improve buyer confidence and add value. Likewise, Armenian firms are likely to
secure more production contracts from high-end branded jewellery makers if
Armenian firms had certified professionals cutting and grading stones and making
jewellery. Certification bodies are probably most important for gem quality, and at the
very least Armenian industry should strive to attract an internationally recognized body
to undertake certification in Armenia prior to export, and to train more certifiers in
Armenia. However, first steps have already been done in this direction, e.g. Armenia
participates together with 46 other countries in the “Kimberly Process”, which is a
complex system that should stop trading of blood diamonds. 
In summary, it can be concluded that moving up the value chain requires that firms
in gems and jewellery have access to retail channels of distribution, as customer
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learning and profitability are both impacted by selling through wholesaler. Given the
closely-knit, cartel-like structure of international industry, particularly in the diamond
business, this will not be easy, but there are examples of successful entry strategies into
the jewellery retail business from other countries that could be examined for feasibility.
Diamond processors and jewellers who produce high quality products need to have
access to retail market outlets or boutique retailer. The high-end, well educated
consumer does buy unset stones when shopping for significant purchases, so diamond
processors should not neglect retail marketing as the stones themselves could
contribute significantly to the image of Armenian industry by bringing the brand to the
attention of the world’s most demanding consumers. However, the overall economic
effects of diamond processing and similar sectors will always be limited, since they
employ relatively few people compared to the value of their exports, while profits
accrue to a small number of people who may or may not invest in other productive
enterprises.
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1. The preceding chapters of this report have examined in some detail key aspects
of the Armenian economy and its regulatory environment and possibilities of its
integration with the EU. Below we summarize our major conclusions and policy
recommendations with regard to a range of scenarios, ranging from simple free
trade to very deep and comprehensive free trade between the EU and Armenia.
We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement (FTA) assuming the
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the bilateral trade between
Armenia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes full liberalization
of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and elimination of all
quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food products on Armenian exports
to the EU and vice versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario assumes full
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all products in the bilateral
trade between Armenia and the EU. Furthering the level of integration via a
Deep FTA would involve a significant elimination of barriers to trade and
investment throughout various sectors of the economy. This would also result in
a more extensive commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction
of EU standards in Armenia. Finally, the comprehensive set of reforms resulting
from the Deep FTA along with more wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on
competition and corruption could lead to a re-branding of Armenia as a
favourable investment location. This is our scenario Deep FTA+ where we
assume that Armenia would achieve a notable reduction in the perceived risk
premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Armenia as a
favorable and safe place to invest. 
2. The analysis of recent trends in the Armenian economy indicates that there is
substantial scope for redeployment of underutilised labour and diversification
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11. Conclusions
of the export structure. But it would be difficult to exploit this scope without a
series of flanking measures designed to strengthen the rule of law, reduce
corruption and reinforce the implementation of competition law, as laid out in
the ENP EU/Armenia Action Plan. For this reason, a Simple FTA could be
expected to have only a limited effect. It would take a Deep FTA+ to unlock the
potential for EU-Armenia trade to act as a locomotive for productivity
enhancement and the development of new sectors in Armenia. A Deep FTA+
would imply extensive commitments not simply to remove non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) affecting traded goods and services but to improve the broadly defined
domestic regulatory system. The potential gains for Armenia of an effectively
implemented Deep FTA+ with the EU include:
• Better market access to the EU if quality of exported products and their
compliance with the EU regulatory requirements were credibly upgraded
• More competition within Armenia
• Upgrading of domestic output
• A more attractive climate for FDI and domestic investment
Such gains are only realizable, however, if Armenia was able to effectively
implement deep integration.
3. According to our findings of the Sussex Framework based analysis, shallow
(simple) integration effects from the future EU-Armenia FTA (both trade creation
and trade diversion) are not likely to be large-scale due to low pre-FTA tariff
protection in both countries. Some shallow integration effects are expected for
goods of central interest to the EU industries, subject to a 10% pre-FTA tariff rate
(such as motor cars, machinery and electrical equipment). The analysis of the
parties’ trade patterns and export structures suggests that trade diversion is on
balance more likely than trade creation from a future EU-Armenia FTA, though it
is expected to be not very significant. Major welfare implications for Armenia could
arise from the deeper integration with the EU, but for those gains to be realized it
would be necessary for Armenia to reduce the existing barriers which affect
domestic business as well as trade (regulatory, institutional, infrastructural, and
political) and to introduce the regulatory and institutional framework aiming at
promoting trade and generating positive externalities and productivity gains.
Effective implementation of regulatory convergence with the EU acquis in the area
of trade and investment would increase the potential for grasping greater welfare
gains for Armenia under the Deep FTA+.
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4. The majority of Armenian firms consider the burden of EU technical regulations
and product standards as not important, with the exception of testing and
certification. This fact is underpinned with the structure of Armenian exports
dominated by minerals, precious stones, and raw materials which meet the product
standards and safety requirements almost by default. Moreover, many export
products are manufactured under some sort of the outward processing scheme,
when Armenian firms provide their production services and all the matters of
logistics and marketing are carried out by their European partner. Therefore the
Armenian counterparts are not even familiar with full costs involved in exporting to
the EU. The companies that fall short of satisfying European market requirement
and are unable to change their technology accordingly are excluded from the list of
exporters – and this is the absolute majority of Armenian companies.
5. Armenia has so far achieved a certain degree of regulatory harmonization with
the EU acquis in all the main trade-related areas, in particular as regards
approximation of the legislation. Nevertheless, incongruities still remain high,
especially in the areas of IPR, state procurement, and SPS. The most striking
differences with EU regulations in all spheres then lie in enforcement of the
adopted legislation and practices. Even in those areas, where regulatory
harmonization is relatively high, the achievements are mostly in the
harmonization of laws on the books rather than in their implementation.
Armenian regulatory system is, one hand, rather bureaucratic and, on the other
hand, ineffectual. Shady and corrupt practices further undermine the system of
enforcement. In the areas of standards and SPS, the impulse towards
harmonization depends not only on the Government efforts but on the private
sector as well. The cooperation between the EU and Armenia needs to focus on the
harmonization of implementing regulations and practices and upgrading of
institutional structures in Armenia, as is designed by the PCA and ENP AP. Once
this is achieved, a Deep FTA+ would be able to bring economic benefits to
Armenia.
6. In terms of the likely impact of an FTA on foreign direct investment flows we notice
that the role of foreign capital has gradually decreased along with the development
of the economy, although it still remains substantial. At the moment, foreign direct
investors into Armenia seem to be primarily market-driven and go to highly
protected service and food-producing sectors. Mineral resources (precious stones,
metal ores) also attract smaller part of the FDI. Investors are not yet willing to use
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the relatively cheap Armenian labour and outsource part of production there. This,
however, might be changed by implementing a Deep FTA+ A further precondition
for this would be to lower the costs of trading across borders, in particular by
achieving an opening of border crossing points with Turkey and Azerbaijan. A
Simple FTA would probably have a negligible impact on FDI. A Deep FTA+
eliminating all NTBs and approximating domestic laws and their implementation to
EU norms, would have a more positive impact. 
7. The estimates of potential foreign investment suggest that Deep FTA+ with
significant improvement of the business environment is likely to have a substantial
impact on FDI inflows into Armenia. If economic, institutional and political reforms
are entrenched and enhanced along with the implementation of the Deep FTA+, the
country could enjoy a sizeable increase in FDI inflows. Some simulations suggest
that the FDI stock in Armenia could increase up to five-fold until 2020, but this has
to be considered a rather optimistic figure, since it assumes that Armenia succeeds
in its transition reforms to the extent of approaching the current level proxied by the
case of Bulgaria, which, it must be acknowledged, has been boosted by the
incentives of EU accession which are not available for Armenia.
8. Analyzing the possible impact of FTA on services sectors, we note that a Simple FTA
could have only a very marginal impact on the services sector. Deep FTA+ could
have a very substantial impact, and could transform some sub-sectors. An effective
Deep FTA+ would need to embrace significant areas of domestic rules including
competition law in particular as it affects trade and would also require far-reaching
flanking measures. Many of these flanking measures such as strengthening the rule
of law, improving the general business climate, combating corruption and
reinforcing the authority of the competition policy are listed under the priorities of
the EU/Armenia Action Plan. A Deep FTA+ could therefore be seen as essentially
complementary to continued implementation of the ENP Action Plan.
9. We also studied the impact on sensitive sectors such as agro-food, mining and
processing of precious stones. For none of those sectors it could be expected that a
Simple FTA would have a large impact. With regard to the agro-food, Armenia is not
in compliance with so many regulations (including SPS measures and the protection
of intellectual property rights but also general competition policy and business
environment) that an effective Deep FTA+ could have a lot of scope to improve trade
and investment into the agri-food sector. With regard to the mining sector, the
impact of a Deep FTA would be negligible, since typical measures of a Deep FTA like
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e.g. standardization are not relevant for that sector. However, with regard to the
processing of precious stones, a Deep FTA+ might stimulate FDI, if it is related to
increased confidence of investors to bring their capital to Armenia.
10. However, a major problem in the implementation of an FTA is the lack of the
level playing field and perceived monopolies in import sectors. A Simple FTA would
do nothing to change the patterns of interaction between small domestic companies,
foreign capital and the domestic political economy. Only a Deep FTA+ containing
effective provisions equivalent to articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty regarding anti-
competitive practices that affect trade between the partners could create the level
playing field. As long as there is no level playing field in the majority of sectors even
a Deep FTA would not lead to increased competition and the domestic consumers
would not benefit. It remains to be seen to what extent a Deep FTA+ could provide
a strong enough incentive to truly liberalise the markets, implement the EU
regulations in practise and open the market to foreign companies in all sectors. 
11. Another significant obstacle to realisation of gains from a Deep FTA and Deep
FTA+ is due to high transport and transit costs. The closed borders with Azerbaijan,
but especially Turkey, and poor infrastructure hamper Armenia’s competitiveness
and its attractiveness to foreign investors. In this respect a good cooperation with
Georgia is of particular importance to Armenia. If the EU was to sign free trade
agreements with both Armenia and Georgia, the incentives to cooperation would be
much stronger as the stakes would be higher. 
12. We study a range of scenarios ranging from the liberalization in the EU-Armenia
bilateral trade that took place in 2006 (baseline scenario) to a Deep FTA+ using a
CGE model. We find that the welfare gains for Armenia from tariff liberalisation on
its and the EU side respectively that took place in 2006 (in particular Armenia's
unilateral lowering of import tariffs and EU's granting Armenia tariff preferences
under the general arrangement of its new GSP) are likely to be small (less than 0.4%
of GDP). Also the additional impact of a possible future EU-Armenia Simple FTA or
Simple FTA BIS is likely to be negligible. A Deep FTA would involve a more
complete elimination of barriers to trade and investment implying reductions in, or
elimination of regulatory and behind-the-border impediments to trade, which may
relate to customs procedures, product standards and certifications procedures and
market access for foreign providers of services. The potential additional welfare
gains are estimated to amount to about 3.38% of GDP. If comprehensive reforms
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brought about by deeper integration along with additional flanking measures related
to competition policy and corruption led to a re-branding of Armenia as a favourable
investment location, a reduction of the risk premium on investment could work as
an additional mechanism for boosting both investment and GDP growth (Deep
FTA+). If this was to occur, from our model simulations, we envisage the possibility
of additional economic gains from a Deep FTA+ reaching as much as 7.95% of GDP. 
13. Overall, we conclude that a free trade agreement between Armenia and the EU is
feasible, but a Simple FTA would not bring significant economic benefits to Armenia.
The real gains could materialize over the medium to long term with a completion of
a Deep FTA+. Given the slow progress with the implementation of the ENP Action
Plan, serious questions remain as to the institutional capacity of Armenia to
undertake steps towards harmonization with EU aquis beyond those indicated in the
ENP Action Plan. However, these problems might be eased with technical
assistance. A Deep FTA+ would almost certainly need to go beyond the
implementation of the ENP Action Plan and would require not only domestic
regulatory harmonisation obligations but also a number of flanking measures such
as strengthening the rule of law, improving the general business climate, combating
corruption and reinforcing the internal authority of the competition policy regime.
Creating a level playing field and market economy conditions are prerequisites to the
realization of the benefits that might stem from deeper integration with the EU.
While Armenia has made some progress towards meeting many of the legislative
requirements of a Deep FTA, it is clear that implementation of statutory laws and
obligations remains a problem and therefore the impact of a Deep FTA and Deep
FTA+ on the Armenian economy would to a large extent depend not only on the
content but on the actual implementation of the provisions of the free trade
agreement and the general business environment.
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Appendix 1
Sussex Framework 
– Additional Tables
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 1. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
710239 Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or set 
(excl. industrial diamonds) 21.76% 53.40 24.07% 65.80 
720270 Ferromolybdenum 1.12% 177.91 16.02% 502.08 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 3.11% 28.23 7.39% 28.71 
220820 Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine 8.88% 177.13 7.30% 232.69 
740200 Unrefined copper; copper anodes 0.43% 13.22 7.24% 127.03 
710813 Gold, incl. gold plated with platinum, other 
semi manufactured forms 0.00% 0.00 3.72% 25.16 
711319 Articles of jewellery and parts thereof, of 
precious metal other than silver 2.19% 6.94 3.44% 12.77 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"     2.30% 317.61 2.45% 468.46 
271600 Electrical energy 0.75% 4.96 1.77% 6.30 
621210 Brassieres of all types of textile materials  0.00% 0.00 1.75% 26.60 
252329 Portland cement 0.85% 14.64 1.71% 37.43 
261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 0.00% 0.00 1.63% 62.07 
710231 Non-industrial diamonds unworked or 
simply sawn 0.01% 0.04 1.23% 3.51 
911180 Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches 
and other watches of materials other than 
precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.67% 1338.65 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.08% 32.19 0.58% 144.27 
 Total 41.48%  80.97%  
 Average  55.08  205.44 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 2. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 2006, HS 6 digit 
 
HS code 
 
Description 
% share in 
total 
exports  
RCA % share 
in total 
exports  
RCA 
  1997 2006 
911180 Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches and 
other watches of materials other than 
precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.67% 1338.65 
911110 Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches and 
other watches of precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.56% 508.30 
720270 Ferromolybdenum 1.12% 177.91 16.02% 502.08 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"      2.30% 317.61 2.45% 468.46 
284450 Spent (irradiated) fuel elements 0.00% 0.00 0.002% 245.03 
220820 Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine  8.88% 177.13 7.30% 232.69 
911430 Dials for clocks or watches 0.00% 0.00 0.31% 229.32 
030629 Crustaceans, fit for human consumption 0.01% 2.28 0.39% 197.33 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.08% 32.19 0.58% 144.27 
740200 Unrefined copper; copper anodes 0.43% 13.22 7.24% 127.03 
730590 Tubes and pipes having circular cross-
sections 0.03% 11.46 0.11% 105.07 
710239 Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or set 
(excl. industrial diamonds) 21.76% 53.40 24.07% 65.80 
570190 Carpets and other textile floor coverings, of 
textile materials 0.00% 0.00 0.09% 63.17 
261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 0.00% 0.00 1.63% 62.07 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.03% 16.30 0.32% 57.33 
 Total 34.63%  61.7%  
 Average  53.43  289.77 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix1 Table 3. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 1997, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share 
in total 
exports  
RCA % share in 
total 
exports  
RCA 
  1997 2006 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or set 
(excl. industrial diamonds) 21.76% 53.40 24.07% 65.80 
220820 Spirits from distilled grape wine 8.88% 177.13 7.30% 232.69 
740400 Waste and scrap, copper  6.33% 76.02 0.55% 3.84 
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or steel  5.80% 67.12 0.0% 0.00 
760200 Waste and scrap, aluminium 5.76% 93.48 0.49% 5.35 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 3.11% 28.23 7.39% 28.71 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"      2.30% 317.61 2.45% 468.46 
711319 
Articles of jewellery and parts thereof, of 
precious metal other than silver 2.19% 6.94 3.44% 12.77 
854459 Electric conductors, for a voltage  1.42% 14.82 0.01% 0.08 
620213 Woman's or girls' overcoats 1.39% 79.30 0.01% 0.72 
900590 Parts and accessories 1.21% 376.70 0.0% 0.00 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 1.12% 177.91 16.02% 502.08 
940600 Prefabricated buildings 1.11% 19.17 0.001% 0.01 
850421 Liquid dielectric transformers  1.08% 86.64 0.01% 0.79 
720421 Waste and scrap, stainless steel 0.98% 32.97 0.14% 1.83 
 Total 64.44%  61.87%  
 Average  107.16  88.21 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 4. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 1997, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share 
in total 
exports  
RCA % share 
in total 
exports  
RCA 
  1997 2006 
710229 Diamonds industrial nes 0.86% 653.8 0.00% 0.00 
400241 Latex of chloroprene 0.32% 533.0 0.00% 0.00 
900590 Parts and accessories  1.21% 376.7 0.00% 0.00 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"      2.30% 317.6 2.45%     468.46  
720450 Remelting scrap ingots, of iron 0.11% 251.1 0.00% 0.00 
846820 Gas-operated machinery for welding  0.51% 185.0 0.05%      30.87  
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 1.12% 177.9 16.02%     502.08  
220820 Spirits from distilled grape wine 8.88% 177.1 7.30%     232.69  
430400 Artificial fur and articles thereof 0.17% 146.7 0.0003%        0.39  
400239 Halo-isobutene-isoprene rubber 0.59% 123.3 0.00% 0.00 
620322 Men's or boys' ensembles of cotton 0.50% 97.6 0.0003%        0.13  
720430 Waste and scrap, of tinned iron 0.23% 96.8 0.00% 0.00 
760200 Waste and scrap, aluminium 5.76% 93.5 0.49%        5.35  
850421 Liquid dielectric transformers  1.08% 86.6 0.01%        0.79  
720429 Waste and scrap, of alloy steel 0.88% 81.0 0.001%        0.03  
Total  24.52%  26.32%  
Average   226.5       82.72 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 5. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 2006, non-agricultural exports, HS
6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in non-
agri 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or set 
(excl. industrial diamonds) 24.48% 54.49 27.39% 69.96 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 1.26% 181.53 18.24% 533.82 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 3.50% 28.80 8.41% 30.53 
740200 Copper unrefined, copper anodes for 0.48% 13.48 8.25% 135.06 
710813 Gold in oth semi-manufactured forms 0.00% 0.00 4.24% 26.75 
711319 
Articles of jewellery and parts thereof, of 
precious metal other than silver 2.47% 7.08 3.92% 13.58 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"   2.59% 324.08 2.79% 498.08 
271600 Electrical energy 0.85% 5.06 2.01% 6.69 
621210 Brassieres of all types of textile materials 0.00% 0.00 2.00% 28.28 
252329 Portland cement (excl. white) 0.96% 14.94 1.95% 39.79 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 0.00% 0.00 1.85% 65.99 
710231 
Non-industrial diamonds unworked or 
simply sawn 0.01% 0.04 0.99% 3.74 
911180 
Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches 
and other watches of materials other than 
precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.77% 1423.27 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.09% 32.85 0.66% 153.39 
701090 Carboys/bottles/flasks etc  0.13% 1.94 0.64% 11.29 
  36.82%  84.10%  
Average   44.29  202.68 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 6. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 2006, non-agricultural exports, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
911180 Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches 
and other watches of materials other than 
precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.77% 1423.27 
911110 Cases for wrist-watches, pocket-watches 
and other watches of precious metal 0.00% 0.00 0.63% 540.43 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 1.26% 181.53 18.24% 533.82 
400249 Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, CR"    2.59% 324.08 2.79% 498.08 
284450 Spent (irradiated) fuel elements 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 260.52 
911430 Clock or watch dials 0.00% 0.00 0.36% 243.82 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.09% 32.85 0.66% 153.39 
740200 Copper unrefined, copper anodes 0.48% 13.48 8.25% 135.06 
730590 Tubes & pipe, i or s, riveted 0.03% 11.69 0.12% 111.71 
710239 Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or set 
(excl. industrial diamonds) 24.48% 54.49 27.39% 69.96 
570190 Carpets and other textile floor  0.00% 0.00 0.11% 67.16 
261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 0.00% 0.00 1.85% 65.99 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.04% 16.64 0.37% 60.96 
252329 Portland cement (excl. white) 0.96% 14.94 1.95% 39.79 
580211 Unbleached terry towelling 0.00% 0.00 0.01% 36.26 
  29.93%  63.49%  
Average   43.31  282.68 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 7. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
720270 Ferromolybdenum 3.57% 714.44 31.50% 740.67 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 72.18% 259.79 21.77% 123.81 
740200 Unrefined copper; copper anodes 0.00% 0.00 15.15% 317.74 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 0.00% 0.00 7.97% 401.37 
621210 
Brassieres of all types of textile 
materials 0.00% 0.00 3.67% 86.10 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and concentrates 
(excl. roasted) 0.00% 0.00 2.84% 667.08 
400249 
Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                                             0.05% 11.32 2.64% 1080.40 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.27% 50.96 1.21% 287.49 
710231 
Non-industrial diamonds unworked or 
simply sawn 0.04% 0.09 1.12% 2.9 
740400 Copper waste and scrap. 2.01% 25.48 0.70% 4.1 
030629 Crustaceans, fit for human consumption 0.01% 2.49 0.69% 168.05 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.11% 34.23 0.67% 86.45 
610822 Of manmade fibres 0.00% 0.00 0.61% 34.6 
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or steel  5.18% 47.69 0.48% 2.9 
621290 Corsets, braces, garters, suspenders 0.00% 0.00 0.40% 57.05 
 Total 83.42%  91.42%  
 Average  76.43  270.72 
202
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 8. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 2006, HS 6 digit 
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
400249 
Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                                              0.05% 11.32 2.64% 1080.40 
720270 Ferromolybdenum 3.57% 714.44 31.50% 740.67 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and concentrates 
(excl. roasted) 0 0.00 2.84% 667.08 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates. 0.00% 0.00 7.97% 401.37 
740200 Unrefined copper; copper anodes for  0.00% 0.00 15.15% 317.74 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.27% 50.96 1.21% 287.49 
030629 Crustaceans, fit for human consumption 0.01% 2.49 0.69% 168.05 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 72.18% 259.79 21.77% 123.81 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.11% 34.23 0.67% 86.45 
621210 
Brassieres of all types of textile 
materials 0.00% 0.00 3.67% 86.10 
570190 Of other textile materials 0.00% 0.00 0.05% 83.20 
551339 Other woven fabrics 0.00% 0.00 0.01% 81.96 
551332 Coloured 3 or 4-thread twill, <85% 0.00% 0.00 0.003% 64.11 
621290 Corsets, braces, garters, suspenders 0.00% 0.00 0.40% 57.05 
720280 Ferrotungsten and ferrosilicotungsten 0.00% 0.00 0.03% 47.76 
 Total 76.19%  88.60%  
 Average  71.55  286.22 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 9. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 1997, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share in 
total 
exports  
RCA % share in 
total exports 
 
  1997 2006 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 72.18% 259.79 21.77% 123.81 
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or steel  5.18% 47.69 0.48% 2.87 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 3.57% 714.44 31.50% 740.67 
711210 Waste&scrap of gold,incl mtl clad  2.85% 498.68 0.00% 0.00 
740400 Waste and scrap, copper 2.01% 25.48 0.70% 4.11 
720421 Waste and scrap, stainless steel 1.78% 50.69 0.29% 2.48 
200970 Apple juice, unfermented 1.68% 55.94 0.00% 0.00 
720441 Ferrous waste and scrap 1.20% 56.35 0.00% 0.00 
710229 Diamonds industrial nes 1.14% 2753.70 0.00% 0.00 
720429 Waste and scrap, of alloy steel 1.09% 121.64 0.00% 0.00 
220820 Spirits from distilled grape wine 0.64% 7.12 0.34% 5.76 
710811 Gold powder non-monetary 0.54% 3405.51 0.00% 0.00 
252310 Cement clinkers 0.45% 31.98 0.00% 0.00 
720450 Remelting scrap ingots 0.36% 560.52 0.00% 0.00 
410110 Whole hides and skins of bovine animals 0.34% 26.14 0.00% 0.00 
 Total 95.10%  55.09%  
 Average  574.4  58.64 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 10. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 1996, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share in 
total 
exports  
RCA % share in 
total 
exports  
RCA 
  1997 2006 
710811 Gold powder non-monetary 0.54% 3405.51 0.00% 0.00 
710229 Diamonds industrial nes 1.14% 2753.70 0.00% 0.00 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 3.57% 714.44 31.50% 740.67 
720450 Remelting scrap ingots 0.36% 560.52 0.00% 0.00 
711210 Waste&scrap of gold,incl mtl clad  2.85% 498.68 0.00% 0.00 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 72.18% 259.79 21.77% 123.81 
570210 
Kelem, Schumacks, Karamanie and 
other 0.16% 148.53 0.00% 0.00 
720429 Waste and scrap, of alloy steel 1.09% 121.64 0.00% 0.00 
253040 Natural micaceous iron oxides 0.04% 79.25 0.00% 0.00 
711029 Palladium in other semi-manufacture 0.24% 67.91 0.00% 0.00 
846810 Torches, hand-held, for soldering,  0.07% 59.04 0.00% 0.00 
720441 Ferrous waste and scrap,i or s,from 1.20% 56.35 0.00% 0.00 
200970 Apple juice, unfermented 1.68% 55.94 0.00% 0.00 
810810 Titanium unwrought; waste and scrap 0.22% 52.46 0.00% 0.00 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.27% 50.96 1.21% 287.49 
 Total 85.62%  54.49%  
 Average  592.31  76.80 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 11. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 2006, non-
agricultural exports, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
non-agri 
ARM-EU 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
ARM-EU 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 3.66% 658.91 31.89% 689.86 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 74.05% 239.59 22.04% 115.32 
740200 Copper unrefined, copper anodes 0.00% 0.00 15.33% 295.94 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 0.00% 0.00 8.07% 373.84 
621210 
Brassieres of all types of textile 
materials 0.00% 0.00 3.71% 80.20 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and concentrates 
(excl. roasted) 0.00% 0.00 2.87% 621.32 
400249 
Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                                             0.05% 10.44 2.68% 1006.29 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.28% 46.99 1.23% 267.77 
710231 
Non-industrial diamonds unworked or 
simply sawn  0.04% 0.08 1.13% 2.73 
740400 Waste and scrap, copper or copper 2.06% 23.50 0.71% 3.83 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.11% 31.57 0.68% 80.52 
610822 Women's or girls' briefs, etc 0.00% 0.00 0.62% 32.23 
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or st  5.32% 43.99 0.49% 2.67 
621290 Corsets, braces, garters, suspenders 0.00% 0.00 0.41% 53.14 
852990 Parts suitable for use  0.002% 0.00 0.30% 0.69 
Total  85.57%  92.14%  
Average   70.34  241.76 
204
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1997 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 12. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 2006, non-agricultural
exports, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
non-agri 
ARM -EU 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
ARM -EU 
exports 
RCA 
  1997 2006 
400249 
Chloroprene "chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                                                0.05% 10.44 2.68% 1006.29 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 3.66% 658.91 31.89% 689.86 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 0.00% 0.00 2.87% 621.32 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 0.00% 0.00 8.07% 373.84 
740200 Copper unrefined, copper anodes 0.00% 0.00 15.33% 295.94 
810299 Molybdenum and articles thereof nes 0.28% 46.99 1.23% 267.77 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but not mounted or 
set (excl. industrial diamonds) 74.05% 239.59 22.04% 115.32 
720291 Ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium 0.11% 31.57 0.68% 80.52 
621210 Brassieres of all types of textile materials 0.00% 0.00 3.71% 80.20 
570190 Carpets and other textile floor cov 0.00% 0.00 0.05% 77.50 
551339 Coloured woven fabrics, <85% synthetic  0.00% 0.00 0.01% 76.33 
551332 Coloured 3 or 4-thread twill, <85%  0.00% 0.00 0.003% 59.71 
621290 Corsets, braces, garters, suspenders 0.00% 0.00 0.41% 53.14 
720280 Ferro-tungsten and ferro-silico-tun 0.00% 0.00 0.03% 44.49 
551644 
Printed woven fabrics, <85% artificial 
staple fibres by weight 0.00% 0.00 0.003% 42.64 
Total  78.15%  88.99%  
Average   65.83  258.99 
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Appendix 1 Table 13. Top 15 export sectors of the EU27, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
HS 
code 
Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, (excl. 
crude) 
3.45% 0.92 070521 Witloof chicory, fresh or 
chilled 
0.00% 2.47 
300490 Other medicaments of mixed 
or unmixed 
3.25% 1.86 040640 Blue-veined cheese 0.01% 2.47 
870323 Motor cars principally 
designed for the transport of 
persons with spark-ignition 
internal combustion 
reciprocating piston engine 
of a cylinder capacity > 
1.500 cm³ but <= 3.000 cm³  
2.23% 1.19 310490 Mineral or chemical 
fertilizers 
0.03% 2.46 
852520 Transmission apparatus 2.11% 1.21 120911 Sugar beet seed 0.01% 2.45 
870332 Motor cars principally 
designed for the transport of 
persons with compression-
ignition internal combustion 
piston engine "diesel or 
semi-diesel" of a cylinder 
capacity > 1.500 cm³ but <= 
2.500 cm³  
1.92% 2.11 020731 Fresh or chilled fatty 
livers  
0.00% 2.45 
847330 Parts and accessories of 
automatic data processing 
machines or for other 
machines of heading 8471, 
n.e.s. 
1.13% 0.59 290260 Ethyl benzene 0.00% 2.43 
870899 Motor vehicle parts nes 1.10% 1.24 253020 Kieserite and epsomite 
"natural magnesium 
sulphates" 
0.00% 2.42 
870324 Motor cars principally 
designed for the transport of 
persons with spark-ignition 
internal combustion 
reciprocating piston engine 
of a cylinder capacity > 
3.000 cm³ 
1.01% 0.86 151000 Other oils and their 
fractions 
0.01% 2.41 
880240 Aircraft nes of an unladen 
weight 
0.91% 1.14 220510 Vermouth and other wine 
of fresh grape 
0.01% 2.40 
854211 Monolithic integrated 
circuits 
0.79% 0.42 550490 Artificial staple fibres 0.02% 2.40 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude 
0.72% 0.15 220850 Gin and Geneva 0.01% 2.39 
870322 Motor cars principally 
designed for the transport of 
persons with spark-ignition 
internal combustion 
reciprocating piston engine 
of a cylinder capacity > 
1.000 cm³ but <= 1.500 cm³ 
0.68% 1.45 870331 Motor cars principally 
designed for the transport 
of persons with 
compression-ignition 
internal combustion 
piston engine "diesel or 
semi-diesel" of a cylinder 
capacity <= 1.500 cm³ 
0.41% 2.38 
852810 Television receivers 0.63% 0.90 250870 Chamotte or dinas earths 0.00% 2.38 
271121 Natural gas in gaseous state 0.63% 0.56 530121 Flax, broken or scotched 0.01% 2.37 
847191 Digital process units 0.57% 1.31 292141 Aniline and its salts 0.02% 2.37 
 Total 21.13%    0.54%  
 Average  1.06    2.42 
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Appendix1 Table 14. RCA correlation coefficients, HS 6 digit, export, 2006
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Georgia 0.052 1      
Azerbaijan -0.004 0.094 1     
Ukraine 0.016 0.031 0.001 1    
Russia -0.005 0.044 0.014 0.061 1   
Iran -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 1  
Turkey -0.007 0.195 0.069 -0.019 -0.043 0.018 1 
EU27 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 -0.131 -0.091 0.009 -0.059 
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Sussex Framework 
– Additional Tables
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/armenia_e.htm). 
Appendix 2 Table 1. Armenia’s tariffs by product group under the WTO commitments
 
Product groups  Final bound duties  MFN applied duties  
 Simple 
average 
Duty free 
in %  
Max Binding in 
% 
AVG Duty free in %  Max 
Animal products  14.9 0 15 100 7.5 24.7 10 
Dairy products 15.0 0 15 100 10.0 0 10 
Fruit, vegetables, 
plants 
15.0 0 15 100 9.1 9.0 10 
Coffee, tea 14.2 0 15 100 9.6 4.2 10 
Cereals& 
preparations 
15.0 0 15 100 5.3 46.8 10 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 13.6 9.2 15 100 5.6 44.2 10 
Sugar and 
confectionery 
14.7 0 15 100 8.8 12.5 10 
Beverages & 
tobacco  
15.0 0 15 100 26.0 13.0 >1000 
Cotton 15.0 0 15 100 0.0 100.0 0 
Other agricultural 
products 
14.6 0.7 15 100 3.2 67.6 10 
Fish & fish products 15.0 0 15 100 9.5 5.3 10 
Mineral & metals 7.0 46.9 15 100 1.5 84.8 10 
Petroleum 5.0 0 5 100 0.0 100.0 0 
Chemicals 0.3 96.7 10 100 0.2 97.6 10 
Wood, paper, etc. 3.4 75.7 15 100 1.4 86.4 10 
Textiles 9.1 4.2 15 100 1.6 83.6 10 
Clothing 15.0 0 15 100 10.0 0 10 
Leather, footwear, 
etc. 
14.0 5.9 15 100 3.1 69.1 10 
Non-electrical 
machinery 
9.3 30.3 15 100 0.3 96.7 10 
Electrical 
machinery  
9.9 33.2 15 100 3.6 64.0 10 
Transport 
equipment 
9.6 9.8 15 100 3.1 68.7 10 
Manufactures, nes 10.6 28.6 15 100 4.2 58.0 10 
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Appendix 2 Table 2. Top 10 Armenia’s imports and exports sectors by major trade partners
Armenia top imports Armenia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
Georgia 
17 - Sugars and sugar confectionery 34.1% 25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; 
plastering materials; lime and cement 34.4% 
31 - Fertilizers 27.4% 9 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 16.7% 
44 - Wood and articles of wood 15.0% 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 15.4% 
22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 4.7% 39 - Plastics and articles thereof 4.7% 
8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or 
melons and watermelons 
3.6% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 4.2% 
28 - Inorganic chemicals 3.4% 70 - Glass and glassware 3.8% 
23 - Residues and waste from the food 
industries; prepared animal fodder 
2.1% 16 - Preparations of meat, of fish or of 
crustaceans 2.4% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 1.9% 2 - Meat and edible meat offal 1.9% 
12 - Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; 
miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit 
1.4% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
1.4% 
70 - Glass and glassware 1.0% 30 - Pharmaceutical products 1.4% 
Turkey 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 15.3% 24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 32.8% 
72 - Iron and steel 9.9% 72 - Iron and steel 29.5% 
44 - Wood and articles of wood 7.3% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 17.3% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 6.5% 62 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 12.6% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
5.8% 82 - Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and 
forks, of base metals 4.3% 
76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 5.7% 55 - Man-made staple fibres 2.8% 
48 - Paper and paperboard; articles of paper 
pulp, of paper or of paperboard 
5.1% 29 - Organic chemicals 
0.8% 
34 - Soap, organic surface- active agents, 
washing preparations 
5.0% 48 - Paper and paperboard 
0.0% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 3.3%   
62 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
3.1%  
 
Russia 
10 - Cereals 16.3% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 52.2% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
15.3% 71 - Precious metals 
9.0% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
8.6% 40 - Rubber and articles thereof 
6.7% 
71 - Precious metals 8.0% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 4.5% 
76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 6.6% 20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or 
other parts of plants 4.1% 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes 
5.3% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
2.9% 
24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
4.2% 70 - Glass and glassware 
2.7% 
40 - Rubber and articles thereof 4.1% 90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus 2.6% 
18 - Cocoa and cocoa preparations 3.2% 91 - Clocks and watches and parts thereof 1.9% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 3.1% 9 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 1.6% 
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Appendix 2 Table 2 cd. Top 10 Armenia’s imports and exports sectors by major trade partners
Armenia top imports Armenia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
Iran 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
31.2% 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 35.0% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 7.4% 25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; 
plastering materials; lime and cement 21.9% 
72 - Iron and steel 7.2% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 16.2% 
39  - Plastics and articles thereof 6.9% 15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and 
their cleavage products 6.2% 
15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products 
5.5% 73 - Articles of iron or steel 
4.2% 
70 - Glass and glassware 4.4% 72 - Iron and steel 3.6% 
8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or 
melons and watermelons 
4.4% 26 - Ores, slag and ash 
2.5% 
26 - Ores, slag and ash 4.1% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 2.0% 
34 - Soap, organic surface- active agents, 
washing preparations 
3.0% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 1.7% 
28 - Inorganic chemicals 2.9% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 1.2% 
Ukraine 
72 - Iron and steel 23.6% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 33.2% 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
19.6% 72 - Iron and steel 
32.4% 
24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
11.2% 20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or 
other parts of plants 11.8% 
15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products 
4.7% 26 - Ores, slag and ash 
7.9% 
22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 4.1% 40 - Rubber and articles thereof 2.9% 
11 - Products of the milling industry; malt; 
starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
3.2% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 1.7% 
4 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 3.1% 3 - Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates 1.6% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 3.0% 70 - Glass and glassware 1.6% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 2.7% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 0.9% 
26 - Ores, slag and ash 2.4% 68 - Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
concrete, asbestos, mica 0.6% 
The US 
71 - Precious metals 25.3% 71 - Precious metals 79.1% 
30 - Pharmaceutical products 21.7% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 3.9% 
90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus 
12.5% 40 - Rubber and articles thereof 
2.7% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
8.6% 20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 
2.4% 
63 - Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn 
clothing and worn textile articles; rags 
5.6% 57 - Carpets and other textile floor coverings 
2.2% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 4.9% 68 - Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
concrete, asbestos, mica or similar materials 1.7% 
2 - Meat and edible meat offal 2.7% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 1.3% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
2.6% 24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 1.2% 
97 - Works of art, collectors' pieces and 
antiques 
2.2% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 
0.8% 
49 - Printed books, newspapers, pictures 1.9% 4 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 0.7% 
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Appendix 2 Table 2 cd. Top 10 Armenia’s imports and exports sectors by major trade partners
Armenia top imports Armenia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
United Arab Emirates 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 19.2% 74 - Copper and articles thereof 38.9% 
94 - Furniture 12.5% 71 - Precious metals 30.1% 
32 - Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and 
their derivatives; textile dyes, pigments 
11.1% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 17.6% 
69 - Ceramic products 7.7% 72 - Iron and steel 2.5% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 7.3% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 2.4% 
71 - Precious metals 7.1% 40 - Rubber and articles thereof 1.9% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
4.5% 78 - Lead and articles thereof 
1.7% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 3.6% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 0.9% 
70 - Glass and glassware 2.3% 16 - Preparations of meat, of fish or of 
crustaceans, molluscs 0.5% 
64 - Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts of 
such articles 
2.0% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
0.4% 
Turkmenistan 
27- Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
99.6% 71 - Precious metals 
45.9% 
52 - Cotton 0.3% 24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 20.5% 
58 - Special woven fabrics; tufted textile 
fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery 
0.1% 30 - Pharmaceutical products 
13.7% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 0.0% 91 - Clocks and watches and parts thereof 7.7% 
56 - Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special 
yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables 
0.0% 20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or 
other parts of plants 7.1% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
0.0% 70 - Glass and glassware 
3.5% 
  84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 0.8% 
  61 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, knitted or crocheted 0.3% 
  21 - Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.2% 
  55 - Man-made staple fibres 0.2% 
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Appendix 3
Top 15 export sectors of Armenia’s
main partners: by export share and
RCA, 2006
Source: WITS
Appendix 3 Table 1. Top 15 export sectors of Georgia, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
720230 Ferrosilicomanganese 8.46% 525.36 720230 Ferrosilicomanganese 8.46% 525.36 
260300 Copper ores and 
concentrates 8.02% 31.16 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 
5.45% 520.25 
720449 Ferrous waste and 
scrap, iron or steel, 
other 5.53% 39.90 
284590 Other isotopes 
0.47% 418.52 
080222 Hazelnuts without 
shells 5.45% 520.25 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh 
or dried 0.23% 351.44 
710813 Gold in other semi-
manufactured forms 4.88% 32.95 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 
4.70% 342.01 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 4.70% 342.01 252321 White Portland cement 0.92% 263.93 
870323 Automobiles Of a 
cylinder capacity 
exceeding 1 4.23% 2.25 
091040 Thyme; bay leaves 
0.13% 245.33 
220421 Sparkling wine In 
containers holding 2 l 
or less 3.99% 26.70 
252390 Other hydraulic cements 
0.88% 214.65 
740400 
Copper waste and scrap 3.04% 21.20 
283711 Cyanides and cyanide 
oxides of sodium 0.38% 147.36 
220820 Spirits obtained by 
distilling grape wine 2.57% 81.93 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood 
0.94% 140.59 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from 
bituminous minerals, 
crude 2.57% 0.52 
880400 Parachutes 
0.18% 129.39 
220110 Mineral waters and 
aerated waters 2.42% 123.95 
220110 Mineral waters and 
aerated waters 2.42% 123.95 
220210 Waters, including 
mineral waters 2.32% 45.90 
880211 Helicopters Of an unladen 
weight  1.71% 116.06 
880230 Aeroplanes and other 
aircraft 1.90% 13.27 
731300 Barbed wire of iron or 
steel; twist 0.14% 106.30 
170199 Cane or beet sugar, in 
solid form 1.90% 20.91 
870490 Trucks nes 
0.32% 104.33 
 Total 61.98%    27.33%  
 Average  121.88    249.96 
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Appendix 3 Table 2. Top 15 export sectors of Russia, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from 
bituminous minerals, 
crude 
35.06% 7.1 251020 "Ground natural calcium 
phosphates, " 
0.06% 25.7 
271000 "Petroleum oils, etc, 
(excl. crude) 
16.04% 4.3 400231 Isobutene-isoprene (butyl) 
rubber 
0.11% 23.1 
271121 Natural gas in gaseous 
state 
15.53% 13.6 400260 Isoprene rubber 0.10% 21.6 
750210 "Nickel unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
1.98% 13.8 310540 Ammonium 
dihydrogenorthophosphate  
0.15% 19.9 
760110 "Aluminium 
unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
1.61% 7.7 252400 Asbestos 0.05% 16.9 
270112 "Bituminous coal, not 
agglomerated" 
1.42% 3.5 440320 Untreated coniferous wood 0.91% 16.6 
720712 "Semi-fin prod, iron or 
n-al steel" 
1.16% 10.4 750220 "Nickel unwrought, 
alloyed" 
0.16% 16.1 
440320 Untreated coniferous 
wood 
0.91% 16.6 283030 Cadmium sulphide 0.00% 15.9 
740811 Wire of refined copper 0.83% 5.6 310551 Mineral or chemical 
fertilizers con 
0.02% 15.8 
440710 Coniferous wood sawn 
or chipped  
0.81% 3.7 720249 "Ferro-chromium, nes" 0.08% 15.1 
760120 Aluminium unwrought, 
alloyed 
0.72% 3.6 470411 Unbleached coniferous 
chemical wood 
0.00% 14.9 
710231 Diamonds non-
industrial unworked 
0.62% 2.5 284130 Sodium dichromate 0.02% 14.5 
740311 Copper cathodes and 
sections of cat 
0.59% 1.5 722820 Bars and rods of silico-
manganese 
0.04% 14.0 
720449 "Ferrous waste and 
scrap, iron or steel" 
0.57% 4.1 750210 "Nickel unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
1.98% 13.8 
720824 "Flat rlld prod, i/nas, in 
coil, hr," 
0.53% 4.0 271121 Natural gas in gaseous 
state 
15.53% 13.6 
 Total 78.39%    19.22%  
 Average  6.8    17.2 
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Appendix 3 Table 3. Top 15 export sectors of Turkey, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
721420 
Bars&rods,i/nas,hr,
hd or he,cntg in 
7.11% 68.9 080222 Hazelnuts without 
shells 
2.05% 195.43 
610910 
T-shirts, singlets 
and other vests 
5.45% 31.9 081310 Dried apricots 0.42% 192.11 
852810 
Television 
receivers including 
vide 
3.70% 5.3 080420 Figs, fresh or dried 0.29% 141.80 
620462 
Women's or girls' 
trousers, breeches 
2.67% 18.3 520291 Garnetted stock of 
cotton 
0.04% 139.08 
711319 
Art. of jewellery 
and pts thereof o 
2.52% 9.3 091040 Thyme, bay leaves 0.06% 102.59 
080222 
Hazelnuts without 
shells 
2.05% 195.4 252910 Felspar 0.19% 101.66 
620342 
Men's or boys' 
trousers, breeches  
1.81% 13.2 121230 Apricot, peach or 
plum stones 
0.02% 90.13 
611020 
Jerseys, pullovers, 
etc, of cotton, 
1.81% 14.4 080620 Dried grapes 0.66% 89.08 
680291 
Worked 
monumental/buildi
ng stone nes 
1.40% 79.4 551110 Yarn, with >=85% 
synthetic staple 
0.10% 80.68 
611592 
Hosiery and 
footwear, of cotton 
1.34% 43.6 620891 Women's or girls' 
dressing gowns 
0.33% 80.06 
630260 
Toilet linen and 
kitchen linen, of  
1.29% 35.1 680291 Worked 
monumental/building 
stone nes 
1.40% 79.40 
610990 
T-shirts, singlets, 
etc, of other t 
1.17% 18.1 251511 Marble and travertine 
crude or rough 
0.37% 74.03 
240110 
Tobacco, not 
stemmed/stripped 
1.12% 64.1 120791 Poppy seeds 0.09% 71.67 
570330 
Tufted floor 
coverings of man-
made  
1.04% 44.6 630539 Sacks and bags, used 
for packing 
0.54% 69.78 
710812 
Gold in unwrought 
forms non-
monetary 
1.01% 3.4 721420 Bars&rods,i/nas,hr,hd 
or he,cntg in 
7.11% 68.89 
 Total 35.49%    13.68%  
 Average  43.0    105.1 
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Appendix3 Table 4. Top 15 export sectors of Ukraine, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports* 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
271000 "Petroleum oils, 
etc, (excl. crude);" 
4.39% 1.2 
392041 
Plates of polymers of 
vinyl chl 0.01% 281.0 
720712 "Semi-fin prod,iron 
or n-al steel,re" 
4.19% 37.3 
480522 
Multi-ply paper with 
only one ou 0.01% 277.8 
720711 "Semi-fin 
prod,i/nas,rect/sq 
cross-s" 
4.05% 65.8 
151211 
Crude sunflower-seed 
and safflower 
2.08% 139.7 
721420 "Bars&rods,i/nas,hr
,hd or he,cntg in" 
3.16% 30.6 
720450 
"Remelting scrap 
ingots, of iron or " 
0.11% 129.1 
720720 "Semi-fin prod, 
iron or non-alloy 
st" 
2.89% 71.3 
721020 
"Flat rlld prod, plated 
or coated wit" 
0.04% 128.6 
720842 "Flat rolled prod, 
i/nas, not in coi" 
2.80% 23.4 
250830 
Fire-clay 0.29% 117.4 
151211 Crude sunflower-
seed and safflower 
2.08% 139.7 
230630 
Oil-cake and other 
solid residues 
0.32% 117.3 
720824 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, in coil, hr," 
2.04% 15.5 
860610 
"Railway tank cars, 
not self-propell" 
0.73% 108.9 
310210 Urea 1.97% 46.3 
410410 
"Whole bovine skin 
leather" 
0.15% 92.1 
721331 "Bars/rods,i/nas,hr,i
n irreg wnd coi" 
1.92% 26.4 
860699 
Railway cars nes 0.35% 79.8 
100190 "Spelt, common 
wheat and meslin" 
1.57% 9.7 
720230 
Ferro-silico-
manganese 
1.25% 77.8 
730511 "Pipe,line,i or 
s,longitudinally 
sub" 
1.56% 32.4 
860630 
"Railway cars, self-
discharging, oth" 
0.32% 75.6 
100300 Barley 1.49% 47.1 
720720 
"Semi-fin prod, iron 
or non-alloy st" 
2.89% 71.3 
720843 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, not in coil," 
1.29% 34.2 
860692 
"Railway cars, open, 
with non-removal" 
0.25% 66.5 
720230 Ferro-silico-
manganese 
1.25% 77.8 
720711 
Semi-fin 
prod,i/nas,rect/sq 
cross-s 
4.05% 65.8 
  Total 36.64%    12.86%  
 Average  43.9    121.9 
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Source: WITS.
Appendix 3 Table 5. Top 15 export sectors of Iran, 2005, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share  by RCA 
270900 Petroleum oils and 
oils obtained from 
bituminous 
minerals, crude 
83.48% 16.9 091020 Saffron 0.16% 497.8 
080250 "Pistachio, fresh or 
dried" 
1.25% 207.4 720610 Ingots, iron or non-
alloy steel 
0.58% 441.7 
570110 Carpets and other 
textile floor cov 
0.80% 142.8 570292 Non-pile floor 
coverings of man-made 
0.17% 223.7 
720610 "Ingots, iron or 
non-alloy steel, of" 
0.58% 441.7 080250 "Pistachio, fresh or 
dried" 
1.25% 207.4 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, 
(excl. crude);" 
0.54% 0.1 293212 2-Furaldehyde 
(furfuraldehyde) 
0.06% 170.2 
720822 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, in coil, hr" 
0.50% 11.2 251120 Natural barium 
carbonate (whitherit 
0.00% 152.0 
271112 "Propane, 
liquefied" 
0.45% 6.8 570110 Carpets and other 
textile floor cov 
0.80% 142.8 
270750 Aromatic 
hydrocarbon 
mixtures which 
0.45% 10.2 280200 "Sulphur, sublimed or 
precipitated; " 
0.07% 83.8 
271111 "Natural gas, 
liquefied" 
0.44% 1.4 610799 "Men's or boys' 
dressing gowns, 
0.01% 68.6 
760110 "Aluminium 
unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
0.40% 1.9 080410 "Dates, fresh or dried" 0.12% 60.7 
081090 Other fruit, fresh, 
nes 
0.38% 18.4 010420 Live goats 0.04% 55.7 
290511 Methanol (methyl 
alcohol) 
0.33% 8.6 410512 "Sheep, lamb skin 
leather, non-veg. " 
0.11% 50.4 
271113 "Butanes, 
liquefied" 
0.33% 7.0 570299 Non-pile floor 
coverings of textile 
0.05% 46.6 
290220 Benzene 0.32% 6.9 570210 "Kelem, Schumacks, 
Karamanie and other" 
0.02% 28.9 
290243 p-Xylene 0.26% 3.8 080620 Dried grapes 0.20% 26.6 
 Total 90.52%    3.63%  
 Average  59.0    150.4 
The total available sample for Armenia comprises 61 firms: 48 firms exporting to
the EU and 13 firms exporting at least to CIS countries. The majority of the firms have
more than 50 employees, and 44 % have more than 100 employees (Appendix4 Figure
1). Only two firms are state-owned and further two have a mixed ownership, the rest is
private owned. Furthermore, 19 firms reported that there is foreign origin capital in the
capital founding of their company. Thereof nine firms have EU-origin capital.
The average export share of the firms surveyed is rather high with 58 %. The median
is even a little bit higher: 50 % of firms have export shares larger than 6 %.
Furthermore, 36 % of the firms have export shares larger than 80 % and yet 25 % of
the firms export their total production. The reported shares vary a little bit with firm
size: on average, larger firms tend to have larger export shares, especially firm with 51
to 100 employees (Appendix 4 Figure 2). Export shares also seem to vary with the
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Appendix 4
Description of the sample and
questionnaire
Source: Survey Results
Appendix 4 Figure 1. Distribution of firms by size
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origin of capital founding. The average export share of firms with foreign participation
is approximately 10 percentage points higher within the sample than that for
domestically owned firms (Appendix4 Figure 3). However, this finding is not
statistically significant. The null hypothesis that the population means are equal cannot
be rejected at the usual levels: the error probability is about 17 %.
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Source: Survey Results
Appendix 4 Figure 2. Distribution of export shares by firm size and share of exports
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Altogether, the 48 firms exporting to the EU reported 99 export relationships with
EU countries. Thereby relationships with “old” EU15 countries clearly have a majority
with 76 relationships, while only 26 relationships exist with the “new” EU12 countries.
Germany is the most frequent trading partner with 16 entries, followed by France with
15 entries and Belgium with 10 entries. The most important “new” EU12 countries with
six entries each are Latvia and Poland.
With regard to the distribution of export destinations within the EU, the sample
looks quite representative. This reveals a view at Appendix4 Figure 4, where the left
panel shows the destinations of all surveyed firms, while the right panel displays the
geographical distribution of Armenian exports in 2006 according to the official trade
statistics of ARMSTAT. Though the shape of the bars in both panels differ considerably,
the rank correlation coefficient (between the rank of a certain EU export destination in
the sample and the export volume according to ARMSTAT) is nevertheless 0.73. Thus,
it can be assumed that the sample is for the EU countries to a large extent
representative with regard to the geographical distribution of exports. The same
optimism is also adequate for the other countries. Here the rank correlation coefficient
amounts to 0.63.
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Source: Survey Results, Statistics 
Appendix 4 Figure 4. Export destinations of surveyed firms vs. geographical distribution of
Armenian exports in 2006
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Larger firms tend to have on average longer established trade relations to EU
countries. Nearly 50 % of the firms with more than 100 employees export to the EU for
more than five years. The shares for all groups of smaller firms are clearly lower, and
the group of firms with one to 25 employees is dominated by rather short trade
relations between one and three years. For the whole sample, the majority of the firms
run export businesses from three to five years.
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Source: Survey Results
Appendix 4 Figure 5. Duration of trade relations
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
For collection of data on EU exporting companies  
 
This research is being carried out for European Union and its goal is to evaluate the 
implications of a possible Free Trade Agreement between the European Uni on and Armenia. 
AVAG Solutions LTD conducts the interview at the request of European Union  
 
Questionnaire code _____________________________ 
 
Company name ________________________________ 
 
Date _____    ________   ________ 
           day        month          year 
 
 
 
WHAT IS YOUR POSITION? 
 
P1. Chief Manager/owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 
P2. Deputy Chief Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 
P3. Head of export department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
P4. Head of sale department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 
P5. Export manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..5 
P6. Sale manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..6 
P7. Other PLEASE SPECIFY _______________________________________________ .  .7 
 
Name of the interviewed person__________________________________________ 
 
Company address _____________________________________________________ 
 
Company Tel. number _________________________________________________ 
 
Interviewer ___________________________________________________________ 
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INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY 
 
1. What is the ownership of your company? Please, mark one:  
 
1.1 state-owned    
1.2 private  
1.3 mixed  
 
2. Is there foreign origin capital in the capital founding your company? 
 
2.1 Yes    
2.2 No (Go to Question 6)  
2.3 Do not know (Go to Question 6)  
 
3. What share of the capital founding your company is the foreign origin capital?  
 
3.1   Please write down _______________ %   
 
4.  Is there EU-origin capital in the capital founding your company?  
 
4.1 Yes    
4.2 No (Go to Question 6)  
4.3 Do not know (Go to Question 6)  
 
5.  What share of the capital founding your company comes from the EU? 
 
5.1   Please write down _______________ %   
 
6. Does your company possess any of the following certificates: 
 
 Yes  No 
 1  2 
6.1 ISO: 9000      
6.2 ISO: 14000                
 
7. How many employees are working full-time in your company? Please, mark one: 
 
7.1   1 – 9  
7.2   10 - 25   
7.3   26 - 50   
7.4  51 - 100    
7.5  101 and more   
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8.For how long has your company been operating?  
 
8.1   <1 year    
8.2   1-2 years  
8.3   3-5 years   
8.4  6-10 years    
8.5  11-15 years  
8.6  >15 years  
8.7  Do not know   
 
9. What was the turnover of your company in 2006?  
 
9.1   Please, enter in local currency _____   
 
INFORMATION ON EXPORT ACTIVITIES  
 
10. Choose those sectors of economy that your company is in. Please, mark maximum three 
sectors: 
 A   Agriculture, hunting and forestry   
10.1. 01   Agriculture, hunting and related service activities   
10.2. 02   Forestry, logging and related service activities   
 B   Fishing   
10.3. 05   Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental to fishing   
 C   Mining and quarrying   
10.4. 10   Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat   
10.5. 11   Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental 
to oil and gas extraction, excluding sur veying 
 
10.6. 12   Mining of uranium and thorium ores   
10.7. 13   Mining of metal ores   
10.8. 14   Other mining and quarrying   
 D   Manufacturing   
10.9. 15   Manufacture of food products and beverages   
10.10. 16   Manufacture of tobacco products   
10.11. 17   Manufacture of textiles   
10.12. 18   Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur   
10.13. 19   Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear  
 
10.14. 20   Manufacture of wood a nd of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials  
 
10.15. 21   Manufacture of paper and paper products   
10.16. 22   Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media   
10.17. 23   Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel   
10.18. 24   Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products   
10.19. 25   Manufacture of rubber and plastics products   
10.20. 26  metallic mineral products   
10.21. 27   Manufacture of basic metals   
10.22. 28   Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
 
10.23. 29   Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.   
10.24. 30   Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery   
10.25. 31   Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.   
10.26. 32   Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
 
10.27. 33   Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
 
10.28. 34   Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers   
10.29. 35   Manufacture of other transport equipment   
10.30. 36   Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   
10.31. 37   Recycling  
 E   Electricity, gas and water supply   
10.32. 40   Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply   
10.33. 41   Collection, purification and distribution of water   
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Section C. INFORMATION ON EXPORT CAPACITY AND CONDITIONS OF THE 
COMPANY 
 
11 Please, specify your status:  
 
11.1 current exporter to the EU   
11.2 exported to the EU last year but do not export now   
 
12. For how many years have you been exporting your g oods to the EU?  
 
12.1 1-3 years  
12.2 4-5 years  
12.3 more than 5 years   
 
13. Please, specify what percentage of your total sales you exported during last year  
 
13.1 Please write down _______________ %   
 
14. What percentage of your total export volume do you send to EU  
 
14.1 Please write down _______________ %   
 
15. What percentage of your total export volume do you send to CIS countries (in total)  
 
15.1 Please write down _______________ %   
 
16. What percentage of your total export volume do yo u send to each CIS country  
 
Indicate Country below  Country Code 
(from table 17)  
 % of total 
export 
16.1 Georgia  17.28   
16.2 Russia 17.30   
16.3 Ukraine  17.29   
16.4 Belarus     
16.5 Kazakhstan     
16.6 Moldova    
16.7 
Other(indicate)________________
_ 
   
16.8 
Other(indicate)________________
_ 
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17. Please check the specific countries where you export (exported, plan to export):  
       
 EU countries  
17.1.  Austria  
17.2.  Belgium  
17.3.  Bulgaria  
17.4.  Cyprus  
17.5.  Czech Republic  
17.6.  Denmark   
17.7.  Estonia  
17.8.  Finland  
17.9.  France  
17.10.  Germany  
17.11.  Greece  
17.12.  Hungary  
17.13.  Ireland  
17.14.  Italy  
17.15.  Latvia  
17.16.  Lithuania  
17.17.  Luxembourg  
17.18.  Malta  
17.19.  Netherlands  
17.20.  Poland  
17.21.  Portugal  
17.22.  Romania  
17.23.  Slovakia  
17.24.  Slovenia  
17.25.  Spain  
17.26.  Sweden   
17.27.  United Kingdom  
   
 Non-EU countries  
17.28.  Georgia (for the survey in Armenia)  
17.29.  Ukraine  
17.30.  Russia  
17.31.  Other CIS  
17.32.  Turkey  
17.33.  Iran  
17.34.  UAE  
17.35.  USA and Canada  
17.36.  Other (specify) ____________   
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18. Which group of products do you export (exported, plan to export) to the EU market:  
 
   1 2 3 4 
 A   Agriculture, hunting and forestry  EU Ukraine Geo-gia Other 
CIS 
18.1. 01  Agriculture, hunting and related service activities      
18.2. 02  Forestry, logging and related service activities     
 B   Fishing      
18.3. 05  Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental 
to fishing 
    
 C   Mining and quarrying      
18.4. 10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat     
18.5. 11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; 
service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction, excluding surveying 
    
18.6. 12  Mining of uranium and thorium ores     
18.7. 13  Mining of metal ores     
18.8. 14  Other mining and quarrying     
 D   Manufacturing      
18.9. 15  Manufacture of food products and beverages     
18.10. 16  Manufacture of tobacco products     
18.11. 17  Manufacture of textiles     
18.12. 18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing 
of fur 
    
18.13. 19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 
    
18.14. 20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
    
18.15. 21  Manufacture of paper and paper products     
18.16. 22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
    
18.17. 23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
    
18.18. 24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products     
18.19. 25  Manufacture of rubber and plastics products     
18.20. 26 metallic mineral products     
18.21. 27  Manufacture of basic metals     
18.22. 28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
    
18.23. 29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.      
18.24. 30  Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 
    
18.25. 31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. 
    
18.26. 32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
    
18.27. 33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
    
18.28. 34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 
trailers 
    
18.29. 35  Manufacture of other transport equipment     
18.30. 36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.      
18.31. 37  Recycling     
 E   Electricity, gas and water supply      
18.32. 40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply     
18.33. 41  Collection, purification and distribution of water      
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RULES OF ORIGINS 
 
19. Did you obtain a certificate of origin valid on EU/CIS market issued by the Chamber of 
Commerce in the last year? 
 
19.1 Yes  
19.2 No (Go to Question 24)   
19.3 Do not know/Do not know about this certificate (Go to Question 24)  
 
20.   How often do you have to obtain a certificate of origin?  
 
20.1 Indicate the number of times per year here:  _______  
 
21. Indicate how much on average does a certificate of origin for one delivery cost to your 
company  
 
21.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
22. How important are the costs of obtaining the rules of origin certificate valid in the EU/CIS 
for your company? 
 
22.1 not at all important  
22.2 somewhat important  
22.3 important  
22.4 very important                
 
23. Did you have any difficulties in obtaining a certificate of origin or/and technical and 
quality standards certification, such as: 
 
23.1 time-consuming procedure  
23.2 costly procedure  
23.3 unclear or uncertain regulations  
23.4 other, please specify  ____________,  
23.5 other, please specify  ____________,  
23.6 no difficulties arise  
 
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES 
 
24. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass export customs of  your 
home country when exporting to EU? (If answer this question, then skip Q25) 
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24.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______   
 
25. Indicate the percent of export value you spent to pass export customs of your home 
country 
 
25.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %   
 
26. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at your country’s bor der while exporting 
products to EU?  
 
26.1 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)   
26.2 one day  
26.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)   
 
26a. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to  pass export customs of  your 
home  country when exporting to CIS?  
 
26a.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______   
 
26b. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at your country’s border while exporting 
products to CIS?  
 
26b.1 less than one da y (indicate number of hours__________)   
26b.2 one day  
26b.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)   
 
27. Who is responsible for the costs of passing EU country import customs procedures when 
exporting to EU?  
 
27.1 Our company or its representative in EU country  is carrying all the costs 
related to import custom procedures  
 
27.2 The ordering parting based in EU country is carrying all the costs related 
to import custom procedures (Go to Question 32)  
 
27.3 other ________ _______(Go to Question 32)   
 
28. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass import customs 
procedures in the EU destination country? (If answer to this question, then skip Q28)  
 
28.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______   
 
29. Indicate the percent of export value you spent to pass export customs of EU destination 
country? 
 
29.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %   
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30. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at EU border while exporting products?  
 
30.1 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
30.2 one day  
30.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
 
31. What are the main obstacles related to passing import customs procedures in the EU 
market: 
 
31.1 time-consuming procedure  
31.2 costly procedure  
31.3 unclear or uncertain regulations  
31.4 other, please specify  ____________, ____________, ______________  
31.5 no problems encountered  
31.6 cannot say  
 
32. Who is responsible for the costs of passing CIS country import customs procedures when 
exporting to CIS country? 
32.1 Our company or its representative in CIS country  is carrying all the 
costs related to import custom procedures 
 
32.2 The ordering parting based in CIS country is carrying all the costs 
related to import custom procedures (Go to Question 36) 
 
32.3 other _______________(Go to Question 36)  
 
33. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass import customs 
procedures in CIS countries? (If answer this question, then skip Q34)  
33.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
34. Indicate the percentage of export value you spent to pass import customs procedures in 
CIS countries? 
34.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
35. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at CIS country border while exporting 
products? 
35.1 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
35.2 one day  
35.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
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TECHNICAL REGULATIONS 
 
36. Must your company meet domestic technical regulations in order to sell in domestic 
market: 
 
36.1 Yes  
36.2 No  
36.3 Do not sell in domestic market  
36.4 Do not know  
 
37. Must your company meet domestic technical regulations in order to sell in the EU market: 
 
37.1 Yes  
37.2 No (Go to Question 39)   
37.3 Do not know (Go to Question 39)  
 
38. How expensive is the compliance with the domestic technical regulations compared to 
foreign technical regulations for your exports?  Would you say that they are….? 
 
Technical regulations Much less 
expensive 
Less 
expensive 
About the 
same 
More 
expensive 
Much 
more 
expensive 
Not 
applicable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
38.1 performance       
38.2 product quality       
38.3 testing and 
certification 
      
38.4 consumer safety       
38.5 labeling       
38.6 health/environment       
 
39. What types of EU technical standards are the most burdensome and expensive for your 
company? Standards which relate to: 
Technical regulations Not at all 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
Not 
applicable 
 1 2 3 4 5 
39.1 performance      
39.2 product quality      
39.3 testing and 
certification 
     
39.4 consumer safety      
39.5 labeling      
39.6 
health/environment 
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40. What was the approximate cost of meeting the EU requirements in local currency last 
year? (If answer this question, skip Q41) 
 
40.1 Product characteristics requirement  
40.2 Marking, labeling, and packaging requirements  
40.3 Other technical requirements  
 
41. What was the approximate cost of meeting the EU requirements as a percentage of your 
total sales over the last year? 
 
41.1 Product characteristics requirement  
41.2 Marking, labeling, and packaging requirements  
41.3 Other technical requirements  
 
42. How would you evaluate the ease of access to the necessary information?  
 
42.1 easy  
42.2 not very easy  
42.3 difficult  
42.4 information is not available  
 
Section D. TESTING FOR CONFORMITY WITH TECHNICAL REGULATIONS 
 
43. Are your products tested for conformity with the foreign technical regulations before they 
are shipped to the EU? 
 
43.1 Yes  
43.2 No (Go to Question 46)   
43.2 Do not know (Go to Question 46)  
 
44. How important the costs of testing the products for your company? 
 
44.1 not at all important   
44.2 somewhat important  
44.3 important  
44.4 very important  
 
45. Are test results and conformity certificates issued domestically accepted by customs 
authorities of the EU countries? 
 
45.1 yes  
45.2 no  
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46. Were your products tested for conformity with the EU technical regulations in the 
destination country over the last year? 
 
46.1 Yes  
46.2 No (Go to Question 59)   
46.3 Do not know (Go to Question 59)  
 
47. In your opinion, how important are the costs of testing for conformity with the EU 
technical regulations in the destination country for your company?  
  
47.1 Not at all important  
47.2 Somewhat important  
47.3 Important  
47.4 Very important  
47.5 Cannot say  
 
48. If you export to more than one country in the EU do you need to have several product 
testing? 
 
48.1 Yes  
48.2 No   
 
49. What is the cost of product testing (if answer, skip next question)  
 
49.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
50. What is the cost of product testing as percentage of the last year sales 
 
50.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
51. If your product meets both domestic and foreign technical requirements, what is the extent 
of duplication of effort involved in testing for both requirements?  
 
51.1 no duplication  
51.2 minor duplication  
51.3 significant duplication  
51.4 complete duplication (two tests are required)  
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52. How many days on average does technical regulations conformity inspection usually last 
upon arrival at EU country? 
52.1  1 day of less  
52.2  2 to 4 days  
52.3  5 to 6 days  
52.4  6 to 14 days  
52.5  more than 14 days  
 
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES  
 
For those who are not working in food sector skip this section 
 
53. Did your company implement the HACCP system? 
53.1 Yes  
53.2 No   
 
54. If exporting to the EU, do you encounter sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which are 
burdensome for the company?  
54.1 Yes  
54.2 No (If choose this option, skip next question)  
 
55. Indicate which types of regulations you perceive as impediments to your exports  
55.1 certification  
55.2 quarantine  
55.3 other, please specify  ____________,  
55.4 other, please specify  ____________,  
55.5 other, please specify  ____________,  
 
 
56. What amount in the local currency was spent in 2006 to ensure compliance with the 
respective sanitary and phytosanitary EU regulations? (If answer, skip Q57) 
56.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
57. How much was spent in 2006 to ensure compliance with the respective sanitary and 
phytosanitary as percent of Export value to EU?  
57.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
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58. How important the costs of meeting the sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations in the EU 
for your company? 
 
58.1 not at all important  
58.2 somewhat important  
58.3 important  
58.4 very important  
 
OTHER TYPES OF NTBS 
 
59. Are your company’s exports to the EU market subject to one of the measures from the list 
below? 
 
 Yes  No 
 1  2 
59.1 Antidumping duties    
59.2 Countervailing duties    
59.3 Other measures affecting price (i.e. minimum 
import prices, voluntary export price restraints) 
   
               
60. If yes, how would you evaluate the degree of restrictiveness of the above measures for 
your export activities?   
 
Technical regulations not at all 
restrictive 
somewhat 
restrictive 
restrictive very 
restrictive 
prohibitive 
 1 2 3 4 5 
60.1 Antidumping 
duties 
     
60.2 Countervailing 
duties 
     
60.3 Other measures 
affecting price 
     
 
 
End of Interview 
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Appendix 5
FDI in Armenia
Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 1. FDI inflows to Armenia and other countries, in USD million, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 3 107 3 013 2 497 1 895 3 550 4 501 6 103 8 818 4 296 
     Armenia  52 232 135 125 88 144 157 217 220 
     Azerbaijan  1 115 1 023 510 130 227 1 393 3 285 3 556 1 680 
     Georgia  243 265 83 135 133 167 340 499 450 
     Kazakhstan  1 321 1 151 1 472 1 283 2 835 2 590 2 092 4 113 1 738 
     Kyrgyzstan  83 109 44 -2 5 5 46 175 47 
     Tajikistan  18 30 7 24 9 36 14 272 54 
     Turkmenistan  108 62 125 126 170 100 100 -15 62 
     Uzbekistan  167 140 121 75 83 65 70 1 45 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 8 994 7 639 7 974 7 167 7 978 8 410 18 089 30 760 35 383 
     Albania  48 45 41 143 207 135 178 332 260 
     Belarus  352 203 444 119 96 247 172 164 305 
     Bosnia a nd Herzegovina  1 67 177 146 119 265 381 606 298 
     Bulgaria  505 537 819 1 002 813 905 2 097 3 443 2 223 
     Croatia  538 935 1 464 1 085 1 338 1 213 2 133 1 262 1 695 
     Macedonia, TFYR  30 128 33 175 442 78 95 157 100 
     Moldova, Republic of  79 76 38 127 102 133 78 154 225 
     Romania  1 215 2 031 1 041 1 037 1 157 1 144 2 213 6 517 6 388 
     Russian Federation  4 865 2 761 3 309 2 714 2 748 3 461 7 958 15 444 14 600 
     Serbia and Montenegro  740 113 112 25 165 137 1 360 966 1 481 
     Ukraine 623 743 496 595 792 693 1 424 1 715 7 808 
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Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 2. FDI stock per capita in Armenia and other countries, in USD, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 131 173 207 244 292 352 433 554 619 
     Armenia  43 119 164 205 235 285 337 332 406 
     Azerbaijan  262 385 446 459 484 651 1 045 1 468 1 661 
     Georgia  50 106 125 155 185 223 300 414 519 
     Kazakhstan  346 426 529 674 866 1 036 1 172 1 478 1 654 
     Kyrgyzstan  58 80 88 90 88 95 96 131 100 
     Tajikistan  13 18 18 22 23 29 31 72 80 
     Turkmenistan  146 158 184 210 244 262 280 272 281 
     Uzbekistan  15 21 26 28 31 33 36 35 36 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 41 53 69 200 296 389 547 701 813 
     Albania  109 124 138 184 251 294 349 453 533 
     Belarus  50 70 114 130 140 165 192 209 243 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina  2 21 68 105 134 201 298 453 528 
     Bulgaria 129 196 298 282 347 469 796 1 183 1 184 
     Croatia  462 422 566 782 959 1 523 2 274 2 776 2 750 
     Macedonia, TFYR  101 165 181 268 454 600 801 877 924 
     Moldova, Republic of  43 57 74 106 131 167 190 232 291 
     Romania  105 198 246 293 347 356 558 945 1 101 
     Russian Federation  7 3 5 218 360 485 665 815 920 
     Serbia and Montenegro  101 112 123 125 141 154 283 376 517 
     Ukraine  41 56 66 79 99 123 159 203 367 
Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 3. FDI inflows in percent of domestic investment in Armenia and other
countries, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 24.4 24.2 21.5 17.8 29.1 34.1 37.0 39.0 14.9 
     Armenia  19.5 75.7 44.6 35.4 23.4 28.8 24.4 26.9 16.2 
     Azerbaijan  76.1 64.8 39.0 10.7 17.4 65.5 85.4 71.0 29.3 
     Georgia  37.4 28.7 11.3 17.4 15.2 20.1 32.3 33.6 24.0 
     Kazakhstan  36.7 33.1 53.9 40.5 53.9 43.8 29.4 38.0 11.8 
     Kyrgyzstan  37.9 51.7 22.6 -1.0 1.9 1.8 17.4 54.4 12.4 
     Tajikistan  11.1 16.9 3.7 28.9 9.7 27.5 7.9 151.4 23.7 
     Turkmen istan 9.8 4.8 8.2 8.6 11.8 8.0 7.7 -1.2 3.6 
     Uzbekistan  3.2 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.2 3.0 3.3 0.0 1.6 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 8.4 10.1 14.5 10.2 9.0 8.6 14.2 18.0 16.4 
     Albania  7.9 6.5 3.9 9.8 10.9 6.3 5.9 9.2 6.6 
     Belarus  9.9 5.1 13.9 4.5 3.4 7.7 3.8 2.6 4.0 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.1 5.1 18.9 15.2 13.4 24.1 27.0 34.1 16.3 
     Bulgaria  44.4 32.4 41.8 50.6 32.8 31.8 54.3 68.2 36.2 
     Croatia  11.0 18.5 31.5 27.0 30.2 21.6 26.9 13.3 16.1 
     Macedonia, TFYR  4.7 20.5 5.4 30.0 86.5 12.4 12.2 16.4 9.7 
     Moldova, Republic of  20.5 20.2 17.5 63.7 41.1 48.9 21.3 28.0 31.7 
     Romania  16.3 26.5 16.5 14.8 13.9 11.7 17.4 39.9 28.0 
     Russian Federation  6.6 6.3 11.7 6.2 4.7 5.6 10.0 14.3 10.5 
     Serbia and Montenegro  28.8 4.7 6.3 1.5 9.5 5.2 37.7 23.9 33.7 
     Ukraine  6.3 9.1 8.2 9.7 10.6 8.5 13.8 11.7 45.2 
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Source: World Bank (2007)
Appendix 5 Table 4. Selected indicators of trading across borders in Armenia and other
countries, 2007
Trading Across Borders  Country 
Documents 
for export 
(number) 
Costs of 
export 
procedures 
in USD 
Time for 
export 
(days) 
Documents 
for import 
(number) 
Costs of 
import 
procedures in 
USD 
Time 
for 
import 
(days) 
OECD AVERAGE 
(2007) 
4.5 905 9.8 5.0 986 10.4 
Armenia 7 1,165 30 8 1,335 24 
Georgia 8 1,105 12 7 1,105 14 
Moldova 6 1,425 32 7 1,545 35 
Russian Federation  8 2,050 36 13 2,050 36 
Ukraine 6 1,045 31 10 1,046 39 
Turkey 7 865 14 8 1,013 15 
Bulgaria 5 1,329 23 7 1,377 21 
Romania 5 1,075 12 6 1,075 13 
Regional economic integration is likely to affect the firm’s FDI decision. A
regionally integrated area may attract more inward FDI for various reasons such as
access to a larger market, defensive investments by firms from non-member countries
to obtain similar treatment as firms within the area, and gains in economic efficiency. 
Dunning’s (1993) OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) framework of
international production shows the role of location in the overall FDI decision of a
firm. According to Dunning, three factors need to be present for firms to engage in FDI:
ownership-specific advantages of property rights and intangible assets in multinational
enterprise (MNE); internalization incentive advantages, and the presence of locational
advantages in a host country. The interaction of the particular FDI motivations and the
location-specific advantages provided by a potential host country will thus prove
determinant as to where a firm will seek making the investment.
While the first and second are firm-specific determinants of FDI, the third is
location-specific and has a crucial influence on a host country's inflows of FDI. If only
the first condition is met, firms will rely on exports, licensing or the sale of patents to
service a foreign market. In the presence of internalization incentives, e.g. protection
from supply disruptions and price hikes, lack of suitable licensee, and economies of
common governance FDI becomes the preferred mode of servicing foreign markets,
but only if location-specific advantages are present. Within the trinity of conditions for
FDI to occur, locational determinants are the only ones that host governments can
influence directly (UNCTAD, 1998). 
The locational determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) is an extensively
researched area of international business. While scholars have yet to reach a consensus
on the significant FDI determinants, a few key variables have been identified. Large
market size, strong market growth, abundant natural resources along with cultural and
distance proximity are attractive for FDI inflows (Aharoni 1966, Bass, McGregor and
Walters 1977, Grosse, Trevino 1996, Basu, Srinivasan 2002, Benassy-Quere, Fontagne,
Lahreche-Revil 2003, Blumentritt and Nigh 2002). Another widely cited FDI
determinant - labour cost – have not universally been found to be significant. While
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Appendix 6
The Model of FDI
Markusen, Zhang (1997), using general equilibrium simulation, showed that wage level
is important for small, scarce-labour country, Loree and Guisinger (1995), who studied
US investment in 48 countries, found wage rates to be insignificant.
Obviously, market size and labour costs are not the only important FDI
determinants; country political and economic risk and/or friendliness of overall
business environment are of great concern to foreign investors as well (Basu,
Srinivasan, 2002). A number of surveys, conducted among investors (Aharoni (1966),
Foster, Alkan (2003), Bass, McGregor and Walters, (1977)), have indicated that sound
and stable macroeconomic policy, a positive attitude to foreign investors and
supportive institutional environment are important for investment location decisions.
In particular, Blumentritt and Nigh (2002), revealed that favourable regulatory
practices would facilitate an integration of a subsidiary company into the host country
environment. 
Another important factor for FDI flows is the level of regional economic
cooperation in a particular location. In general it is found to have a positive impact on
FDI for several reasons. First, it expands the size of the local market, and therefore
makes the region more attractive to FDI. Second, regionalism can promote political
stability and permit countries to coordinate their policies Asiedu (2006). Giovanni
(2004) also finds the significance of RTAs for cross-border M&A flows. Jaumotte (2004)
concluded that market size of regional trade agreement (RTA) has positive impact on
the FDI inflow, but countries within the same RTA do not benefit to the same extent as
those ones from different RTAs. Countries with relatively higher education and
financial stability tend to attract a larger share of the FDI at the expense of other RTA
members. This conclusion supports the above mentioned findings on the importance of
the institutional environment and macroeconomic stability for foreign direct
investment. 
A related issue is the impact of a country’s engagement in international trade on
FDI. The OLI framework suggests that, as trade becomes concentrated in goods
produced by firms using knowledge-intensive assets, FDI will gradually substitute
trade. On the other hand, if a country is a recipient of largely efficiency-seeking FDI,
then it would stimulate flows of imports of intermediate products and exports of final
(or more completed products). Therefore, a country’s engagement in international
trade may have either substitutary or complementary impact on FDI. As a result,
exports/imports variables are rarely employed in FDI models. In those cases when they
were included, they have been reported to not have a significant impact on FDI (Bevan
and Estrin, 2000). Consequently, we decided not to include trade variables in our
analysis. 
Yet, instead we do employ an indicator of the openness of the economy in our
model. It has traditionally been measured as a ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.
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Kravis and Lipsey (1982) and Culem (1988) report it to have a significant positive effect
on FDI. The degree of a country’s openness can affect FDI in multiple ways (some of
them are similar to the trade effects). Lower import barriers discourage tariff-jumping
FDI but may stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the imports of inputs and machinery.
Lower export barriers tend to stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the re-export of
processed goods, and other (non-tariff-jumping) horizontal FDI by expanding the
effective market size and leading to an improved business climate and expectations of
better long-term economic growth. So, although it is based on trade data, it is less
influenced by imports vs. exports (substitution vs. complementarity) logic and on top to
the trade activity in a country, it also reflects the country’s general business climate.
Although the endogeneity problem – whether openness of the economy causes more
FDI or more FDI result in higher engagement in international trade – is in place in this
case; we cannot think of a good instrument which could have helped us to resolve this
issue, hence we assume that causality runs the former way. 
The scholars employed various methods - ranging from straightforward surveying
of foreign investors to robust econometric modelling - to explore FDI determinants.
Following recent developments in the field, we are employing a gravity model in this
analysis (Brainard 1997, Brenton 1998, Benassy-Quere, Fontagne, Lahreche-Revil,
2003 Benassy-Quere, Coupet, Mayer 2005). 
The gravity model, which was developed by Linnemann (1966), is widely used in the
analysis of bilateral trade. It was applied to the field of FDI analysis by Brainard (1997).
He succeeded in matching the company based logic of OLI with general equilibrium
trade models. According to OLI, multinational enterprises’ choices in serving foreign
markets are determined by the trade-off between incremental fixed costs of investing
and the costs of exporting. While many of these costs are determined by the traditional
factors which were discussed above - economies of scale, relative input costs, intangible
assets - the success of the gravity model in explaining bilateral trade flows points
strongly to the inclusion of distance variables in FDI equations. 
Distance acts as a proxy for transportation costs, or economic barriers to trade.
Another aspect of the distance is cultural proximity, which implies cultural and
language community. The closer the countries, the more common cultural aspects are
available, the easier to conduct business. The proximity is usually measured as a
distance between the capital city of the host country and investing country, or a
distance between a host country capital and Brussels. Most studies found positive
negative correlation between distance and FDI (Bevan and Estrin (2000), Smarzhynska
and Wei (2000, 2002), Resmini (2000), Johnson (2006)). However, Campos and
Kinoshita found positive relation for distance from Brussels for CIS countries, which
may indicate that the geographical proximity to the Western markets also play an
important role in attracting FDI. Interestingly, Tondel (2001) revealed a positive
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correlation between geographical position and progress in transition. He noted that the
most advanced countries in terms of transition are most often geographically closer to
Western Europe. 
In our study we estimate the following model (it is specified in logarithms):
lnFDIij = β0 + β1 borderij + β2 ln_dist ij + β3 ln_gdpi + β4 ln_gdpj + β5 ln_popi + β6
ln_popj + β7 ln_debtj + β8 TOj + β9 ln TIj + β10 ln gdp_capita j + β11 WTOj + β12 EUj
where:
lnFDIij - a natural logarithm of nominal (USD) FDI flows from country i to country j, 
borderij - dummy variable, equals 1 if i and j have common border,
ln_dist ij - a natural logarithm of the distance between the capitals of country i and
country j,
ln_gdpi - a natural logarithm of the nominal (USD) GDP of countries i and j
respectively,
ln_popi - log population of countries i and j respectively,
ln_debtj - a natural logarithm of the external debt of country j as a percentage of GNI
of country j,
TOj - the ratio of sum of exports and imports of country j to GNI of country j,
ln TPIj - a natural logarithm of the EBRD Transition Progress Index of country j,
ln gdp_capitaj - a natural logarithm of nominal (USD) GDP per capita in country j,
WTOj - dummy, equals 1 if a country j (a recipient country) is a member of WTO,
and
EUj - dummy, equals 1 if a country j (a recipient country) have signed the
Europe Agreements
As a measure of market size, and consequently economic attractiveness of the
location, we use GDP of home and recipient countries. We also employ GDP per capita
as another measure of market attractiveness, i.e. purchasing power in the host country. 
We have faced a challenge of finding a suitable index of business environment
which will cover the countries in the sample plus Georgia and Armenia. After
comparing various indicators, it was found that the only suitable index is the EBRD
transition indicators which are available at the EBRD website. The EBRD assesses
progress in transition through a set of transition indicators. These have been used to
track reform developments in all countries of its operations since the beginning of
transition. Progress is measured against the standards of industrialised market
economies, while recognising that there is neither a “pure” market economy nor a
unique end-point for transition.
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The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+ (i.e. 4.33), where 1
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+
represents the standards of an industrialised market economy. The reform scores
reflect the assessments of EBRD country economists using the criteria described in the
methodological notes.
Assessments are made in nine areas: Large scale privatisation, small scale
privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and
foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate
liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and
infrastructure. For purposes of our research we use an average index of all of the above
indicators apart from the infrastructure, we call it Transition Progress Index.
We also control for the level of indebtedness of the host economy, measured as a
ratio of the country’s external debt to GNI, which is another explanatory/control
variable employed in this study. Furthermore, we are analysing an impact of WTO
accession on FDI inflows through the inclusion of a dummy variable. Finally, we
directly control for the impact an EU membership has had on the FDI inflows in the
region by including a corresponding dummy variable. We were not able to gather data
on unit labour costs for a number of countries in the sample, so unfortunately, we did
not include a labour cost measure in our model.
The sample under consideration includes 31 OECD countries as source countries
and 10 transition countries as FDI destinations (Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine). The sample
covers years 1995-2003 that yields 819 observations in a panel under examination. 
We use random effects model to estimate our model. The Haussman specification
test does not reject random effects speciation at the 5% significance level. Table A1
reports the model’s estimates. In line with the previous research we report significant
effects of distance, GDP, population, progress in transition and indebtedness of the host
economy. The distance has a significantly negative effect on FDI flows and, hence,
supports the basic logic of the gravity model. Other traditional gravity model factors –
GDP of both home and host countries – have significant positive effects on FDI inflows
that confirms a hypothesis of the importance of host country’s market size for FDI.
In the earlier versions of the model, we have also considered the common language,
surfaces of the donor and recipient, and other variables, which appeared to be highly
insignificant. Hence, we decided to exclude them as this model is also to be used for
forecasting purposes (in this case it is better to have a model which consists of
statistically significant variables mostly).
The impact of the level of indebtedness is significantly negative, which is in line with  a
conventional economic logic. The more indebted an economy is, the poorer perception of the
level of economic stability investors have, and, hence, the investment is less likely to happen. 
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The EBRD transition indicator index has also been found to have a significantly
positive effect in our sample. It indicates that countries with more stable business
environment are significantly more attractive for foreign investors than less stable
countries. The WTO dummy came out insignificant in our analysis – probably WTO
membership itself does not affect FDI flows strongly.
Interestingly, the EU dummy did not turn out to be significant in our specification
(we have also tried a specification which included only the EU dummy without the
WTO one and received similar results). One of possible explanations for this lack of
significance is that our sample covers only the years after signing of the Europe
agreements, so there is no variation across time (only among countries: members and
non-members). Yet, in this case other variables (for example, GDP of countries-
recipients) may have stronger power in explaining differences in FDI inflows than the
EU association, hence, making the dummy insignificant.
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*** - significant at 1% level
**  - significant at 5% level
* - significant at 10% level
Appendix 6 Table 1. Estimates of the Gravity Model for FDI inflows into CEE
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Log (FDI) 
Border 
0.763 
(0.173) 
Log(Distance) 
-0.298 
(0.135) 
Log(GDP Source) 
1.449*** 
(0.000) 
Log(GDP Recipient) 
0.521** 
(0.023) 
Log (Population Source) 
-0.984*** 
(0.000) 
Log (Population Recipient)  
0.199 
(0.785) 
Log (Debt) 
-0.008** 
(0.045) 
Log(TPI) 
3.894*** 
(0.001) 
Trade Openness 
0.001 
(0.973) 
Log(GDP capita) 
0.196 
(0.873) 
WTO (Dummy) 
-0.402 
(0.836) 
EU (Dummy) 
0.436 
(0.815) 
Constant Term 
-40.238*** 
(0.000) 
R-Squared 0.301 
Number of observations 819 
Model structure
This model is based on the MRT - Multiregional Trade Model - by Harrison,
Rutherford and Tarr (HRT) used in their evaluation of the Single Market (HRT, 1994)65. 
Markets and prices
The following notational conventions are adopted:
i, j – indexes of goods
r, s – indexes of regions
f – primary factors
p – market price index, 1 in the benchmark
– benchmark value of quantity variable X. 
The following market prices are included in the model:
PCr – price index for final consumption in region r
PGr - price index for government provision in region r
PAir – price index for the Armington aggregate of good i in region r, inclusive of all
applicable tariffs, border costs and monopolistic markups
PYir - supply price (marginal cost) of good i from region r, excluding fixed costs
associated with the production of goods in industries subject to IRTS
PFir - price index for factor inputs in sector i, region r
PT - price index for transport services.
Summary of the equilibrium relationships
Final demand in each region arises from a representative agent, maximising a
Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to a budget constraint. Income is composed of
returns to primary factors and tax revenue directed to the consumer as a lump sum.
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65 Their code was obtained from Anders Hoffmann with the permission of Thomas Rutherford and our modelling
exercise uses large parts of this code. This model in turn is based on the code employed in their evaluation of
the Uruguay Round in HRT (1995, 1996a), which is available for public access on Harrison’s Web site.
Appendix 7
CGE Model Equations
x
Within each region, final and intermediate demands are composed of the same
Armington aggregate of domestic and imported varieties. The composite supply is a
nested CES function, where consumers first allocate their expenditures among
domestic and imported varieties and in the second level the consumers choose among
imported varieties. In the imperfect competition case firm varieties enter at the bottom
of the CES function. 
There is no distinction between goods produced for domestic market and for
exports. Goods are produced with the use of intermediate inputs and primary factors.
Primary factors are mobile across sectors, but not across regions. We assume a CES
function over primary factors and a Leontief production function for intermediate
inputs and factors of production composite. Exports are not differentiated by the
country of destination.
All distortions are represented as ad valorem price-wedges. They consists of factor
and intermediate input taxes in production, output tax, import tariffs, export subsidies,
taxes on government and private consumption. 
Equations
Markets
• Regional output
(1)
where Yir is output of good i in region r, Xirs is export of good i from region r to s and
if r=s,  Xirs represents domestic sales.
• Regional demand
(2)
where Air is total supply (production plus imports), Cir is total final consumption, aijr is
intermediate demand coefficient and Tir is demand for good i in transport costs.
• Value added
(3)
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where Vir is total sector i value added, a
V
ir is value added demand coefficient, fir is the
fixed cost per firm and Nir is the number of firms in IRTS sectors. 
• Primary factor markets
(4)
where     is the endowment of factor f in region r and aFfir is the price-responsive
demand coefficient for factor f in sector i. 
• Armington supply
(5)
where      is the benchmark supply,    is the value share of domestic supply,      is
benchmark exports of good i from region r to s,     is the benchmark value share of
region r exports in region s imports and ρDM and ρM are determined by Armington
elasticities of substitution σDM and σM:             .
• Value added supply
(6)
where      is benchmark value-added, αFfir is the benchmark value share of factor f,       is
the benchmark input coefficient and ρFir is determined by the elasticity of substitution. 
• Border/transport costs
(7)
where τ is the index of single commodity used for transport services and βjrs is the
transportation cost coefficient. 
• Welfare index
(8)
where      is benchmark final demand for good i in region r.
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Profit conditions
• Value added
(9)
where fFir is the ad valorem factor tax rate,         is the benchmark (tax-inclusive) price.
• Marginal cost
(10)
• Armington composite supply price
(11)
where 
(12)
and
(13)
and 
(14)
where       is the mark-up on marginal cost on sales of good i from a firm in region r in
region s, 
is the ad valorem tax rate which incorporates import tariffs and export subsidies,  
is the benchmark supply price for goods from domestic producers,           is the
benchmark supply price for imports. 
• Regional income 
Regional income is a sum of factor income, indirect taxes, taxes on intermediate
demand, factor tax revenue, public tax revenue, consumption tax revenue, export tax
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revenue and tariff revenue net of investment demand, public sector demand and net
capital outflows:
(15)
• Final demand
Public sector output consists of Cobb-Douglas aggregation of market commodities:
(16)
A representative agent determines demand in each region. He is endowed with
primary factors, tax revenue and exogenous capital flows from other regions. He
allocates his income to investment (exogenous), public demand (held constant in real
terms) and private demand. Private demand is determined by the maximisation of
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
(17)
Aggregate final demand is then determined by regional expenditures and the unit
price of aggregate commodities gross of tax:
(18)
where Er is regional expenditure, which equals income (Mr) net of investment and
public expenditures.
• Bilateral trade flows
There are two tax margins (import and export tax) and transport costs in the model.
Transport costs are proportional to trade. Transport costs are defined by a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of international transport inputs supplied by different countries:
(19)
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Bilateral trade flows are determined by cost-minimising choice given the fob export
price of commodity from region r (PYir), the export tax rate (tir
X), and the import tariff
rate (tir
M), where the export tax applies on the fob price net of transport margins, while
the import tariff applies on a cif price.
• Free entry zero-profit condition for monopolistic firms
(20)
Monopolistic competition
• Goods are distinguished by firm, by region and area of origin (domestic or imported). 
• Demands arise from a nested CES function with a supply from firms in a single
region at the lowest level of the CES aggregate. At the next level, the firms compete
with supplies from other regions from the same area and at the top level consumers
choose between goods from different areas. Demand for final composite arises from
a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
• Producers compete in quantities based on a Cournot model with fixed conjectural
variations. Markups over marginal costs are based on the profit maximisation. There
is free entry, so profits in equilibrium are zero. Markup covers the fixed costs, which
are fixed at the firm level and as the markup revenue in a region changes, so does
the number of firms.
• The model does not incorporate gains from variety, only the rationalisation gains. A
reduction in tariffs leads to loss of the market share by domestic firms. Domestic
producers reduce the markup on marginal costs, some domestic firms exit, the
remaining firms slide down their average cost curves and output per firm increases. 
Algebraic relations
The equilibrium conditions for each market where there are IRTS are estimated
separately. The following notation is adopted:
X – Aggregate demand
Yk – Supply from are k
Sr – Supply from region r
qfr – Supply from firm f in region r
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P – Price index for aggregate demand
Pk- Price index for supply from area k
wr – Price index for supply from region r
πfr – Sales price for supply from firm f in region r.
CES aggregators are used to create the composite goods:
(21)
(22)
(23)
The associated price indices:
(24)
(25)
(26)
and associated demand functions:
(27)
(28) for k = kr
(29)
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Behaviour of firms
The profit of firm f in region r selling into a given market is as follows:
(30)
where C is total cost. First order conditions for profit maximisation may be written as
follows:
(31)
in which cfr is the marginal cost of supply and mfr is a markup over marginal cost (on
gross basis):
(32)
where efr is the perceived elasticity of demand. The expression for the elasticity of
demand arises from the nested CES structure of demand and depends on the assumed
reaction of other producers.
The perceived elasticity of demand
Derivation of the perceived elasticity of demand begins with the inverse demand
function:
(33)
Then compute the derivative:
(34)
Here, HRT develop further derivations with the simplifying assumption of unitary
conjectural variations (Cournot conjectures). The non-unitary conjectures are
introduced to reconcile the estimates of the economies of scale in production with the
estimates of elasticities of substitution in demand.  Under Cournot conjectures:
(35)
and the term         is computed using the chain rule the second time:
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(36)
Substituting (34) and (35) into (33) we get:
(37)
Then using (32):
(38)
make the substitution to obtain:
(39) 
Applying the same steps at the next level we get an analogous expression:
(40)
Applying the same operations again at the highest level of the CES, given that the
demand elasticity for the aggregate X is unity, we get:
(41)
When equations (38)-(40) are assembled, we obtain an expression for the optimal
Cournot markup as follows:
(42)
where the share of supply from region r in the supply from area k is denoted as:
(43) for k = kr
and the supply from area k in total supply of a given good is denoted as:
(44)
In our model we assumed that products of different firms are imperfect substitutes
in demand. The elasticity of demand depends on the country of origin. There are three
252
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ARMENIA
CASE Network Reports No. 80/2008
 
fr
r
r
r
fr
r
q
S
S
w
q
w
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
 
r
r
fr
r
r
fr
fr
r
r
fr
frfr
frfr
S
w
1
q
S
w
q
1
q
S
S
q11
q
q
∂
∂ε
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+ε⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
ε
+
ε
−=
π∂
π∂
r
fr
fr
r
wq
S πε
=⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
1
rr
frfr
r
r
r
r
rr
frfr
fr Sw
q
w
S
S
w
Sw
q
e
ππ
εε ∂
∂
++−=
111
kk
rr
k
k
k
k
kk
rr
rr
rr
Yp
Sw
p
Y
Y
p
Yp
Sw
wS
Sw
∂
∂
++−=
∂
∂
ηη
11
PX
Yp
PX
Yp
pY
Yp kkkk
kk
kk ++−=
∂
∂
σσ
11
fr
Y
rk
X
k
fr
Y
fk
fr
fr NNN
m
θθ
σ
θ
ησεηε
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−+=
1
1
111111
kk
rrY
rk Yp
Sw
=θ
PX
Yp kkX
k =θ
elasticities of substitution associated with the nested CES structure of demand
discussed earlier:
σDD – elasticity of substitution between varieties supplied by domestic firms 
σMM – elasticity of substitution between products of any two foreign suppliers 
σDM – elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties.
We assume that domestically produced goods are more easily substitutable among
themselves than products from different countries and that σDD is 15. In addition
imported goods are assumed to be better substitutes to each other than domestic and
foreign goods. The elasticity of substitution between imported goods is assumed to be
equal 10, while domestic and foreign goods enter the demand function with the
elasticity of substitution of 5. These are priors used by HRT (1994).
Further let θrs denote the market share of region r firms in region s. Then we can
apply equation (C41) to represent the optimal markup applied in the domestic market
and in the foreign markets:
(44)
These are the optimal markups expressed as a function of elasticities of substitution,
market shares, θMr the market share of imports in region r and Nr the number of firms
producing in the region r. 
Estimation of the equilibrium conditions in ITRS sectors
This paper adopts a simplification by estimating the equilibrium conditions in IRTS
industries for each commodity in separate models. Demands and supplies for all
regions are included into these calculations, but factor markets, intersectoral linkages
and income effects are ignored. In each iteration of the IRTS models, regional demand
functions are calibrated to the most recently estimated equilibrium conditions of the
general model including all GE interactions. Given constant marginal cost, sales prices
are determined by the markup equations.  
The single commodity models are estimated as follows. The markup pricing
equation (44) is specified given the benchmark elasticities of substitution, the number
of firms and an adjustment parameter, the conjectural variation. First, the values of
elasticities of substitution at all nests of the CES function, as well as the number of
firms and therefore their market shares are specified. Further, the value of production
at consumer prices at the benchmark combined with the estimates of the cost
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disadvantage ratio taken from the literature (see next section), determine the value of
fixed costs, i.e. FCir = CDRirYCir. Given the assumption of zero profits, the markup over
marginal cost generates the revenue equal exactly to the fixed costs. This condition
appears as a constraint in a non-linear least squares calculation. 
The objective in the estimation is to calibrate the conjectural variations, which are
as close as possible to one. This value is consistent with pure Cournot-Nash behaviour
of players. Therefore a sequence of least-squares problems is solved for each
commodity subject to IRTS. These problems look for implicit numbers of firms (Nr)
which results in calibrated conjectural variations (CVrs) which are as close as possible
to 1. This looks as follows:
(46) 
subject to:
(47)
where MG is a markup equation, i.e. equation (44), and Xirs represents sales of i from
region r in region s. 
Therefore, the conjectural variations act as parameters, which allow reconciliation
of the benchmark data with the estimates of the elasticities of substitution and CDR
taken from the literature. In the majority of sectors calibrated conjectural variations
are less than 1 indicating a more competitive behaviour than predicted by the Cournot
model. 
For sectors, where the assumption of free entry and zero profits in the benchmark,
given values of the elasticity of substitution, is consistent with pure Cournot-Nash type
behaviour, a second calculation is performed. It looks for the number of firms as small
as possible subject to the consistency of conjectures with the Cournot behaviour. 
(48)
subject to:
(49)
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Calibrating the Cost Disadvantage Ratio
The calibration of the cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) in IRTS sectors is based on the
assumption of constant marginal cost. The total cost function is specified as follows:
(50)
where f is fixed cost, m is constant marginal cost and q denotes the output level.
Average cost function looks as follows:
(51)
Assuming zero profits, the benchmark data provides the information on the industry
total costs (C) and output (Q). If there are n representative firms in the initial
equilibrium (1), then nc1=N and nq1=Q. Since
(52)
given the initial data we know already one point on the firm’s average cost curve i.e.:
(53)
Given the assumption about a specific form of the average cost curve, we only need
a second point in order to calibrate it. This is done with the use of information from the
engineering estimates on changes in average cost accompanying changes in output. 
If output declines to αq1 then average costs increase to               where 0<α<1, β>1 is 
required for the marginal cost to be nonnegative. Given the values of α and β we know
the second point on the industry average cost curve:
(54)
By multiplying the nominators and denominators of the last two equations we
obtain equations on the total output and costs of industry, on which the data is
available. The equations look as follows:
(55) and 
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where F is the fixed cost. Further, we solve the above equations for the fixed and
marginal costs:
(57) and
(58) .
Since the cost disadvantage ratio is defined as f/c, which by symmetry equals F/C,
we know that at the initial equilibrium:
(59) .
We obtain the values of α and β from Pratten (1988). Since there are no estimates
of the economies of scale for all 3-digit sectors according to NACE classification or the
available estimates are not representative, we used a rage of estimated parameters for
each GTAP sector. Based on those parameters we constructed three values of the CDRs
i.e. low and high using the lowest and highest values of the estimated parameters and
middle one. The only exception was the food sector, where the economies of scale differ
a lot by products, so we used the average production values to aggregate the CDRs for
more finely defined sectors. The allocation of Pratten’s NACE sectors to GTAP sectors,
as well as the final CDRs are presented in Appendix 7 Table 1 below.
Following others such as Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) or HRT (1994), we
are assuming that in the benchmark equilibrium firms operate at the minimum
efficient scale (MES). Firms should have difficulties competing, if they were operating
at less than MES. Given the function form used in this study, at the MES further
expansion of output reduces average cost of production. If initially output is lower than
the MES, then the CDRs will be underestimated since the slope of the average cost
curve increases in absolute value for decreases in output. In all scenarios we assume
low values for the economies of scale. 
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Notes:
Column 1: Parameter β in the CDR calibration equation.
Column 2: Data corresponds to (β-1)*100 where β is from the CDR calibration equation.
Column 3-5: CDR estimated according to equation 58.
Column 6: Numbers indicated in this column correspond to NACE sectors from Table 5.1 in Pratten (1988).
The assumptions on CDRs in services follow assumptions of HRT (1994). 
Appendix 7 Table 1. Data on CDR values
Implied CDR  Share of MES 
(á) 
Percentage 
Cost Increase at 
Output Level 
(â) 
Low Medium High 
Source of Data  
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0  
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0  
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
  7.7 11.1 14.5  
   Meat 0.67 5    412 
   Dairy 0.67 2    413 
   Other food 0.67 4 to 9    414, 416, 420, 422 
   Tobacco 0.33 2.2 to 5    429 
Textiles 0.5 2 to 10 2 6 10 43 
Clothing 0 0 0 0 0  
Leather 0.33 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 451 
Wood 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Paper 0.5 8 to 13 8.0 10.5 13.0 471, 472 
Petroleum 0.33 4 2.0 2.0 2.0 14 
Chemicals 0.33 4 to 19 2.0 5.7 9.4 25 
Non-metallic 
Minerals 
0.33 10 to 26 4.9 8.9 12.8 241-247 
Iron, steel 0.33 10 to 11 4.9 5.2 5.4 22 
Other metals 0.33 11 to 11 4.9 5.2 5.4 224 
Metal prod. 0.33 10 4.9 4.9 4.9 221 
Motor vehicles 0.5 11 11.0 11.0 11.0 35 
Other transport 0.5 8 to 20 8.0 14.0 20.0 361 
Electronics 0.33 5 to 15 2.5 4.9 7.4 23, 344, 345 
Machinery n.e.c. 0.5 3 to 10 3.0 6.5 10.0 321, 322, 326 
Manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
0.5 3 to 5 3 4 5 HRT 
Utilities  0 0 0 0 0  
Trade 0 0 0 0 0  
Transport 0.5 2 2 2 2 HRT 
Financial services 0.5 5 5 5 5 HRT 
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Appendix 8 Table 1. Welfare, GDP and factor returns results of the CGE simulations – net effects
compared to the 2006 scenario
  2006 SIMPLE FTA SIMPLE FTA 
BIS 
DEEP FTA DEEP FTA+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Welfare  (% change )  
Russia  0 0 -0.001 0 0.002 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.006 
Armenia  0.381 0.178 0.075 3.375 7.952 
Azerbaijan  -0.009 0 0.001 0.017 0.027 
Georgia  0.031 -0.004 -0.018 0.14 0.186 
Turkey  0 0 0 -0.003 -0.004 
EU27 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
CIS -0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0.002 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.001 -0.002 
GDP (% change)  
Russia  0.058 0 0 0.001 0.002 
Ukraine  0.174 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.006 
Armenia  0.403 0.177 0.076 3.352 7.939 
Azerbaijan  0.015 0 0 0.022 0.03 
Georgia  0.115 0 -0.023 0.137 0.183 
Turkey  0.093 0 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
EU27 0.03 0.001 0.001 0 -0.001 
CIS 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 
ROW  0.013 0 0 -0.001 -0.002 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change)  
Russia  0 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.006 
Armenia  0.45 0.447 0.375 3.955 7.996 
Azerbaijan  -0.011 0 0 0.057 0.072 
Georgia  0.032 -0.004 -0.02 0.151 0.206 
Turkey  0 0 0 -0.002 -0.003 
EU27 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
CIS 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 
Wages of skilled workers (% change)  
Russia  0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine  0 0 -0.001 0.003 0.004 
Armenia  0.357 0.405 0.386 2.565 6.126 
Azerbaijan  -0.017 0 0.001 0.081 0.095 
Georgia  0.025 -0.002 -0.009 0.046 0.071 
Turkey  0 0 0 -0.002 -0.003 
EU27 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 
CIS 0 0 0 0 0.001 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 
Appendix 8
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Appendix 8 Table 1. Welfare, GDP and factor returns results of the CGE simulations – net effects
compared to the 2006 scenario
  2006 SIMPLE FTA SIMPLE FTA 
BIS 
DEEP FTA DEEP FTA+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total exports (% change)  
Russia  0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.007 
Armenia  2.926 3.204 4.435 18.881 27.291 
Azerbaijan  -0.099 0.001 -0.001 0.218 0.201 
Georgia  0.149 0 -0.055 0.477 0.757 
Turkey  0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.012 
EU27 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 
CIS -0.001 0 0 0.003 0 
ROW  0 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
Total imports (% change)  
Russia  0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 
Ukraine  0 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.008 
Armenia  1.631 1.556 2.101 12.193 16.398 
Azerbaijan  -0.04 0.001 0.002 0.046 0.068 
Georgia  0.074 -0.009 -0.037 0.255 0.403 
Turkey  0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009 
EU27 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 
CIS -0.001 0 0 -0.001 0 
ROW  0 0 0 -0.004 -0.005 
Capital stock (% change)  
Armenia  0.66 0.357 0.15 6.891 19.513 
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Appendix 8 Table 2. Armenia - Output changes (%)
 2006 SIMPLE 
FTA 
SIMPLE 
FTA BIS 
DEEP FTA DEEP FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
0.3 0.3 0.2 3.9 9.6 
Livestock 0 -0.1 -0.4 3.3 8 
Forestry -0.4 -1 -1.4 -0.6 4.2 
Fishing 5.1 10.3 17.4 19 27.4 
Coal 0 0  0 0 
Oil 0 0  0 0 
Gas 0 0  0 0 
Mining and quarrying  1.1 0.8 1.4 -3.8 5.5 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
-0.8 -1.8 -2.9 -1.3 2.3 
Textiles and textile goods  5 59.2 60 219.8 229.8 
Leather products  2.9 4.6 5.7 36.9 43 
Wood products  -2.3 -8 -7.4 -4.7 -5.4 
Paper products, publishing  0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -1.4 8.6 
Petroleum, coal products  -0.1 0.5 0.8 -3.5 6.9 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
0.1 -0.2  -2.4 4.3 
Mineral products nec  5.7 1.9 2.4 31.7 38 
Metals and metal products  5.1 5.1 5.6 19.7 22.6 
Transport equipment  0.9 -2.1 -1.7 -0.5 5.5 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
1.3 2.7 3.1 5.4 9.9 
Manufactures nec  3.2 4.4 5.6 42.5 59.4 
Electricity 0.3 0.2 0.3 1 7.2 
Gas manufacture, distribution  0.3 0.6 0.9 0.2 16.3 
Water 0.4 0.7 0.6 5.6 12.8 
Construction  0.3 0.6 0.4 4 10.5 
Trade 0.3 0.5 0.4 3.3 9.5 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
-0.1 0.5 0.9 -7.8 -3.4 
Communications  -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -3.9 4.9 
Banking lending and insurance  -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -11.2 -8.1 
Business services nec  0.3 0.9 0.8 4.5 18.6 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Service s 
-0.2 0 0.6 -3.3 7.3 
Public administration, education, 
health care  
0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3 4.5 
Investments  0.3 0.5 0.3 4.1 9.8 
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Appendix 8 Table 3. Armenia - Price changes (%)
 2006 Simple FTA Simple FTA 
BIS 
Deep FTA Deep FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
0.2 0.2 0.1 2.1 1.9 
Livestock 0.2 0.2 0 2.4 2.1 
Forestry 0.2 0.3 0.2 2.3 1.7 
Fishing 0.1 0.1 0 1.6 0.3 
Coal 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining and quarrying  0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
-0.2 -0.5 -1.1 1 0.9 
Textiles and textile goods  -0.6 -4.4 -4.4 -4.4 -4.5 
Leather products  0 -6.3 -6.3 -6.2 -6.2 
Wood products  -1.2 -3.1 -3.1 -4.1 -4.4 
Paper products, publishing  0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 
Petroleum, coal products  0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
0 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.1 
Mineral products nec  -1.4 -4.7 -4.7 -6.5 -6.5 
Metals and metal products  -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Transport equipment  0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 
Manufactures nec  0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 
Electricity 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.8 
Gas manufacture, distribution  0 0.1 0 0.5 -0.4 
Water 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.3 -1.1 
Construction  0 0 -0.1 0.9 -1.2 
Trade 0.1 0 -0.1 1 -0.7 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
0.1 0.1 0 -1.5 -1.6 
Communications  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 -0.4 
Banking lending and insurance  0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 
Business services nec  0 0 0 0.4 -2.8 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services  
0 0 0 0.2 -0.1 
Public administration, 
education, health care  
0.2 0.2 0 2.1 2.4 
Investments  0 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 -1.2 
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Appendix 8 Table 4. Armenia -  Change in exports to all regions (%)
 2006 SIMPLE 
FTA 
SIMPLE 
FTA BIS 
DEEP FTA DEEP 
FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops nec  10 11 12 28 31 
Livestock 1 1 2 -1 2 
Forestry 0 -1 0 -6 0 
Fishing 40 81 136 125 153 
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining and quarrying  1 0 1 -7 1 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
5 7 10 -1 1 
Textiles and textile goods  7 78 79 259 268 
Leather products  7 31 33 47 50 
Wood products  14 20 22 55 68 
Paper products, publishing  1 2 3 11 24 
Petroleum, coal products  0 0 1 -6 5 
Chemical, rubber, p lastic products  1 1 2 -5 1 
Mineral products nec  15 20 21 71 77 
Metals and metal products  6 6 7 23 24 
Transport equipment  1 7 7 9 13 
Machinery and electronic equipment  1 3 4 6 9 
Manufactures nec  3 4 5 39 53 
Electricity -1 -2 -1 -14 -7 
Gas manufacture , distribution  -1 -2 -1 -12 12 
Water -1 -2 -1 -11 10 
Construction  0 0 1 -8 12 
Trade -1 0 1 -9 6 
Transportation and Storage Services  -1 -1 0 -10 -7 
Communications  -1 -1 -1 -12  
Banking lending and insurance  -2 -3 -1 -19 -18 
Business services nec  0 0 0 -4 34 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services  
0 0 1 -6 4 
Public administration, education, 
health care  
-2 -1 0 -18 -20 
Investments  10 11 0 28 31 
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Appendix 8 Table 5. Armenia - Change in imports from  all regions (%)
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
Deep FTA Deep FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops nec  1 2 1 18 23 
Livestock 3 5 4 30 34 
Forestry 1 1 -1 13 14 
Fishing 2 3 3 15 14 
Coal 0 0 0 5 9 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 1 1 1 4 10 
Mining and quarrying  3 3 3 11 14 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
6 12 17 24 28 
Textiles and textile goods  2 21 21 81 86 
Leather products  2 14 14 63 68 
Wood products  3 5 5 21 28 
Paper products, publishing  0 1 0 9 12 
Petroleum, coal products  0 0 0  4 
Chemical, rubber, plastic produ cts 0 1 0 6 11 
Mineral products nec  1 2 2 10 16 
Metals and metal products  2 2 2 11 15 
Transport equipment  0 0 -1 3 7 
Machinery and electronic equipment  0 0 0 3 9 
Manufactures nec  1 3 3 21 28 
Electricity 1 2 1 12 13 
Gas manufacture, distribution  1 2 1 7 9 
Water 1 2 1 13 7 
Construction  1 1 0 9 4 
Trade 1 0 0 9 6 
Transportation and Storage Services  1 2 1 18 22 
Communications  1 1 0 15 14 
Banking lending and insurance  1 2 1 39 44 
Business services nec  1 1 1 8 -2 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services 
0 0 0 3 7 
Public administration, education, 
health care  
1 1 0 14 19 
Investments  0 0 0 0 0 
